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The Doctrine of the Actual Occasion in Whitehead
Chapter I
Introduction
1, Statement of the Problem
The problem of this dissertation is twofold. Our first task is
to define and evaluate the actual occasion in the philosophy of Alfred
North mtehead. Our second task is to relate the doctrine of the actual
occasion to those concepts of other thinkers wiiich may contribute to its
clarification and to an understanding of its adequacy,
2, Statement of Methods of Procedure
Several methods of procedure will be employed in the investigation
of the problem stated for this dissertation. The historical method will
be used in the attempt to locate the system of Whitehead in the develop-
ment of philosophic thought. The method of analysis will be used in the
attempt to render a clear exposition of the doctrine of the actual occasion
in the general scope of ’Whitehead's philosophy. The synthetic and analyti-
cal methods will characterize our procedure as we shall bring into perspec-
tive similar concepts of other thinkers in the history of philosophy. In
an effort to appraise the concept of the actual occasion we shall apply
the tests of consistency and coherence.
As a means of achieving the ends set forth in the statement of the
problem the following sequence of chapters will be used after the present
chapter; general view of the philosophy of organism (Whitehead's oivn desig-
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2nation of his philosophy), the actual occasion in Whitehead’s psychology,
the actual occasion in Whitehead’s philosophy of natui*e, the actual occa-
sion in 'Whitehead’s theory of value, a critique of the doctrine of the
actual occasion, summary and conclusions. In the remainder of this chap-
ter we shall take account of the sources of data and treatments of the
actual occasion by Whitehead and his critics,
3, Sources of Data
The primary sources of data are those works of Whitehead in wliich
the concept of the actual occasion is treated. Prominent among Whitehead's
writings which contain discussions of the actioal occasion are the follow-
ing in chronological order; Science and the Modem World
. Symbolism: Its
aeaning and Effect , Process and Reality . Adventures of Ideas , and Modes of
Thought,1 The writings of Vhitehead relevant to our problem also include
several articles most of which are to be found in the Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society (incliading Supplements) from 1915 to 1923. Articles
of a later period bearing on our problem include "Physics and Metaphysics
with special reference to the problem of time"'^ and "Ob.^ects and Subjects. "3
Other articles and books referred to in our general treatment may be found
listed in the Bibliography,
Secondary sources of data include books and articles by other
writers dealing more or less explicitly with V.hitenead's theory of the
u
^ general accoimt of all sources of data see the Biblio-graphy, Writings of Whitehead will be designated by initials or abbre-
viations. All other references will include the nax.ies of the authors
and initials or abbreviations of their works,
2, Brightman (ed. ) ,P6IC, 59-64,
3, Phil, Rev . .41 (1932) ,130-146.
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3actual occasion. Among the books dealing with Whitehead's philosophy which
are helpful in the understanding and evaluation of his theory of the actual
occasion are Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism by Dorotiiy M, Emmet, The
P^osophy of Whitehead by Rasvihary Das. The Philosophy of A.N-\Yhitehftarl
by David L. miler and George V. Gentry, and The Philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehead edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp,
Those who have written articles on Whitehead having interest for
this investigation are the following: C, Lloyd Morgan, George V, Gentry,
R. F, Creegan, Evander Bradley McGilvary, Arthur E, M\irphy, Percy Hughes,
Roy Wood Sellars, William Ernest Hocking, John Dewey, Albert Balz, D. Bid-
ney, Everett Hall, A. H, Johnson, John W, Blyth, Edward J, V, K* Menge,
Victor Lowe, Merrit Haddon Moore, Daniel S. Robinson, L. Susan Stebbing,
William Marshall Urban, A. P, Ushenko,Gregory Vlastoa
,
Donald Williams,
Edmund Wilson, Charles Hartshorne, David L, railer, John Goheen
,
David
Easton, and Joseph Needham,^ Other secondary sources include works by
writers on concepts similar to Whitehead's actual occasion, Lnportant
among works by writers with similar concepts is The MonadoIogY (La Monad-
ologie) by Leibniz,
As a part of the introdiactory material we shall review briefly the
literature on the problem of the actual occasion. This review will be com-
posed of two sections; namely, Whitehead's treatments of the actual occa-
sion, and treatments of the actual occasion by other writers.
V
writers mentioned are to be foxmd under
others. The Bibliography contains full references to thearticle or articles by each of the writers enumerated.
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44, Hfhitehead • s treatments of the Actual Occasion
The doctrine of the actual occasion in Whitehead is mainly a pro-
duct of his later philosophical reflections. It is common among some stu-
dents of Whitehead *s philosophy of organism to distinguish three periods
of his productive activity,^ In the first period liWiitehead devoted him-
self primarily to mathematical and logical investigations. One philo-
sophic tendency of this period relevant to the object of this enquiry
was expressed in a paper submitted by Whitehead to the Royal Society in
1905 under the title "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World,"®
This paper dealt with the possible relations of ultimate entities to
space. On the basis of the theory of relativity Whitehead sought to unify
the concepts of space and matter into one theory of the material world.
The place of the actual occasion in Whitehead »s theory of the material
world will be the chief interest of the fourth chapter which deals with
the actual occasion in Whitehead’s philosophy of natiore.
During the second period Whitehead constructed the general out-
line of his philosophy of physical science. It was in this period that
he gave systematic expression to ideas which are closely related to the
notion of the actual occasion. In ”La Theorie Relationaliste de I’Espace"
V?hitehead clecirly arrived at a relational view of space in virtue of
which he considered space to be only the expression of certain properties
of physical things,*^ The problem of the entities of nature enters in-
creasingly into Whitehead's notion of experience, Whitehead sought to
5, Lowe, "The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy",in Schilpp
(ed,),PW,17, See also Rudolph Metz,HBP,592,
6, Phil , Trans ,Roy . Soc . . Serie s A, 205 (1906) ,465-526,
7, Rev.Met.Mor .25 (1916) ,429,430,
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weave into a pattern of thought various findings in the fields of phy-
sics, biology, neurology and psychology. The immediate result for
Whitehead of bringing his philosophy of natiore to bear upon the analy-
sis of experience was a relatively new orientation in philosophical
thought and terminology, 8 Here emerge the notions of 'events', *con-
gredience', 'extensive connection', and 'eternal objects.' Events are
considered as units of change in space and time.^ Congredience and
extensive connection are tei*ms employed to designate the characteristics
of events in their relations to other events. Eternal objects are de-
scribed as the recurring characters of events. The concepts here
referred to constitute an introduction to the third and more
speculative period of Whitehead's philosophy.
In the third period there is a tendency on the part of V/hitehead
to move away from scientific empiricism. Whitehead seeks during this
period to counteract the distrust in speculative philosophy which charac-
terized his inheritance of empiricism. Certain works of this period,
particularly SMW, SME, PR, AI, and MT, show a determined effort on the
part of Whitehead to come to grips with the persistent problems of philos-
ophy in the Ught of recent advances in science. The bare outline of the
organic philosophy of the earlier periods was filled in by the metaphysi-
cal content of these later works. This was preeminently true in Process
and_Reaiity. The frequency of references to the actual occasion in the
writings of k’.hitehead's philosophic maturity indicate its membership in
8, Early examples of this new philosophic orientation are VOiite-head's PNK, CON, and POR.
9. CON, 52,76.
10.
"Symposium; Time, Space, and Material: Are they,and if so in
what sense, the ultimate data of science?" Proc.Arist.Soc.Supp
-2 (1919), 51,
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6the structure of his thought. The core of the idea of the actual occasion
wiU be the main object of our investigation. In most criticisms of White-
head some mention' is made of his doctrine of the actual occasion. The
detailed exposition and appraisal of these criticisms will be worked in-
to the subsequent chapters of this treatment. However, in the immediate-
ly succeeding section notice will be taken of those investigators whose
writings deal rather explicitly with Whitehead »s doctrine of the actual
occasion,
5. Treatments by other Writers of Whitehead's Doctrine of the
Actual Occasion
Creegan has written an article on "The Actual Occasion and
Actual History." In this article we have a suggestion by Creegan of the
sources of the actual occasion and its significance as a unit of histori-
cal analysis.il Morgan has made a carefta examination of Whitehead's pro-
test against the bifurcation of nature in his review of The Concent of
In the chapter on Whitehead's philosophy of nature we shall deal
explicitly witri the bearing of Whitehead's protest against bifurcation
upon his notion of the actual occasion. Menge and Balz have also made
studies of Whitehead's attempt to avoid bifurcation of nature. In their
articles Menge and Balz, like ilorgan, have done much to give clarity to
the problem.lS
11. Jour.Phil.. 59 (1942) ,268-273.
12, Morgan, "Kie Bifurcation of Nature," Monist.4Q (1930) ,161-181
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In McGilvary’s writing on Whitehead we have an analysis of cer-
tain aspects of the latter's concept of nature not dealt with by Morgan,
Menge and Balz. Under the title of "Space-Time, Simple Location, and
Prehension" McGilvary has given us a substantial and critical account
which shows the relations of these notions to the actual occasion which
is the cliief object of the present investigation.^^ Writing on a more
restricted subject, "The Problem of Substance in Spinoza and Whitehead",
Sidney has pointed out a possible similarity between the two thinkers
(whitehead and Spinoza) which has the value of encouraging further in—
vestigation.l^ In the field of VThitehead's psychology, as well as his
theory of nature. Gentry and Ushanko have offered valuable criticisms of
Whitehead's doctrine of prehension. In two articles, "Prehension as Ex-
planatory Principle",16 and "The Subject in Whitehead's Philosophy, "17
one may find comments by Gentry that serve as a critical introduction to
the understanding of actual occasions. Ushenxo's article, "Negative Pre-
hension" is important in caLling attention to a possible complication, if
not an actual weakness, in the metaphysics of Whitehead. 18
The investigation of what ^^tehead means by an event will consti-
tute one phase of our analysis of actual occasions. In that part of our
investigation dealing with the event and the actual occasion we have the
advantage of researches by Murphy and Robinson on the subject. 1^ Sellars
14. Schilpp (ed.),PW,2ir-239.
15. Phil.Rev .. 45 (1936) ,674-592.
16. Jour.Phil .. 55 (1938) ,517-522.
17. HuJ..Sc ..ll (1944),'222-226.
18. Jour. Phil .. 34 (1937) ,263-267.
19. Murphy, "What is an Event?" Phil.Rev .37
"Dr.Whitehead's Theory of Events."Pyd,^v.,30 (1921) ,41-56.
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8has written a helpfxil comparison of Whitehead and the philosophy of
physical realism. It is entitled "Philosophy of Organism and Physi-
cal Realism. "20 xhe actual occasion is included in the scope of the
analysis by Sellars, A question unavoidable in the study ’of the ac-
tual occasion has been raised by Hall in his article, "Of what use are
Whitehead’s Eternal Objects? "21 According to Eall there is confvision
by Whitehead on the relation between actual occasions and eternal ob-
jects, Hall’s criticism is based mainly on Process and Reality
.
Dewey has dealt with the psychological and the physical aspects
of Whitehead’s philosophy, particularly voider the notion of experience.
The force of Dewey’s discussion is to add plausibility to Whitehead’s
rather inclusive use of the term experience to describe ail actual
things. On the psychological side of Whitehead’s thought Lowe’s com-
parison of William James and Whitehead contains points which help one to
understand both men, especially on the problem of experience amd duration,2b
Hocking has given a critical review of Whitehead’s system. 24 in addition
to a direct criticism of- the actual occasion Hocxing’s treatment provides
the reader with important material on the assumptions of the organic
philosophy.
As commentators on 7/hitehead’s value theory, John Goheen and
Bertram Morris have written respectively on "'^tehead’s Theory of Value"
20. Schil|5f,(©ci,)pff^407^453,
21. Jour.Phil .. 27 (1930) ,29-44.
22. Dewey, "Whitehead’s Philosophy," Phil.Rev .. 46 (1937) ,178-186.
23. Lowe , "William James and Whitehead’s Doctrine of Prehension "
Jour,Phil .. 58 (1941) ,113-126. *
24. Schilpp (ed.),PW, 383-404.
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and "The Art-Process '^d the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead’s Philosophy,
These treatises bring before the reader the problem of the relation of
valiie to the actiaal occasion. In chapter five we shall discuss the pro-
blem of the actual occasion and Whitehead’s theory of value. It is at
that point we shall taice account of the details of criticisms by Goheen
and Morris,
The investigations of Whitehead’s philosophy appecir in book form
as well as in articles. Notable among the books dealing with Vdiitehead
which were mentioned earlier is ??hitehead's Philosophy of Organism by
Dorothy M, Emmet, In Emmet ’s book there are several very rewarding chap-
ters for study of the actual occasion. The headings of such chapters are
as follows: "Some primary notions of the Philosophy of Organism," "Are
the Eternal Objects Platonic Ideas?" "The Organization of Feelings" and
"Creativity and Order," Althoiigh Einmet writes in sympathy with V.Tiitehead’
philosophy, her work has the value of indicating how Vdiitehead might purge
himself of some of his obscurities. Das has written a sympathetic, yet a
substantially critical volume on Whitehead’s system of thought under the
title. The Philosophy of Whitehead
. The chapter on actual entities is well
written. The treatment of difficulties in Whitehead’s philosophy is pre-
cise and on the whole penetrating. Some of the difficulties found by Das
will be examined in the course of oiir discussion. Another book on White-
head has been written by David L, Miller and George V. Gentry. It is,
"Hie Philosophy of A» N, Whitehead
. This volume is especially good in the
exposition of parts of Whitehead’s Philosophy of Nature, and in the show-
ing of conflicts in Whitehead’s thought, A classic study of VThitehead’s
25, Schilpp (ed.) ,PW, 437-459 and 465-486.
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philosophy is to be foimd in the volme. The Philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehend
,
edited by pan! Arthur Schilpp, It is singularly valuable as a
co^ipreheiisive and criticul treatment of the basic ideas in Vaiitehead • s
piiiloGophy , T/hitehead’s doctrine of the actual occasion is ponsidered by
most writers in tnis volume, Swiie of the sciiolars v/ho have v/ritten in
tiiis study of vinitehead nave been mentioned already. Others ViTiting v/itiiiii
and outside of this work will be mentioned in the course of the analysis
and the critiqxae.
The results of txxis survey of 3j.terature may oe summed in the
comments that folio*/, Tne fact tnat une actuaa. occasioii is generally' in-
cluded in discussions oi kilhitehead ' s philosopny by iiis commentators v/arraiits
tile judgment txiat thxs doctrine is counted an integral part of his system.
At least one ol ills critics (Creegan) tninKs that tne whole philosopn^'' of
organism as expounded by V/hitehead is grounded upon the concept of the ac-
tual occasion, Hocxiiig is hardly less empixatic in the sxjggestion tiiat tlie
notion of the actual occasion is an hyi^thesxs. Actual occasions there must
be, ix tue world oe a woraa of quoxitatave ciian^e. Li sympatny with tuo
critics mentioned I shall argue ir: succeedii'ig iorts of tnis dissertation
that any consideration of the actual occasion leads one into the heai’t of
tne organic philoso^Kiy of hhitehead, and that any defects appertaining
tnereto count against the adequacy and
-wholeness of the organic metapiiysics.
Anotner resid.t oi tne survey of literature is the suggestion tiiat
tile actual occasion with its poles is tne concept by which
.^iitehead seeks
to estaeiisn meuapnysical unity in the place of bifurcation or dualism,
whether or not polarity is a solution or the restatement of a metaphysical
problem is tiie source of divided opinion among tiiose who have commented on
tne organic philosopny. Critics liae Morgan are not satisfied with une
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interactioix theory v;hich Vihitehead proposes. Gentry does not think tiiat
the integrating function assigned to the actual occcision in the notion of
prehension is satisfactory as a principle of explanation, '
A further result of the consideration of the literature of critics
is that there is not a thoroughgoing satisfaction with hliitehead's atte%>t
to reconcile such notions as change and percianence, togetnerness and
separateness in his doctrine of the actual occasion, Sellars thinks, e,g,,
that YiThitehead ' s doctrine of tne actual occasion over- accentuates atomism.
There is still another result of the revie’iv of critical opinion, naiaely, the
iuea tnat itiiu.Wneaa uo±us w an oaoentiaxj^ dyntuiiic theoi'y of actuality.
Being is becoming,. Nowhere does Vihitehead argiae more deliberately iii de~
fense of a dynaxidc theory of actuality than in doctriiie of the actual
occasion, Notv/itiistanding Bidney's charge that there is a residual of sub-
stance in hhitehead's philosopiiy, I shall attempt in subsequent portioixs of
this treatment to sliow that hhitehead's metaphysics as expressed in iiis doc-
trine of tne actual occasion marics an advance over substance piiilosophies
,
In view of the diversity of opinion considered in tixis section, and also in
view of the general e.greement among the critics that the doctrine of tne
actual occasion is an integral part of Vvhitehead’s philosophy, there is
placed upon the writer the necessity of offering forthwith some initial
clarification of tixe concept in question, Tnis wiT i. be the problem of
chapter two.
As a preview to the next cliapter we shall mention the order of
materid-i. w oe uiscussea, Tntj sco^>e of the i*itt.tferi«_». 'will be wide enougn to
embrace a general vie;v of the pliilosophy of oi’ganism. It is only upon such
a general background that we may hope to give an adequate appraisal of the
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actual occasion. We siiall begin the study of cha'jter two with a discvission
of the historical positioii of Whitehead’s pixilosopiiy, Ti-is is selected as
a starting point because it is on].y through such an approach that ;ie can
kno.v how and why Whitehead’s system is what it is, Follovong’ the historical
analysis and expanding i^on it we shall deal witn the presi^rpoeitions of
Thiteliead and the v/ay he elects to solve certain persistent problems oi'
philosophy. Once these presuK^ositions and elections are understood, we
shall be prepared to enlarge the analysis by going into the clfiief notioins
wiiich Whitehead professes a determination to refute. It is by means of
seeing clearly what Whitehead fights against txiat v^e snail oe able to see
clearly what he fights for in his philosophizing. Among tnose concepts for
which Whitehead fights there is none more fundamental to the structure and
validity of his metaphysics than the doctrine of the actual occasion. As
a means of grasping iii a preliminary way the meaning of the actual occasion
we siiall bring together in compact form most of vrnitehead ’ s explicit state-
ments of what he means by the actual occasion. These definitions will
serve as a table of reference at different points in the development of the
discussion, Tiiey will be s\;5iplemented by the liter’s ovtii wording defini-
tion of the actual occasion, Tliis wording definition of tiie actual occasion
will mark the extent to which we shall go in the analysis of our problem
in cxiapter two.
gaKmjp^ ofcjur»^ B iaiw ow^r JLU.j» .iWiCAuoo
w.. ‘;^' IP ’’;
r^i*'
^
'y;’ '
'V-^is
. ^
«' v, , "'jfl, •''' ^ ^ .1- *’TB
!frv> ^
-''
' jj * pj>, 'T* -w-
cti-<4 p%' 4s^« ^«2o ai nM'
•
safxoad^ '^^oWTca^a a
^
^ > r, a-JiSr ^
'XdOi'XGJai;^! 9dt:;;>tiiri(Mio'I '^Aiillt< pti «i04^bx^ s 'ij^iaeJijUiirt 'za» ..^tu£ i.ai po/u£«
^
'
w^. .. .!* f .mi. .1. 'K
.->«
^~''l!<u ^^ i^b JL^a wi; j^ogu .&4K lUtfctcai.
.
7’
.->ip
Efi
;‘4^ ’„.i ' js 'xoiC'amitto^ O^ayulsri;^ ovlo*; 4||9;^^« «Bci wJioWxQl ^' -O
e»w ,,>ooia'i£xyaj o'i« J-u^xjraoXa batk 4Ooi^Ji»i^z&-iq^tai0iiiJ eaiiO ^
y
•
^ 1 Idi^idv edf oyifiltm o<t baxicd'^^ 49 Iiad«
..rfl.'i' . *», • K . i 1_B
j •Jij
Til' ST' L jo «)* ««a'iit!<ilo*S5 b.i.&si»^MSi d&Jiim"'
aa aw.^jJKT ia.1nr ^*uj«gU ;^ai»<« ^ <
m^' V 'v ^ .-V.,
•
'
'
,.^
’t
•
’+S *(
-, .
Mo'x^4t^eo(io3 9i3oa^ ^ooia^ aia ai lo'Jt aa .:.Uj»a£a v^ ' :•
^
^ »
.j
'
"
'
'ira
J-- ' Tf *0 'i JT^-' —
'
eu.;^ ^UJmanaJuau^ uinu aoou ax t^-utaS aiji^^AUj»at;oJ'^'iV ^»JUiv /,<
.
V. ^ 5
;^
-
a/^ .aoicjinoo Xiii;^4?5 <0.^ Ic oai'rJdofe e^U- :i3fl^i'«tpli^LiJi^m Qhi lo
i- ,
"''
.
' j,
£2ol;;,xoo cojJ 'io ^ala^oa oiii^ \^n 'c^imLa^’tft 'ia ij>ito<ai a
Ti " s >’"' ? ^
l^:JLlcx4ja[bv>t»a»dJtufj^ lo itucm ffKol ^oaqisiaa Iltuia aw V'«--
I.
^i»iliijA09Q lasjtOix tniy x^ moAmt^ tsd JiiWf lo sd.iea
'T
.1 i’l.^
^*
,
^ > ' 5 ' ^-j^'
ouli ^10 du4rauaI«(V&L aod ax'^ajaix^ iUM'm'iMit' «i:^:;::cK>a«a«l<n^ s.a ;
.
-
iwo mit \f5 Wok -'^M •aoia«a;oalb
•' ^ ^
-,:'^V "
.'t
'
•'
-i,."''
*»- E ^.
,
.'Ifl
.7r “
,.
^'‘'
nok^ooo xj^jXo^i0iiJ ^ i/MUMilubib jibUlovi! d4t ^.^ioiiiUooo JLaadoa o£li 16 0011^1
«p ' - «'
'
'
'
.i-i
*
- —'
‘.K- *5'
.-'UC
i
& aiaiaoTSL owo lo isl^^JLs^ iliiiift air «« d‘a6d:c0 wii ii'iJcsK Xliwit^S
'w>3
!v.
Chapter II
General View of the Philosophy of Organism
1. Historical Position of ^liitehead ’s Philosophy
vVhitehead ’s reference to his system of thot^ght as ’the philosophy
of organism’ are especially frequent in his Process and Heality . He also
refers to his system as ’provisional realism’ and as ’organic realism.’^
It is primarily upon the basis of these self-imposed descriptions that we
shall attempt to locate historically the philosophy of Vhitehead. The se-
quence of material in this section will be according to order in which the
descriptive terms were mentioned.
The philosophy of organism has its roots in the modern developments
of biology, physics, neurology, psychology, and mathematics. The special
scholarly interest of ^i tehead before his years of philosophic ma-
turity were in physios and mathematics, Whitehead’s writings on quan-
tum physios and the theory of relativity indicate the concern of a
competent investigator. Developments in biology, particularly the concepts
of emergent evolution and organism, stimulated -Vhitehead to correlate
biology with advances in physics. The search for analogues in neurology
and quantum physics resluted in a distinctly organic approach to reality
by Whitehead, According to ^itehead "modem physicists see energy trans-
ferred in definite quanta. This quantum theory has analogues in recent
neurology. "2 genuineness of .'/hi tehead ’s claim of analogues is a mat-
ter of controversy vftiich must await farther investigations. The applioa-
1. SM, 101. (provisional realism); PR, 471 (organic Realism)
2, PR, S65.
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tion of psychological concepts ( e,g., fatigue and memory) far beyond the
fields of physics and neurology by Wnitehead is done in an effort to avoid
a dualistic account of nature, tThitehead has been very active in iiis pro-
test against metaphysical dualism, that is, the bifurcation X)f nat^ure,
T/hitehead*s philosophy belongs historically to modern philosophies of
science in wnicn tnere is an effort to reach a nev> syixthesis ii; the con-
cept of nature,
Vthitehead’s outlook in his organic philosophy is more compa’ehei*-
sive than that of lians Driesch who ivrote The Science and Philosopijiy of
the Organism , Txie concern of Driesch is partly tne giving of scientific
exactness to the notion of or^^anism, and partly the construction of a
philosophical system upon this concept, Driesch gives more space in Iiis
analysis to experiments in biology tiian may be found in references In the
vn:itings of Whitehead, Driesch cUid Vdiitehead are in agreement on tiie
notion of wholeness as basic in the concept of organism, Howevei',
Driesch differs from Whitehead in the denial of a ceil tneory of actuality.
According to YiMtehead, "The philosopliy of organism is a cell-theory of
actuality,"^ On the contrary Driesch in a descriptive note on the organism
says; "It [ the organism J is the whole that uses the cells,,,,, or tiiat
may not rise tnem; tuus tiiere is nothin^, like a 'cell theory', even in a
deeper meaning of the word,"^ Another poiiit of difference between tne two
tninkers is revealed in the general tendency of Driesch to discredit the
claim of analogues wiiich we noticed in Vihitehead, Driesch says; "iiachanistic
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autiiors occeisioiiaHy have brought rorvvard some inorganic ’analogies ’ to
’experience’ or to ’iceiuoiy’ as the potential ground of experience.'’^> iSx-
pressing his opinion of tiiis seai*ch for analogies Driesch coinraents as fol—
loi7s: "in facty wnat oney nave brought forward^ it seocts to loe^ does not
even deserve to be called ’analogy’, much less ’explanation’ of the his-
torical basis of reacting as it really is,”^ irniteheaa’s defense of ana-
logies is based pertly i^on developments in the physical sciences, especial-
ly physics, since the publication of Driesch ’s worx on organism. The iiis-
torical changes in science betvfeen The Science and Philosophy of the Organism
(1908) and tTpcesa and Reali^ (19i9) require a v;iiiingness to reexamine the
evidence for analogy. This reexamination will characterise oui- trei^tment of
tne central problem of tnis dissertation at various subsequent points. The
final point to be mentioned in tiiis comparison of Driesch and iThiteiiOcd has
to do with mechanism and teleology. Vihitehead tries to reconcile meciianism
and teleology.7 Driesch, however, is ardent in his defense of teleology as
an alternative to mechanism. The big result of the investigations and re-
flections of Driesch is vitalism.
.Vhitehead’s philosophy of organism fcOls
within that intellectual tradition in which there is a recognition of the
need of reconciling the concepts of mechanism and teleology wiiich are held
in opposition by Driesch,
trnitehead's historical position is further indicated by a reaari in-
troducing his process and Reality. "These lectures are based upon a recurrence
5. Driesch, ^P0,v.2, 77.
6. Ibid, 78.
7. See pp. 100-105;166-169.
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to that phase of philosophic thought which began '.vith Descartes and enaed
with Kume,”® The outstanding philosophic thinkers of tl'iis period are
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Kume, The period begins
with the rationalism of Descartes and ends with the skepticism of Hume,
Whitehead claims an affinity between his doctrine of prehension
(feeling) and Descartes' doctrine of mental cogitations. The term cogita-
tion as used by Descartes means experience, that is, the enjoyment of
sensitivity. The notion that every actual thing is sensitive, that is, en-
joys a world, is at the root of Vifhitehead ' s doctrine of prehension, Tne
significance of tnis concept for «Wiitenead is expressed when he says that
"The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a 'critique of pure feel-
ing# Whitehead dii'fers from Descai-tes in that liis doctrine of feeling
given a v/ider extension, Descartes' mental cogitations are si^jplfiinented
by physical cogitations in the organic philosophy. According to V/hiteiiOad
the notion of prehending is "applicable to every grade of individual actvial-
ity,"^ Whitehead puts himself withii^ the Cartesian tradition at another
point lifhen he declares tiiat,"For Descartes the word 'substance' is tiie
equivalent to vay phrase actual occasion, Descartes' notion of substance
is tliat of an existent which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.
Because of some significations that have oecome associated with the term
substance, Whitehead seldom uses it in his discussions of ontology, 'However,
the previous reference is a confession that the signification given the term
substance by Descartes is not objectionable to
-Vhitehead, On the basis of
the Cartesian doctrine we maj^ conclude that for ^Thitehead actual occasioiis
require notiiing but themselves to exist. They are metaphysical entities.
8, PR,V,
9, FR,172,17b,
10, PR,29,
11, PR,116,
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•Actual entities - also teriaed ^actual occasions' - are the final real
things,,,"^ The final real things of the iiThiteheadian philosophy ans^ver
to the substances of the Cartesian philosophy.
Although Tihitehead offers the suggestion that "SpinozA is practically
a systematization of Descartes,"^ he nevertheless rejects the substance
-
quality concept of Spinoza, The morphology of substance characterizing
Spinoza's analysis is replaced by a description of dynamic process in the
organic philosophy. This distinction notwitnstanuing, ViiMtehead calls atten-
tion to a recurrence of his philosophy to that of Spinoza, On the basis of
dynamic process "Spinoza's 'modes' no;? become the sheer actualities,"^ This
reinterpretation of Spinozistic modes lifts them from a secondary to a pri-
mary status of being, hhitehead's system of thought bears a close similai'ity
to that of Spinoza in that each contains an attea^t to avoid the CJartesian
dualism, Spinoza seeks a solution in a monism of substance with a plut'ality
of attributes, two of which - thoiight and extension - we know, Whitehead
seeks a solution in an ultimate creativity (process) which expresses itself
i^ ^ plurality of actual entities (actual occasions ) each having a mental
and a physical pole or aspect
A
qualitative monism is the cosmological
ideal of each thinker, Tirhitehead's movement toward a quantitative pluralism
shows his departiire at one point from the absolutism of the Sx^inozistic sys-
tem, At this point the organic philosophy of '»Vhitehead is the historical
succession of tne monaaolog^' of Leibniz,
12 , PR,27,
13, PR,114,
14, PR,10,
PR,64, Lee pp, 46^143- for a treatment of Whitehead'
of tlie dipolarity of actual occasions.
s notion
.L;ui xjuiil wiB - ’tiiaBlajoooo olIb - Iju^oA^
u.slL^^:Mio;tjLii^ mjJ lo x^^*X
.v>..,oaoujuiq 0iut lo ^MoOf^cdtre Mil oj
f*^ ljui CQxJmc a.ist dsyoiirf^lA
-Ov.ii-JccJ/s s:iw £^na(,e^ audJLa.'J^'i^von ad *^^i;adir;,».oC lo r*olwaciiirreJ a(8 a
• <
.}iti8i'i&iOi.'Uj:io BooB^Huus Zo y^joSotUirom •«! <2 'lo ^^onoo '^LL^tp
&,ij i.l ijiiuou'^ lo i^li^il*zon.6b ^ yd ijs:>flJ,&i cl clar^L^cu. s'^ooiqS
:^ix./iiXb 4du«l'‘ ,^^oaojLLiq oiru jjO
4
lo .D lo ol ^ ’roon *- oj. uoll
T I
laadc Mil aaoo^u .oa •eojt'oos* t’ssoclqg^ fecooOTq alcijaxfc
-I'i^ , <>v xxt Ujoaea £ outl cl'iii aeloc, *^*i»iic:ociuC lo ^*olliil#‘a<;*i»lnla'x
owOla a axsoo ld;,yuul lo tuai :‘;ii xo
iivJci*;C'ij>.. xovj ol : ^i.ull3 zx. ^liJaoo doaa ladl ol aiOiitqL lo l^^'l ol
.li^a'SjJj^ £ rill'.. aoui^^loOLTO *lo i£a.t^»ia a cl ixli>Jlti& a •calXjuo
htjotipil.'!
.
*oxi:» «»- - ao^..:«©vXo uoa l..^>oxil - ..iiiin lo ovl ^ooludlilla lo
»io'*,w*ii^-.^ .'xoldtt \,iiiLOZfQ i ') iiB ui aoljuloe a aito^a
! rii^A.f Mii i., uOiiid ^ a«.»ooo r uoUxliikC ^isL'lDa lo £ rtl
.ijjox^jojjuiufcoa Mil wi ccliiut. ovll illXaui/
.i.
‘^.voo.^a-i 'io oioq i iola^ds^ .. bas
ocJLt«xir.l fvlljilllrTaop .. Lrii^oi lxx>ffle7oc a’bddi'jliif; .^yjlaldo lioio lo Xcebi
\
-«v“u jx; v-ir.otil.iM odl lo r-:axdiiIo»da d.id ijoal wala^ ooo oiWwaa^&b ala awwia
l^ox'ffouiiri 3aJ cl iwoiiadid*' lo *4d-;csoXiO(i olxi' .'lO auJ uiloq axdl 1/. .aoi
'^••XCCXduL aO y^ojLO I < I II lAiim lo ilOa^ttCySSO
S
•
• ',<>. r:
'•!
, .i^X
uOkc^ou c’ ^ac&^X-a; xo ^ stol < ».*•«•_.»» «
x-x/Xoc lo Xo^lJb t'iJ’ lo
18
The notion of physical feelings applicable to the lowest ranges of
aotoalities in the organic jdiilosophy is equivalent to the notion of con-
fused perceptions in the Leihnizian monadology. Thus the extension of the
notion of feeling or perception to all actualities is a concept which is
coninon to Whitehead and Leibniz. Whitehead inherits from Leibniz a dynamic
concept of actuality in which each real thing is a loous of process. In
each system there is also the notion of grades of experience of actual
things. The graded experiences of monads is paralled by the graded feelings
of actual entities the acme of which is consciousness. In The Konadologv
Leibniz makes the following remark on the experiences of manads:
But as feeling (le sentiment) is something more than simple per-
ception. I am willing that the general name of Monads or entele-
chles shall suffice for those simple substances which have per-
ception only, and that the terra souls shall be confined to those
in ihlch perceptions are more distinct, and accompanied by memory.
Whitehead in speaking of levels of experience gives a dominant position
to consciousness which he calls '’the supreme vividness of experience.
On the basis of these references it appears that 7diitehead is like Leibniz
in holding to levels of experience in all actual things. In the lower
ranges of existence there is a relative confusion and dimness. In the more
developed forms of existence there is a greater vividness of feelings or
perceptions. The increase in vividness marks the development of individual-
ity. Whitehead is faithful to the Lelbnlzian monadology in the basic re-
quirement of the individuality of existents. The concept of individuality or
atomism is a part of the philosophy of organism. The atomism and the disjunc-
tion of the organic philosophy are however, counterbalanced by conjunction
*
and continuity. Creativity is that principle by which the luiiverse as a
16. Rand (ed.),M0p, 202.
17. m, 170.
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plurality of po8sil>le things hscomes something organic and concrete* This
is irtiat Whitehead means iRfeen he speaks of creativity as '’the ultimate princi-
ple hy which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one ac-
tual occasion, ^Ich is the universe conjunctively,"^® It is in this passage
that we see Whitehead’s tendency to leave the monadology of Leibniz for a
wider construction irtiioh includes disjunction and conjunction. Although ad-
mitting his system to be "a theory of monads,"^® 'Vhitehead nevertheless states
that he owes most to Locke in the construction of his system of thought, "Ihe
writer who most fully anticipated the main pt»ltlons of the philosophy of or-
ganism is John Locke in his Essay , , , We shall now consider I'Vhi tehead 's re-
lation to Locke in order to ascertain more clearly the historical position of
the organic philosophy of .Vhitehead.
•Vhi tehead ’ s basic notion of feeling he holds to be the e(],uivalent of
Locke’s notion in the use of the term 'idea*, including the ’ideas of particu-
lar things.' In a note on the comparison of his concept of feeling with
Locke’s ’idea’ '.Vhitehead makes the claim that "a new analogy is Locke’s use
of the te imi Idea.,."^^ Locke’s terminology - "ideas of particular things,"
and Ideas as "found in exterior thirgs" - is interpreted by .’diltehead as
being suggestive of his own theory of feeling in particular things. It is
to bo noted however that Locke uses "ideas" as the qualities of things inside
the mind. '’’Whatsoever the mind perceives in Itself, or Is the immediate
object of perception, thought or understanding, that I call idea.."^^ In
the same section Locke qualifies his use of ’ideas’, by saying "which ideas,
if I speak of sometimes as in things themselves, I would be understood to
mean those qualities in the objects which produce them In us,.."^^
18. PH, 21.
19. PR, 124.
20. PH, V, The reference is to An Es saj/ concemiiX:^, Human Understanding*
21. PH, 65.
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The general \ise of the term in Locke's Essay does not siQDport Whitehead's
claim of an anticipation of his organic philosophy, Easton refers to
Locke's infrequent use of 'ideas' as found in exterior things as an ex-
ample of "a literary laxity, In defense of Locke Easton says that
"He admits of such easygoing phraseology which slips in because of con-
venience, On the strength of these observations it seems that White-
head's notion of feeling will have to stand on its own without benefit
of any clear antecedent in Locke, Whitehead inherits from Locke and
other empiricists a belief in actual things. Yet ’»?hitehead seeks to
purge Locke of the distinction made between the primary and secondary
qualities of things by the notion that all qualities are in the same
status, "All we know of nature ^primary and secondary qualitiesj is in
the same boat, to sink or swim together,"^ Whitehead finds in Locke an
anticipation of his ontological principle. By the ontological principle
Whitehead means "the principle that the reasons for the things are always
to be found in the composite nature of actual entities, It is in the
real internal constitution of an actual entity that Locke and \7hitehead
fmd why it affects other actual entities, Locke's notion of power as
an inherent quality in substances has a parallel in Whitehead's notion
of the ontological principle by wiiich each actual thing is a causa sui >^
The anticipations of his philosophy in Locke are sometimes in need of
correction. However, it is instructive for historical analysis that White-
head believes there are many connections and similarities between his sys-
'^4. Phil,Forum,! (1943), 12.
<£. Ibid.
2 6. CON, 148.
2 7. PR, 28.
2 8, Essj^, II, xiii., 7.
2 9. PR, 339.
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tem of thotight and that of Locke,
Whitehead is less pronounced in stating any connections between his
Ihilosophy and the philosophies of Berkeley and Htune. Nevertheless the notion
of the 'private psychological field' is according to Whitehead anticipated in
Berkeley and Htune.^ The claim of this notion as an intellectual heritage
from these philosophers shows that Whitehead's docthine of privacy has roots
in two philosc^hies that brought to an Impasse the empiricism of Locke.
his treatments of Locke, Berkeley, and particularly Hume, ’Whitehead comes to
that philosophical position which he calls provisional realism. It is this po-
sition "urtiich helps to make definite the historical connections of Whitehead’s
philosophy.
•Vhitehead's enlarged concept of nature differentiates him from those
who wrote the realistic platform; namely, 3dwin B. Holt, Walter P. Ifervin,
W. P. Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding.
According to Whitehead, "There are more entities involved in nature than the
mere sense objects."^^ Following the mention of his more inclusive view of
nature '.Vhitehead suggests his contentment with a " a provisional realism in
which nature is conceived as a complex of prehensive unifications."^ These
prehensive unifications are sentient entities in process. Each actual occasion
is a prehensive unification. ’•'hitehead 's view here suggests epistemological
realism. Another aspect of ’Whitehead's realistic position is indicated by his
substitution of fluent energy for static stuff. The flow of energy obeys
quantum conditions. The actual occasion is a quantum of fluent energy, 'i^'hite-
head calls this position organic realism. It suggests metaphysical realism.
30. PR, 497. For a discussion of the actual occasion and the private
psychological field see pp. 53 ff-Thls concept is the basis of Ahi tehead »
s
empirical method,
31, 3MW, 101, Other entities include eternal objects. See pp, 76 ff, f or
a discussion of eternal objects,
32, SM7, 101.
33. PR, 471.
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and generally is evident in Vi/hi te headj;.8 discussions of the actual occasion.
A larger understanding of the entities of nature, and especially actual occa-
sions, will require more than an effort to give an historical position to
Whitehead's philosophy. Among other things -m shall have to take account
of the presuppositions of Whitehea4's philosophy. In the next section we
shall seek to answer the question, 'what are the presuppositions of Whitehead's
philosophy?' The attempt to answer this question will result, it is hoped,
in a clearer Introduction to the organic philosophy.
2. The presiqppositions of Whitehead's philosophy
i. The presi;ppo8ltion of creativity
The notion of creativity is basic in the philosophy of organism as
presented by Whitehead. Creativity may be called the prerequisite concept
without Trtiich any statement about reality is iracomplete. Creativity must be
assumed as the basis of any disclosure about the metaphysical character of
things. In the introduction to: thEl« category Whitehead labels creativity the
ultimate category. It is "th# universal of universals characterizing ultimate
matter of fact."®^ There is no matter of fact or actual thing which is not
a disclosure of the ultimate creativity. Creativity is contained in every
creature according to Whitehead who says: "The creativity for the creature
has become the creativity with the creature..."®^ The universal creativity
is inseparable from particular fact of concrete existence.
Creativity is the first principle of all being, becoming, and perishing
of things actual. It is eternal potentiality realizing itself in fact. It
is the ground of emergence of all particulars. Creativity is to be assumed
if any intelligible account is to be given to the advance into novelty. If
34. PR, SI.
35. Brightman (ed.), P6IC, 61
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creativity is not assumed we are left with a static world having no basis of
interaction and advance. If creativity is not assumed, we fail to find in the
organic philosophy a metaphysics of disjunction and conjunction. Of creativity
’Shitehead says: ’’It is the ultimate principle by vfcich the many
,
which are
the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the uni-
26
verse conjunctively,” Thus observe that for Whitehead creativity is the
principle of connection in virtue of which many possible entitles become one
actual entity. It is also in virtue of creativity that one actual entity
may become an element in many other actual entities. Upon perishii^ an actual
entity in virtue of creativity becomes a potential in the process from which
many actualities emerge. The decision of \Vhitehead to assume creativity means
that activity is permanent In the character of things. Emergence is on this
basis a process of the becoming of actual entities from an original potential-
ity, Given oreativit;/, Whitehead does not face the problem of the nature
of activity. Activity is fundamental to creativity* It belongs to creativity
to actualize itself; and this means in the philosophy of orgahlsm the following
of ordered paths of activity.
In the development of '»Vhltehoad * s notion of actuality wo shall bo con-
cerned with another prestqpposition of his system; namely, q\ialitative monism.
The quality of being which underlies all particulars is a matter of signifi-
cance for the total range of the philosophy of organism,
11, The presupposition of qualitative monism.
The presupposition of qualitative monism is made by Whitehead who
holds that it is ’an ideal of cosmological theory,*®"^ There is on the basis
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of this prssijpposi tion only one genus of actual entities constituting the uni-
verse. /Whitehead’s desire to hold to the presupposition of <iualitative moniam
of actual things is evidenced by his protest against bifurcation and by his
tendency to hyphenate terms that represent various aspects of nature. All
aspects belong to a total metaphysical situation. For example, reality is
considered by Whitehead both physical and mental.^® Thers is a pluralism
of aspects, but a monism of quality at the source of things. Aliitehead ac-
knowledges a quantitative pluralism of things in his doctrine of atomism.
Nevertheless, all atomic structures of reality are of one genus in the ulti-
mate nature of their being. The problem of the nature of this ultimate genus
of things is the problem of creativity and the connections of its diversified
aspects. Positing the cosmological ideal of oneness of kind in reality,
Aliltehead seeks to work out his system accordirgly. The actual occasion with
its poles of experience is one of the theories developed by Whitehead in at-
tempting to have his systdm conform to his ideal of cosmological simplicity.^®
The cosmology of /Whitehead includes the presupposition of several scientific
theories, particularly evolution and the assimilation of space and time.
ill. The presupposition of evolution and the assimilation of space
and time
There is the notion of creative advance in the organic philosophy of
Whitehead. Not only is sonething going on everywhere and all of the time,
but there are lines of advance and the emergence of novel entities. There is
an increase in the vividness of experience vdiich finds its highest egression
at present in consciousness. The possibility of novelty is accentuated on
38. AI, 245.
39, See pp,46,145for a treatment of the poles of actual occasions.
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the level of conscious experience. ?’^odification of action is a possibility as-
sumed in Whitehead's theory of organic structTires. Whitehead posits evolution in
the cosmic process. Nothing that is actual is outside of evolutionary advaice
of things. The creative advance includes God and the world.
^
"Neither God,
nor the world, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate
metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty."^ ’Creative advance
into novelty’ is the basic meaning of evolution in the organic philosophy of
Whitehead. Something is always becoming. In his categorical system Whitehead
equates being and becoming. When speaking of an actual entity Whitehead ss^ys:
"Its ’being’ is constituted by its ’becoming, ”41 The evolutionism of .'i/hite-
head interpreted as a theory of becoming forms a primary presupposition of
the organic philosophy. Apart from the presupposition of evolution in the
process of entities there is no solid basis for actuality as conceived by
Whitehead.
Whitehead’s theory of actuality also involves the prestqjposition that
space and time belong to one manifold. The assimilation of space and time is
accepted by .Vhitehead ^o describes his own belief as "the relational theory
of both space and time.”^ The nature of space and time and their relation
to actual occasions will be dealt with in the discussion of 'Whitehead’s
A *2.
philosophy of nature. Whitehead’s orientation from the relativity theory
44
has led to his system being described as objective relativism." The
philosophy of nature vhich Whitehead constructs is a working together of
various doctrines of science ^ich he accepts. The philosophy of organism
40. PR, 529.
41. PR. 34, 35.
42. CON, 24.
43. See chapter Iv.pp.
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Is charactaristic8.11y a speculatlre system in which many scientific doctrines
are assumed with the qualifications of the specialized knowledge possessed hy
'%itehead.
The notions to ^ich attention has heen called in this unit of our
study are considered the chief presuppositions of the philosophy of organism.
There are other presuppositions ^*ich will he brought out in the process of in-
vestigation. The presuppositions here treated suggest the general nature of
the philosophy of organism. The general nature of Whitehead's philosophy may
also he suggested hy a few of the notions lAiich he thinks it necessary to re-
pudiate.
3. The chief repudiations of '^Vhitehead
1. The repudiation of the distrust in speculative philosophy
The spirit of Whitehead's jiillosophy, especially in his later works, is
expressed in his devotion to speculative philosophy. Vhitehead stands against
schools of philosophic thought which renounce metaphysics. It is his desire to
construct a speculative and metaphysical system i^ich Includes a great diversity
of ideas. In his metaiAiyslos Whitehead seeks to bring into one scheme of tiiou^t
such notions as the mental and the physical, chaise and pennanence, being and
becoming, becoming and perishing, the one and the many, time and eternity, God
and the world. The doctrine of the actual occasion is a construction of White-
head created in the attempt to make more coherent the speculative outline of
the organic philosophy. Prehension, concretion, creativity, oonformi ty,nov8lty,
and eternal objects are some of the notions developed by .Vhitehead in the build-
ing of his doctrine of the actual occasion. These ideas take Whitehead beyond
the pcsltivism and the logical empiricism of today.
This going beyond positivism and logical empiricism in their strictly
non-metaphysical character is seen in Whitehead's description of the function
46. See PR,viii, for a list of repudiations by Whitehead
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of philosophy, ’’Its j^phlloscphyj business is to explain the emergence of the
more abstract things from the mors concrete things, The speculative reach
of philosophy and its connection with the empirical are staggested by Whitehead
in proposing ^lat he believes to be the real question of philosophy! "The true
philosophic question is
,
How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from
4.7
itself and yet participated in by its own nature?”' Connection with the em-
pirical is sought by Whitehead in his theory of prehension. Using the notions
enumerated in the previox® paragraph, and others not particularly relevant to
our problem, ’/hitehead seeks to show how concrete fact exhibits entities ab-
stract from Itself, A.coprding to the definition and function of philosophy
given by Whitehead trust in speculative philosophy is a logical sequence. Those
who distrust speculative philosophy are not truly philosophical from .Thitehead’s
point of view, .Whatever might be said in criticism of «/hitehead*s metaphysics
cannot destroy the impression that its author has undertaken a speculative task
of great magnitude.
In his effort to provide solid ground for his speculative system .Vhite-
head feels it necessary to declare himself against the faculty psychology and
certain other notions to be considered in this section on repudiations.
ii. The repudiation of the faculty psychology
According to Whitehead there was in the faculty psychology the falacy
of misplaced concreteness. By misplaced concreteness -Vhitehead means the in-
terpretation of the merely abstract as a matter of fact, "Philosophical thought
has made for itself difficulties by dealing exclusively in very absti^ct notions,
such as those of mere awareness, mere private sensation, mere emotion, mere
46. PR, 30.
47. Ibid.
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purpose, mere ajpearance, mere causation. These are the ghosts of the old
’faculties,’ banished from psychology, hut still haunting metaphysics,
Whitehead’s contention is that there i s no pure or isolated function or item
of experience. In as much as the notions of mere awareness, sensation, emotion,
and purpose have been put out of the field of psychology because there is no
mere togetherness of such abstractions, Whitehead reasons that coordinate
notions in the field of philosophy should also be put aside. Thus Whitehead
> repudiates ’the mode of philosophic thou^t ^ich implies, and is implied by,
^ the faculty psychology. Acoo(Mlngly, there i s no mere appearance. .Vhite-
head criticizes Bradley’s doctrine of appearance, according to which objects
of appearance are inconsistent if taken as real. This is called by Whitehead
a ’doctrine of Inclusiveness ’ comparable to Santavana’s doctrine of animal
faith by its Inadequacy in relation to the epistemological difficulties of
Cartesian dualism.^ To add this* notion of ’mereness’ to any of the basic
concepts of philosophy is to fall into the falacy of misplaced concreteness.
^Vhltehead’s attempt to avoid this fallacy of misplaced concreteness
runs through most of his writings. Sven in his primary notion of creativity
Whitehead connects it with matters of fact - the one and the many - so that
it will not be taken as mere creativity. ” It f creativityj is the ultimate
principle by 'irtilch the many. . .become the one actual occasion...’’®^ There is
thus for Whitehead no ultimate separation between creativity and the actual
occasion. Whether or not Whitehead avoids the fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness In formulating his doctrine of the actual occasion will be a matter call-
ing for watchfulness in the development and criticism of our thesis. Another
48. PR, E7.
49. PR, viii.
50. PR, 86,
51. PR, 31.
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repudiation of Whitehead having its origin in psychology is the sensationalist
doctrine of perception. We shall presently examine Whitehead’s protest against
the sensationalist doctrine of perception.
iii. Repudiation of the sensationalist doctrine of perception
The repudiation of the sensationalist doctrine of perception is bluntly
stated by Whitehead when he asserts: "The confinement of our prehension of other
actual entitles to the mediation of private sensations is pure myth."^^ 7/hite-
the
head demands an enlargement of the process of^ preheilding of experiencing objects.
Thus to the process of private sensation he adds emotional tone which is thought
by Whitehead to be more primitive. Private sensation is detflared by Whitehead
to be characteristic of exceptional organisms. At this point Whitehead is set-
ting forth a theory of emergent evolution in which emotional tones are considered
prior to and distinguishable from private sensations. In the emergence and de-
velopment of organisms new dimensions of prehension emerge. New ways of experienc-
ing objects emerge providing a wider base of possible relations of the organism
to its world. According to Whitehead, "the more primitive mode of objectifica-
tion is via emotional tone, and only in exceptional organisms does objectifica-
tion^ via sensation, supervene with any effectiveness."^ Notwithstanding the
priority accorded emotional tones over private sensation, Whitehead nevertheless
holds that "The two modes fuse with. important effects upon our perceptive knowledge.
Th» fusion of modes of prehension is basic in v/hitehead’s theory of ex-
perience. It is an important part of his protest of what he thinks to be a con-
finement of experience contained in the sensationalist doctrine. Another factor
in f/liitehead *s protest against the sensationalist doctrine is the introduction
of what he calls ’a phenomenal vell.'^^ According to Whitehead: "there are
52. PR, 214.
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no rational principles irtiich penetrate from the veil to the dark background
of reality. 'The sensationalist might meet this contention of .Vhitehead
by saying that coherence and consistency are rational principles capable of
penetrating the phenomlnal veil, or of giving us a dependable *acco\mt of the
objects of our experience, '^/hitehead can offer the rejoinder that on the sen-
sationalist basis of knowledge we are never free from the danger of solipsism.
In order to avoid this danser ?/hitehead attempts to build a doctrine of the
direct experience of the external world, Thus we find him saying: ’’The phi-
losophy of organism follows Locke in admitting particular ’exterior things’
into the category of ’object prehended. Here we have Whitehead attempting
to find support in Locke for his epistemological theory of the Immediacy and
directness of ’exterior things’ in experience. The philosophy of organism
is grounded upon a repudiation of the sensationalist doctrine in so far as it
is suggestive of a mediate rather than an immediate character of the experienc-
ing process. Whitehead substitutes a presentational for a representational
view of perception. Perception is of actuality. In his theory of act\iality
’.yhitehead offers us another of his repudiations.
Iv. Repudiation of the doctrine of vacuous actuality
The opposition of 'Aliltehead to the notion of an actuality as some-
thing in itself apart from and independent of all experiential processes is
a characteristic of the organic philosophy which he holds. In short. White-
head attacks the scholastic Lockean doctrine of substance. In abandoning
the category of substance Whitehead calls for the surrender of the category
of a qxiantity of concrete being totally external and abiding throi^gh modifi-
56. P5;2^].6.
57. PR. 215
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cations of form. In the analysis of his scheme of categories he designates
certain of those ( categories ten to thriteen nnder categories of explanation)
that deal with prehension as constituting a repudiation of the notion of
vacuous actuality.^® To prehend means to feel, to experience,^ to have to do
with. This process of feeling is the core of every actual thing. It consti-
tutes the subject immediacy in virtue of which an entity is actual. "The
term ’vacous actuality* here means a notion of a res vera devoid of subjective
immediacy. **^^ The repudiation of vacous actuality means for Whitehead the
abandoning of the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of
change. Every real thii^ is a changing subject,an experiencing organism.
Its internal constitution is its own process of becoming.
The repudiation of the^ concept of vacuous actraality registers White-
head’s (^position to the traditional view of substance. The substance-quality
interpretation of actual objects .Thitehead finds not supported by advances
in the physical sciences. .Vhitehead shows in his discussion of actuality a
willingness to abandon the subject-predicate form of expression which he
thinks has become tainted by outmoded conceptions. The subject-predicate form
of expression belongs to the outmoded substance-quality interpretation. Hence,
it is repudiated in connection with the repudiation of vacuous actuality.
Getting rid of the notion of vacuous actuality is conceived by *Vhitehead as
a precondition for an explanatory metaphysics. '*We shall never elaborate an
explanatory metaphysics unless we abolish this notion of a valueless, vacuous
existence,*’^0 In the metaphysics of the organic philosophy process equals
reality.
58. See Categories ten to thirteen under the categories of explana-
tion, PR, 35,45.
59. PR, 45.
60. FOR, 24.
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In the discussion of the actual occasion we shall note the prominence
given to passage, transition, change, hecoming, and perishing, all of v^ich
are contrary to the suhstantialist theory 6f actuality. There is in ’.Vhite-
head’s theory no suggestion of an ahidii^ object. Not only dqes Whitehead
express opposition to the idea of an abiding object, but he also opposes the
notion of the objective world as a construct from purely subjective experience.
We shall now consider this opposition as a general phase of the organic phi-
losophy.
V. The repudiation of the Kantian doctrine of the objective world as
a theoretical construct fran purely subjective experience
Whitehead is bent upon repudiating a notion which was hardly Kantian.
In opposition to the tabula ras^ theory of the original condition of the mind
and its supposed passivity in the process of sensation, Kant hold to the theory
of mind as dynamic and constructive in experience. In his efforts to correct
the extreme passivity of the empiricist psychology of his day Kant did not
mean to assert that the objective world is a theoretical construct from purely
subjective experience. The notion of a purely subjective experience can hardly
be drawn from the passage which »Vhitehead quotes from Critique of Pure Reason
by Kant. In this passage Kant claims the necessary union of concepts and per-
ceps - Thought without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.
It is the purpose of Whitehead to invert the Kantian analysis. The point
of Whitehead’s attack is upon the priority and constitutive function of the sub-
ject of experience. There is for 'Whitehead a primacy of the feelings over the
feeler. "For Kant, the world emerges from the subject* for the philosophy of
organism, the subject emerges from the world. The idea that the world
61. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
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emerges from the subject means simply for Eant that the subjiect is active and
constructive in the knowledge process. The subject la not thought of as creating
the objective world from purely subjeotlve experience. In repudiating what he
believes to be the Kantian position Whitehead affirms his own pfosltlon that the
subject emerges from the world. The notion of the primacy of the object and
the derlvatlvenesa of subject characterizes the general approach of ^Vhltehead.
Its bearing upon the doctrine of the actual oooasion will be noted in the next
chapter. Before going into the next chapter we shall attempt to give focus to
the preceding discussion by some abbreviated statements of the persistent problems
of philosophy treated in the organic philosophy of Whitehead. The closing part
of this chapter will be a definitive account of the actual occasion.
4. The philosophy of organism and the persistent problems of philosophy
In studying the presuppositions of Whitehead we noted the problems of
/
creativity, potentiality, aotmllty, change, permanence, and order. The pre-
suppositions of Whitehead are made partly in agreement with realistic thought,
and partly in opposition to certain strains of thou^t, especially in Aristotle
and Kant, The phlloscphy of organism contains a reinterpretation of the oonoept
of substance, giving it a dynamic, changing structure. The being of an actual
thing consists in its becoming. The nature of being, blooming, and perishing
make up a group of problems which have received emphasis in virtue of Whltdiead *8
approach. The problems of atomicity and continuity are faced by Whitehead
in the construction of his doctrine of the actual entity. Whitehead takes over
much that is in the monadology of Leibniz, yet he tries to avoid its difficulties.
To compensate for the extreme atomism of the monads Whitehead proposes the notion
of continuity and extensive connection.
The problems of the nature and kinds of being are closely related
to the problems of Descartes. In the last analysis Whitehead calls for a meta-
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physics ^ich puts the mental and the physical into one context. The scheme
of categories is a series of e^lanatory notes on creativity, eternal objects,
and actual entities (actual occasions). In the development of these ideas
VThitehead is dealing with problems that reach back into Platonic traditions;
namely, the receptacle. Ideas, and material things. The repudiations of Tfliite-
head treated in the previous section deal with some of the persistent problems
of philosophy. The problem of the abstract and concrete is at the root of the
old faculty psychology. There is also the problem of togetherness and functional
unity ^Ich is not adequately dealt with in the faculty psychology. The problem
of sensation and the problem of knowledge are included in .7hitehead*s repudiation
of the sensationalist doctrine of perception. The problem of actuality is ob-
viously at the base of .Thitehead’s opposition to vacuous actuality. The subject-
object relation is a problem of considerable Importance In kVhltehead’s repudia-
tion of the Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical construct
from purely subjective experience. The problem of the actual occasion has
ramifications in most of the organic jdiilosophy of «Vhitehead. This will be seen
in the expanding treatment of the central problem of this dissertation. As a
means of giving this introductory view of '.'ihitehead' s philosophy a relevance to
the doctrine of the actual occasion we shall offer a table of the most concise
definitions of the actual occasion found in the works of 7/hitehead. Uo attempt
will be made in this chapter to explain the selected definitions. They will be re-
ferred to and explanations offered in subsequent parts of this investigation.
5. Table of definitions of the actual occasion
i. "An actual occasion is the limiting type of an event with only
one member.
63. PR, 113

36
li. ’*An actijg.l occasion on the side of its full concreteness is that
in virtue of vhich it is an event in nature."^^
A A
iii. "An actual occasion is a process of limitation and gradation.”®
iv. "Acttjal entities - also termed ’actual occasions* - are the final
\
66
real things of which the world is made up."
V. "Thus actual entities are creatures; they are also termed 'acttial
67
occasions’"”
Vi. "The term ’actual occasion’ is used synonymously ^th ’actual en-
tity ’;'but chiefly ^en its character of extensiveness has some di-
rect relevance to the discussion, ei ther extenhiveness in the form
of spatial extension, or in the more complete signification of
66
spatio-temporal extensiveness."
vii."Each monadic creature is a mode of the process of ’feeling’ the
world, of housing the world In one unit of complex feeling, in every
way determinate. Such a unit is an ’actual occasion’, it is the ulti-
69
mate creature derivative from the creative process.”
viil, "For each time he /^DescartesJ pronotinces ’I am, I exist, the actual
occasion, which is the ego, is different, and the ’he’ which is
coranon to the two egos is an eternal object or alternately, the
nexus of successive occasions," ”
lx. "An actual occasion is a prehension of one infinite hierarchy (its
associated hierarchy) together with various finite hierarchies,"'^^
64. SIW, 238.
65. SJW, 226.
66. PR, 27.
67. PR, 33.
68. PR, 119.
69. PR, 124.
70. PR, 116.
71. SW7, 239, 240.
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X, "Every actual occasion is a limitation imposed on possibility in virtue
of which the particular value of that shaped togetherness of things
emerges
,
xi, "Every actiial occasion presents itself as a process; it 'is becoiidngness.
xii, "It actual, occasion^ is a particular individual achievement, focussing
in its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal objects,
xiii, "Actual occasions are the emergence of values which require limitation, "^5
xiv, "Every actual occasion is defined by how these possibilities (_for ac-
tualityj are actualized in itself, "5^6
XV, "This is the doctrine that each actuality includes an actual, occasion or
is an occasion of experience, the outcome of its own purposes,
xvi, "In the same way that every actual occasion is a synthesis of all
eternal objects under the limitation of gradations of actuality, so
every occasion is a synthesis of all occasions under the limitation of
gradation of types of entry, "78
xvii, "Each actual occasion is an activity of concern, ,, "7f
xviii, "It has bepn a mistake of European metaphysics to confuse societies
with the completely real things which are the actual occasions. "B8
72., SMW, 244.
7S.. SM, 246.
74. Ibid.
75. SM, 249.
76. SMW, 222.
77. FOR, 25.
7/8., SMW, 245.
7/9. Runesi (ed.) TCP
80
.
AI, 262.
Jir\
Ow
/'
-.iw j.' 0 .1 :-cXwco30 .ra»;^Cvn
z tj*, ''t-irj » .' iuo. ' •’. \
, n '--‘t'.i:-’.:: .•*- J *jtc tviJL-v -i,. ©fiJ lo
v^*X9tC#'
ii^riluoyoc' Jj w+I ; wfci^CrO'i!,. i. aiJ L-^q u ./v v -rcc i ^-r^oa .
• .". iiio,. X •- >.r^xUi2 ^ -, ni x i'wou uT“ .
,
3j 0wJ|CJo Xjifl’XbuO io ili'i'dJOi i,ijA • • >* X fu.
'>
'’2lij, v'i rji>ixiv> i.teifa., ; ic ^a:) f'rij tri'..-: -•voo i^'w**_A*^ .j-ijbc
-Oo '^0-3 c »o^v^j V ,j txiini- 'i' fcl itoxaiioop .. avv
4 .:;j i:
:il.iJj 'jt-i. Xiui-rf tA-.j,'-'' Cv&J.' •- Uv’ 4;- aJli* .T.<
J Lir-c. v^42 'ip cptf/o ei.t -O .icl2.:,o:'C iPi -i
1A.» JO JorAiutA . A ' i MOi :- -:oo .fjiUCTyA "C^ova 4 i**U v:;r.- ot.A-.s ciiJ
0 .. .,:>i iK-oB lu- ccozv.p'^/j::, io x;oi;4 *.’3 .ii.'ii erli •iZ'j.vjo I'^ost^o Xe^-rtaJ©
p.iv -•-•alf !i:.-.i Kjbiuo Sl^ "-0 jiiiOiiJTIXe i- jI Iic/^.AOCO VM -.f
V
'
'
. .
,a’i.-’i xkjg ic vj-xvJfcuO.A - •’’I Acivjj'poo j.. ;;Po.A tiOij..--"
L /Otif i‘SU xiiC 1^' Uj ' OXiJ n/‘5€*fj_0'Iir2 io JJ. J- .i,J .-.Va
t-^’'
.
iiiv^ c-.OwO ) •iX'-- i>‘w y'i^i lay-i ©r^X XJx.
^7. ' • - ' 5 ^ t-Si*
.-f' - ' . • ”^1
.
>?
[rr
-.XT
j'jOT ' 4 <-*v^ sJ 3ny • * ^
.‘‘82 ,U ,C?
« ; X’
.d^a
• ixdl
,
'::.i
c
.Ss t-iC
.
,-Xc.
57
xlx» call each such actual occasion an ’epochal occasion’. The
81
actual world is a community of epochal occasions,”
xz. An original working definition of the actual occasions
An actual occasion is a metaphysical unit* It is a monaaic and
sentient entity possessing the characteristics of spatio-temporal
extensiveness (transcending simple location and having duration)
and dipolarity (mental and physical). As a concrete whole of
becoming it is a process of aiming at and achieving value.
There are a number of less explicit statements of the nature and function
of the actual occasion which occur in ’Sfhitehead 's discussions of the various con-
cepts of his organic philosophy. Such statements vd 11 be referred to as the treat-
ment of the problem expands. In the present chapter we have tried to make clear
the historical background of the doctrine of the actual occasion. By way of
making clear that background we gave historical placement to the philosophy of
organism, noting tiie diversified interest of Aliitehead in utilizing and reject-
ing various concepts according to his presuppositions and central objectives.
Through his repudiations we found Whitehead working toward a dynamic and essen-
tially psychological view of actual things. This vie'w^oint is reflected in
the various definitions of the actual occasion which have been given.
The prominence of pwjpchol ogy in Whitehead’s approach to actuality makes
an Inquiry into Whitehead ’s psy'Thology a promising next st^ of investigation
toward the understanding of his doctrine of the actual occasion. In the next
chapter therefore we shall treat the problem of the actual occasion from the
standpoint of Whitehead’s psychology. 'We shall begin the work of the advancing
chapter by a consideration of the general aims of -Vhitehead ’s p^sychology. The
unfolding of material in consideration of Whitehead’s aims psychology will
81. RM, 91.

reveal those concepts (for example, feeling, experience, consciousness,
snh^ect-superject, the private, the public, and society) in terms of which
it will be profitable to analyze the doctrine of the actual occasion. Let
us now widen the scope of our treatment of the actual occasion .by exploring
the field of Whitehead’s ^g^^ohology*
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Chapter III
The Actual Occasion in \Vhitehead ' s Psychology
1.
The Aims of Whitehead *s psychology
Whitehead’s psychological outlook and its possible significance for his
doctrine of the actual occasion are indicated by the fact that several of his
definitions of the actual occasion are put in psychological terras,^ The expres-
sions - "occasion of experience", "activity of concern”, "ultimate facts of im-
mediate actual experience” - to describe the actual occasion suggests that the
doctrine of the actual occasion is a real part of vVhitehead's psychology. The
terra experience is expressed or implied in most of TVhitehead’s definitions of
the actual occasion. One aim of Whitehead’s psychology seems therefore to be an
analysis of experience.
Another aim of Whitehead’s psychology is the discovery of similarities be-
tween the psychical and the physical processes. This interest in analogues be-
tween the psychical and the physical was noted in an earlier part of our discus-
sion,^ The final product of siach an interest and investigation would lead to
what Whitehead calls "psychological physiology.”^ This incipient science is based
among other things upon developments in the field of physiological psychology.
The work of Helmholtz, Fechner and other contributors to the field of physiologi-
cal psychology is utilized in the new field of psychological physiology. However,
the aim of psychological physiology is the understanding of physical processes by
comparisons with psychological processes. The core of inquiry in the field of
1, See definitions at close of previous chapter; Five, seven, eight,nine,
thirteen, and fifteen on pp. 35,36.
2, See p,13 ff,
3, PR,167.
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psychological physiology is the investigation of possible analogues beteeen the
physical and the psychical. It is a psychological approach to wdiat is orainarily
called the order of nature.
The first problem to be considered in our treatment of the actual occasion
from the point of view of Whitehead *s psychology is his concept of feeling. This
concept is made the basis of our approach because it occurs most frequently in
Whitehead’s discussion of the actual occasion. It follows that a grasp of what
Whitehead means by feeling will help considerably in understanding the nature
and structure of the actual occasion,
E, The actual occasion and Whitehead’s psychology of feeling
The general importance of feeling in the philosophy of Whitehead is in-
dicated by his remaric that "The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a
’critique of pure feeling’ in the philosophical position in which Kant put his
Critique of Pure Reason
.
"4 The conjunction of the concepts of feeling and the
actual occasion in the philosophy of Whitehead is shown in the following defini-
tion of the actual occasion; "Each monadic creature is a mode of the process of
’feeling’ the world, of housing the world in one unit of complex feeling, in
every way determinate , Such a unit is an ’ actual occasion ’ ; it is the ultimate
creature derivative from the creative process,"^ The actual occasion is thus
a feeling unit, a monadic creature comprehending a world, an. entity emergent
from the creative process. Feeling is the core of existence for every e;ipe-
riencing creature. Feeling is elemental, being the basis of those processes
in virtue of which a thing may be called actual. Nothing becomes actiJal without
4. PR,172,173
5. PR,1E4.
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feeling being a factor in that becoming. There is no novel actuality wiiich is
minus feeling as an ingredient. In one of his descriptions of an actual thing
TOiitehead reioarks that "a feeling is a component in the concrescence of a novel
actual entity,"® This means that there is no togetherness constituting the
emergence of a new entity which does not have feeling as part of that together-
ness,
Whitehead defines feeling in the following manner: "Feeling is a mode of
ingression of eternal objects in actual occasions,"*^ Feeling as here defined is
a way by which eternal objects become realized in actual things. Sternal objects
are defined in the fifth category of existence as "piire potentials for the spe-
Q
cific determination of fact or forms of definiteness," By ingression Whitehead
means "the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is
realized in an actual entity,"^ An eternal object is called a pure potential be-
ca\ise its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. On the basis of these
references it may be said that feeling is a way by which a potentiality, becomes
something realized and definite. Becoming definite means becoming actual. Feel-
ing is a function of the relationship of the possible to the actual. Feeling is
the process in virtue of which there is a union of the abstract and tnid concrete.
It may also be called a function of the Platonic participation of Forms in matter.
It may be said that the potential and the abstract feels its way into the actual
and the concrete,
Whitehead sometimes uses the term prehension for the term feeling, A
positive prehension refers to a positive feeling, whereas a negative prehension re
fers ,t 0 elimination from feeling, At one point Whitehead speaks of feeling as
6, PR, 35b,
7, PR, 131.
8, PR,3£.
9, PR,34,
10,
PR,55, For a discussion of positive and negative prehension see pp,67,79
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"prehensions of data,"^^ Whitehead goes further to say that some of the data ex-
perienced are feelings,^ On this basis patches of color, sounds and smells
would be classed as feelings. Obviously the term feeling is given a wide usage
by Whitehead. Hence, a demand for clarity,
Whitehead seeks to give clarity to his theory of feeling by the siaggestion
that his use of the term has a close analogy to Alexander's use of the term enjoy-
ment and Bergson's use of the term intuition, According to Alexander "The act
of mind is an enjoyment, the object is contemplated, ,, It [enjoyment^ has to include
sxiffaring or any state or process in so far as the mind lives through it,"^^ As
here used by Alexander enjoyment means living through a reaction to one's world.
It is a process of being en rapport with the objects belonging to one's world,
Whitehead makes a distinction between physical and mental feelings,^ Mental
feelings are marked by the emergence and dominance of concepts. The dominance
of conceptuality is characteristic of the mental relation of the organism to its
world. Enjoyment as described by Alexander is more in agreement with Whitehead's
notion of mental than pliysical feelings. In language close to that of Alexander
'Whitehead says, "The notion of life implies.
. .self enjoyment, a certain immediate
individuality,.,a process of appropriation, , .The process of appropriation I have
called a prehension, "16 organism prehends or feels its world by appropriating
it. The process of appropriation involves subjective forms which are called
feelings by Whitehead. To 'live tiirough' in Alexander's phraseology equals to
11. PR,537.
12. PR,184.
13. PR, 65.
14. Alexander,STD, V,1,12,
15. PR, 375, SBffi,20.
16. MT, 205, 206.
17. AI,236.
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*appropriate' in Whitehead's phraseology.
As already noted Whitehead also claims an analogy between his concept
of feeling and Bergson's concept of intuition, Bergson writes as follows about
intuition. "But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us -
I mean instinct that becomes disinterested self consciousness^
capable of reflecting upon its object and enlarging it indefinitely, j
inteiTpret Bergson at this point intuition is a direct and intimate grasp of the
objects held in reflection. This direct and instinctive grasp as expressed by
Bergson is analogous to Whitehead's appropriation by means of feeling, Bergson*
concept of intuition includes in its scope the higher ranges of conceptxaality
described by Whitehead, The inwardness chciracteristic of Bergsonian intuition
is matched by the inwardness of feeling which characterizes the actual entity in
VThitehead's philosophy. Every actual entity has its inwardness which Vdiitehead
calls its "immediate enjoyment" or its "subjective intensity.
It is upon the basis of the subjective intensity of ein actual entity
that Whitehead repudiates the notion of vacuous actuality. The occasion as
something actual has an inwardness of feeling, that is, a subjective intensity.
It is in his repudiation of vacuous actuality that Whitehead is similar to
Bradley, Both stress feeling as basic in the constitution of any actuality. In
a word of caution about Whitehead's use of the feeling, Johnson observes that
Whitehead's "various uses of the term 'feeling' can only be distinguished by
reference to the context in which they occur. However various his use of the
term feeling Whitehead always relates it to some form of experience, even thov^ih
18. Bergson, CE,176.
19. I«IT,206.
20. PR, 41.
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primitive. It is in the wider context of his doctrine of experience that we may
see how Whitehead works out his theory of feeling and applies it generally to the
actual occasion,
3, The Actual Occasion and the meaning of e^qperience
According to 7/hitehead an actual occasion of experience is an eraergent
which ’’arises as the bringing together into one real context diverse feelings, di-
verse purposes, and other diverse activities ”22 Feelings, purposes, and
activities are thus basic to experience. It is in terms of a doctrine of emergent
evolutionism that Whitehead introduces his analysis of the problem of experience.
This way of handling the problem is \ised by Whitehead to remain clear of the sub-
stantialist point of view. It is also used by Whitehead to avoid the shortcomings
of the introspection psychology by showing that antecedent to the relatively clear
phases of experience there are factors not ordinarily appreciated.
The field composing each actual entity is rooted in Leibnizian confused
perceptions,25 These confused perceptions seem to be the equivalent of l^hitehead's
primary perceptions, It is by the bringing together into one real context that
diverse perceptions and feelings give rise to actualities. Each such emergent is
for Whitehead a concrescence, 25 The actual is the concrete. It is anytiiing that has
acquired specification and definiteness.
In bringing together his concepts of actuality and experience iThitehead says
"This is the doctrine that each actuality is an occasion of experience, the outcome
of its own purposes, "26 Here Whitehead holds that there is no disjunction between
22. Sli!E,9.
23. Rand (ed,),MOP, 207,
24. SME,9.
25. PR,33.
26. FOR,26.
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experience and actuality. Every case of actuality is also a case of an experienc-
ing entity. This way of stating Whitehead’s position gives siqpport to Johnson's
observation that "It must be admitted at the beginning that Whitehead’s psychology
provides the basis for his metaphysics, ”^7
We shall note some descriptions of experience by Whitehead as a means of
understansing more adequately his concept of the actual occasion. Of any occasion
now present Whitehead holds that it "specifies a particular duration,"^® It is
at this point that Whitehead is clearly Bergsonian, It belongs to the cliaracter
of a duration that it includes a past and a future. The past is included by an
act of memory, and the future by an act of anticipation, Witiiout meraory and anti-
cipation there can be no occasion of experience. Relative to the past Whitehead
says "We are continuous with and derivative from our immediate past,"^^ This im-
mediate past "we reduce,..to a perspective, and yet we retain it as the basis of
our present moment of realization,"^ Relative to the future as well as the past
of an actual occasion Whitehead says, "The self enjoyment of an occasion of ex-
perience is initiated by an enjoyment of the past as alive in itself aiid is termi-
nated by an enjoyment of itself as alive in the future, In the same source
Whitehead also says that "Each moment of experience confesses itself to be a transi-
tion between two worlds, "^2 Each occasion of experience is thus a Jamesian spe-
cious present. It endures in a receding past and an advancing future. It is held
within the limits of an enduring span of meraory and anticipation.
Within its own span an actual occasion is something whole. It is a gestalt.
Each actual entity is a ’drop of experience’ a ’throb,
a
’rhythm,’®® These
27. Johnson, "The psychology of Alfred North i^tehead,
"
Jour .Gen.Psv . . 52
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28. EPK,69.
29. AI,209.
30. Ibid.
31. AI,248,249.
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34. PR, 280
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characterizations of e^qperience or occasions of experience disclose the wholeness
of a duration of experience. Drops, throbs, and rhythms are configurations, that
is, patterns of occasions of experience. Each is a whole which becomes, and in
becoming experiences passage or transition. It is in virtue of the eternal ob-
jects ingressed in every occasion of experience that there is an identity in the
becoming of the actual.
Still another characteristic of occasions of experience is their dipolarity.
Each occasion has a mental and a physical pole,^® These poles may be thought of
as the aspects of the occasion. In the phraseology of Spinoza we may call the as-
pects or poles the attributes, and a particular occasion a mode of the underlying
process. In formulating his double aspect theory Whitehead is attempting to con-
struct a metaphysics of experience that will be consistent with his provisional
realism. Morgan thinks that V?hitehead’s realistic position is weakened by his
failure to tell how a complex of entities can be expressed in thought without
reference to mind. ^7 xn defense of Whitehead it can be said that this way of con-
ceiving the world is merely a methodological device. It has a possible parallel
in the method of bracketing used by phenomenologists. The problem of experience
and reality treated in this section may be pressed further for a solution by an
investigation of Whitehead’s concept of consciousness. In the aneilysis of White-
head’s concept of consciousness we shall be chiefly concerned with the establish-
ment of a more coherent accoimt of the actual occasion.
4, The Actual Occasion of Consciousness
Whitehead uses the term consciousness in a general sense and also in a
36, AI,270, See also PR, 54.
37, Morgan, ’’The Bifurcation of Nature," Monist.40 (1930),165.
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restricted sense. In the general sense Whitehead defines consciousness as "the
acme of emphasis"^® and as "the supreme vividness of experience, According
to these definitions emphasis and vividness of awareness are its characteristics.
Emphasis refers to the intensity of the organic response. Vividness refers to
the discrimination val\ae of the organic response. Consciousness is thus in a
general sense the attainment of a condition of experience in which there is a
high degree of unity and intensity in the behavior of the organism. It is also
the attainment in the behavior of the organism of a high degree of clarity dnathe
factors in the psychological field. The use of the superlatives *acme‘ and 'supreme*
suggests that consciousness is an attainment resting upon a background of experience
which is less emphatic and less vivid, Whitehead here agrees with Freud that
much of the mental life is unconscious. In Whitehead's own language we note, "The
principle I am adopting is that consciousness presupposes experience and not ex-
perience consciousness, "40 Consciousness emerges out of relatively vague or con-
fused modes of experience. The Cartesian emphasis upon clarity and distinctness
is accepted by Whitehead as applicable only to highest ranges of experience. The
primitive character of experience is described by Whitehead as untidy and ill-
adjusted, It is not composed of clean-cut discriminations and enriching purpose-
fulness, These characteristics accrue only in the sharpening process of evolution.
Experience in VJhitehead's scheme is applicable to a long range of activities or
conditions, whereas consciousness covers cases of maximum emphasis and vividness.
The divergence between the lower and the higher levels of experience not-
withstanding, Whitehead holds to a notion that these extremes are connected, "An
occasion of experience which includes human mentality is an extreme instance at
58, AI,231,2S2.
39, MT,170,171,
40, PR, 83.
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one end of the scale, of the hapi>enings irtiich constitute nature.”'^ Although
an extreme Instance, human mentality is nevertheless an instance of a natural
happening* Nature therefore in 77hitehoad*s philosophy is seemingly a subject
for psycho-analysis, The f^ychologism of the organic philosophy, contains an
extension of the term experience to include all actual entities. The generalized
use of the term experience indicates in //hitehead a tendency toward panpsychism*
2ach actuality is an occasion of experience or feeling* This extension of the
term experience belongs to Whitehead *s argument fora metaphysics that is in-
clusive of happOTiings at all levels of creative advance*
The level of mentality is marked by conceptuality* Mental experiences
4 pInclude concepts in addition to percepts.-*^ Whitehead defines conceptuality as
A
•the teleological introduction of novelty**" Ccinceptuality is expressed in the
endowment of agency or purpose which results in novelties. The discussion of
conceptuality brings us to .Vhitehead’s more restricted and technical use of the
term consciousness.
There is an emphasis upon conceptuality in Whitehead’s words that ’’Con-
sciousness is that quality shlch emeiges *..as a result of the oonjtinction of a
fact and a supposition about that fact*”^ Consciousness is an emergent quality
^ich inheres in a contrast; namely, the contrast of fact and stjjpositlon or
theory* In more logical fashion w© may say that a fact is the subject of a
proposition and the supposition is its predicate* Putting this idea in wliite-
head ' s terminology wo may say that the subject is an actual entity and the
predicate is an eternal object* The predicate is con^osed of eternal objects
because they are the ’pure potentials for the specific determination of Fact
or Forms of ])efinitones8,
’ This analysis of contrast, and hence consciousness.
41* AI, 237*
42* SMS, 20*
43* AI, 249,266
44* AI, 347.
45* PR, 32*
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"by means of a constniotlon in logic is maie specific in fiThitehead ‘ s statement:
The proposition is the possibility of that predicate applying in that assigned
Way to those logical subjects,*’^ (Vhetiier or not the eternal objects apply to
the subject is determined by the prehensive quality of the actual entitles in-
olved. This amounts to sayii^ that consciousness is a quality of experience
Inherent in a hi^ly conceptual response to an environment.
Contrast as an element in >/hitehead *s theory of consciousness is further
shown by the following definitions: ’*It consciousness is the feeling of the
contrast of theory as mere theory, with fact as mere fact."^’^ ”Conscious-
ness is how we feel the affirmation - negation contrast.'"^® In each of these
definitions the theory - fact relation is made central. His tendency is toward
an emphasis of negation in the affirmation - negation contrast. This tendency
toward a negativism receives a focus in the declaration : *’Thus negative per-
ception is the triumph of consciousness.”-^ On the basis of this assertion
consciousness is supremely displayed in concepts of vviiat things are not rather
than what they are. This is a theory of consciousness that is peculiar to
Aliitehead. It may be granted that in some instances it is quite important to
be able to comprehend v^at a thing is not. In general however, the purpose
is to comprehend vrtiat a specific actuality is. Denial is in the Interest of
affirmation. If it bo by his theory of consciousness that -Thitehead is trying
to defend his notions of actual entities and eternal objects, it is not clear
that his defense has added to their plausibility. In his more restricted use
of the teim consciousness centering in the notion of discrimination and con-
trast as well as in his less restricted use of the term consciousness center-
ing in the notion of vividness or intensified awareness, the function of feel-
ing is considered elemental by Whitehead. Oonsciousness presupposes feeling
46. PH, 594.
47. PR, 286.
48. PR, 372.
49. PR, 245.
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or experience,^ An occasion of consciousness is also an occasion of feeling.
An occasion of feeling or experience hov/ever is not necessarily an occasion of
consciousness, 3xporience does not presuppose consciousness,^^ C6nsci ousness
in the more restricted sense as used hy »Vhiteh0 ad is less supported by his
theory of feeling than conscl onsness as mere awareness with relative vividness.
On the basis of the notion of consciousness as relative vividness of feeling
occasions of feeling are generally occasions of consciousness. However, on
the basis of the notion of consciousness as discrimination and contrast oc-
casions of feeling are not generally occasions of consciousness. There is thus
a strain in //hitehead’s thought which is contingent upon the different senses
in which he uses the term consciousness.
The analysis of consciousness by Whitehead includes his discussion of
presentational immediacy, Vhitehead says, "By presentational immediacy I mean
what is usually termed sense percept! on. In a note on presentational im-
mediacy we find ^^^liitehead oharaoterixing it as *a clear, distinct conscious-
ness of the extensive relations of the world, By the term immediate T/hitehead
is inserting a realistic concept into his analysis of sense experience, Tfie
Cartesian terminology - clear and distinct - in this connection is used with
the hope of reaching an affirmation rather than a negation, ’<Vhi tehead * s affirma-
tion about extensive relations however, does not commit him to the position
that presentational immediacy is primary. As a clear and distinct conscious-
ness of external objects presentational immediacy is preceded by or based upon
a vagiae and inarticulate experience. The condition of response is only in its
advanced stage a clear and distinct consciousness. It is even on its primitive
level an occasion of experience.
50, PR, 83,
51, Ibid,
52, S?®, 21,
53, PR, 95,
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/i/hitehead says of the cognitive occasion that '’there is disclosed In
it the ego-ohject amid objects,”^ Relating this reference to cognitive ex-
perience definitely to ^^itehead’s view of consciousness we observe that he
calls "a duration of consciousness the ego-object situation,"^^ .-This is an
activistic theory of consciousness ^ich has gained influence since Hume's
analysis. The situation experiencedis an ego-object situation. Thus con-
sciousness is enjoyment or contemplation of object. It is never reducible
to a thing in itself. In his analysis of the ego-object situation -Vhitehead
develops a theory of the subject-superject ^ich belongs to his general analy-
sis of the actual occasion.
5. The actual occasion as subJect-superJect
The subject-superject replaces the subject in ATiitehead's i^s^schology.
’’.Vhen ’subject* is used it is to be construed as an abbreviation for ’subject-
superject.”* .Vhitehead's theory of the subject-superject is a result of
his desire to formulate a theory of actuality which transcends the errors of a
materialistic psychology. "The philosophy of organism abandons the notion of
an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change. An actual entity is at
once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is
subject-superject."®’^ According to this quotation the actual entity is the
subject experiencing as well as the end product of the e^eriencing process,
hence, a superject. This seems to be but another way of phrasing the dual
character of the situation experienced. It consists in memory and anticipation.
The memory is of the subject and the anticipation is of the superject. The
specious present spans subject and superject. It is subject-superject. Any
54. SW^, 210.
55. sm, 211, 212.
56. PR, 42.
57. Ibid.
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actiml occasion whether of c onaciousness or the unoonacious, is dualiatic in
its reference to past and to future.
'.Vhitehead ’ s theory of the suhject-superject contains the notion that
the sub j ect-superject is derivative. '’?he subject-superject is ‘the purpose of the
process originating the feelings."^ In the same context .'/hitehead says that
’’The fselings aim at the feeler, as their final cause. The feeler, that is,
the superject, is created by the feelings, and the union of the two is thought
by '.Vhitehead to be inseparable. Otherwise stated by V?hitehaad, "The philoso-
phy of organism Inverts the order, and conceives the thought as a constituent
operation of the creation of the occasional thinker." ^ The thinker is a re-
sult of the thought; or the feeler is a result of the feeling, '.hi tehead 's po-
sition on the feeler and the feelings is a part of his repudiation of ^at he
oalls vacuous actuality. Not to grant the priority of feelings or experience
over a feeler is to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The fallacy
of misplaced concreteness is the error of ascribii^ actuality to that which is
merely formal. A feeler antidatizig feelings is a vacuous actuality from Yhite-
head’s point of view. In the course of evolution, and in the transition from
occasion to occasion, the feeler or the thinker is a product of previously
existing processes.
The pegging point of <vhitehead's analysis is feeling in contrast to
Kant whose pegging point is pure reason. Ahitehead’s interest is to go back
of the ego which is the foundation of Kant’s psychology. .Vhitehead agrees
with Kant in the latter’s dlcttun t "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauun-
gen ohne Begriffe sind blind, (Thoughts without content are empty, intui-
tions without concepts are blind). Although accepting this Kantian dictum.
58. PR, 339.
59, Ibid.
60. PR, 228.
61, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason .A51 (B75).
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Whitehead reaches a conclusion opposed to F^nt: ’’For Kant the world emerges from
the subject; for the philosophy of organism the subject emerges from the world.”
The notion of the primacy of fehlings in the occasion over the feeler and thoughts
in the occasion over the thinker constitutes an inversion or a repudiation of kant
at a point of no small significance. .Vhen this point is overlooked there is great
danger of misinterpreting Whitehead’s psychology, and also his philosophy of na-
ture. Bldney in opposition to VJhitehead contends that activity without substance
in some sense is unintelligible.^^ The subject for Whitehead is a pattern of ac-
tivity. Apart from the subject- superject pattern of activity there is no subject
as such according to vVhltehead. Svery occasion of experience follows this pattern.
In terms of the subjective and the objective we may interpret ATiitehead ’s position
in the statement that each occasion has a private and public aspect. The problem
of the following section will be to determine the meanings and resltionships of
the private and the public phases of the processes that constitute the actual oc-
casion.
6. The actual occasion as private and public
Each actual entity has its own immediacy of ^^ioh it is the subject.
There is a privacy of existence in the process of each subject-superject. The
most immediate environment of each actuality is its own organic structure and
activity. In the individual life of each actual entity there is an inward
awareness and a private enjoyment. Inward awareness and private enjoyment mark
off the region of subjective intensity. There is a definition of the actual
occasion in vftiich Whitehead speaks of it as a ’’monadic creature. . .housing the
world in one unit of complex feeling.”®® IKis definition suggests the privacy
of the actual occasion. Each actual occasion is a housing unit or a private
62. PR, 135,136.
63. Sidney, ”The Problem of Substance in Spinoza and Whi tehead ”
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dwelling. Raving privacy, the actual occasion may he said to possess atomicity.
Whitehead stands hy his doctrine of the privacy of occasions when he with a
Democrltean leaning calls atomism the ultimate metaphysical truth, On the
level of the personal Whitehead gives his theory a Lelhnizian touch hy the claim
that our individual experiences are strictly personal to ourselves, 6? To he
an Individual, or an actual occasion, is to enjoy a definite isolation. Indivi-
duals are the entities of the universe in their solitary function. 'Whitehead’s
defense of atomism and privacy is his answer to the felt need of a principle of
individuation and discrimination in the universe. Without such a principle of
individuation aai discrimination there would he a confusion amounting to non-entity.
Whitehead respects the atonistic tradition, hut he does not allow this
respect to obscure the larger perspective which includes also relatedness. There
is a public as well as a private aspect of existence. ’’There are no Isolated
occasions. Actuality is throiigh and throu^ togetherness,”^® Singularity and
togetherness are relative. The universe is a system of opposites which include
singularity and togetherness, atomicity and relatedness, iVhitehead holds that
the private life of actual occasions is perpetually perishing only to become
objectively immortal, *Vhen no longer actual, an actual occasion becomes an in-
heritance in those acttial occasions to which it has some relevance. If there
he no completely isolated occasion, there is no occasion which fails to have an
affinity for some other occasion. To be actual is also to he a potential for
incorporating ^at is presently beyond the private and the immediate. In a com-
ment on perishing Whitehead avers that "In perishing an actual entity acquires
objectivity while it loses subjective immediacy In perishing the private
life of an actual occasion becomes a novel content of the actuality which is in
66, PR, 53.
67. S?®’, 123,124.
6 8. ST,W, 244.
69. PR, 44.
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the line of its development. As a novel content this surrendered life of the
actual occasion may be conceived of as an essence in the actual occasions which
follow. According to Whitehead each actual occasion ’'mirrors within itself the
modes of its predecessors, as memories fused into its content,"*^®* Each actual
thing is thus a locus of the universe. Each actual thing injoys extensive re-
lations with the rest of the universe. By participating in the actualities
that emerge from it, and by prehending those realities for ^ich it has some
affinity, an actual occasion becomes a public establishment in the universe,
Vhitehead conceives the twofold process of privacy and publicity as in-
deed rhythmic. In the rhythm of becoming, an actual occasion "swings from the
publicity of many things to individual privacy, and it swings back from the private
individual to the publicity of the objectified individual, Privacy and publici-
ty seem thus to be for '/hitehead poles or aspects of the processes of occasions.
With reference to the publicity of things an actual occasion is a superject,"^^
The superject is the expression of objectivity relative to a preceding oc-
casion, As if to make sure of his allegiance to the public as well as to the pri-
vate, Whitehead says that "exterior things are the final actualities,"'^® Accord-
ing to this statement external relations are coordinate with internal relations.
There is throughout all forms of actuality an interconnection of events as well
as the privacy of each event. '^Whitehead’s fundamental affirmation is accordingly
a double aspect view of things.
The notion of aspects or poles belongs to a procedure of »Whitehead which
is illustrated in his approach to other metaphysical problems, e.g.
,
the problem
of the mental and the physical, The solution offered is adequate in so far as
70. SIW, lOS.
71. PR, 229.
72. PR, 142.
73. PR, 87.
74. See pp, 46 ff.
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it estatlishea a coherent concept of the relationship of the factors belonging
to the problem. The very notion of aspects OJ* poles appears to be rather sugges-
tive of a materialistic position which ^itehead tries to escape. The thesis of
the relatedness or continuity of actual occasions leads to the development by
.Vhitehead of the notions of societies of actual occasions. The treatment of the
concept of societies of actual occasions will enlarge our perspective of actual
occasions at a point which is in logical sequence to the present discussion,
7, Societies of eustual occasions
The passage of entities in nature involves according to -Vhitehead a family
of durations. The entities of nature are in flux, and this flux involves groups
of actuality. "The passage of nature involves the existence of a family of dura-
tions,”’^^ Each occasion belongs to a group or a nexus of occasions, J^mbership
in the nexus is the determining factor in the behavior of every occasion. "The
term nexus does not presuppose anj^ special type of order; it only presi5)po3e3 mu-
tual immanence, The occasions belonging to the nexus of occasions participate
in the life of each other. Each considerably affects the roots of the other mem-
bers of the group, "A societj^ is a nexus viftiich ’illustrates’ or 'shares in’ some
typo of 'Social Order. By social order -i/hitehead means the following charac-
teristics of a nexus: a common element of form in the definiteness of each actual
entity ^ich makes up the nexus; this common element of form in each entity arises
in it because of its prehensions of son« other members of the nexus: the prehen-
sions impose that condition of reproduction because they include positive feeling
of the common form. In a society of occasions there is a common form ^ich ap-
parently determines certain affinities. It is because of feeling together, and
the mutual influence of feeling together, that particular occasions experience
group life. They constitute a social order.
75. CON, 59.
76. AI, 258,259.
77. AI, 260,261.
78. AI, 261
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,Vhen a social order takes a special form of personal order it is called "by
79
^itehead an ’enduring object’ or an ’enduring creature,’ The terei personal as
here used does not necessarily mean an entity possessing consciousness. An en-
doxring object is personal vihen it possesses a high degree of organization and a
dominating center of activity, Whitehead holds that in ideally simple cases an
ordinary physical object having endurance possesses personal order, and is an en-
during object.®^ The personal as well as the impersonal grouping of occasions is
the outcome of some common function performed by the occasions in their percipient
experience. The notion of a society of occasions as held by Whitehead is thus a
functional concept. This concept may be called an incipient personalism because it
contains the suggestion that puts the notion of agency into the notion of 'nha.t en-
dures. The application of the concept of agency as organization and central control
to ordinary physical objects seems to spread the essence of the concept over an un-
justifiably large area. It is granted howeve#, that the term personal is more in-
clusive than the term human. Extension of the concept to the inorganic realm fol-
lows however the general pattern of vVhitehead *s thought in his search for analogies
between the psychical and the physical. The analogies are functionally grounded.
In speaking of the notion of a society of occasions as a functional consept,
Whitehead points out that the conmon function of any group of actual occasions is
that otf ’mutml Imimnence ’ , The function of belonging to a society of occasions
is the sharing of a common life of feeling. By thus sharing a oomrnon life each oc-
casion is determined. «hitehead puts the doctrine of mutual immanence another way
by stating that ’’There are no isolated occasions.”®^ By the doctrine of mutual
immanence Whitehead makes the group concept a testing ground of existence and en-
79. PR, 50.
80. PR, 52.
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durance. Accordingly the togetherness of the experiences of many actual entities
is the basis of all endurance. ’’The real actual things that endure are all socie-
84
ties. They are not actual occasions.” Contrary to this statement '.Vhitahead says
it has teen a mistake of European metaphysics to confuse societies with the complete-
85
ly real things which are the actual bccasions. In the one case 'iShitehead holds
that societies of actual occasions are the real acttali ties ; and in the other case
he holds that the completely real things are actual occasions. These two concepts
of Aliitehead appear to stand in the logical relation of contradictions. There is
a possible way out of this difficulty if the expressions ’real actual things’ and
’completely real things’ mark a difference between the realm of the existential
and the realm of the metaphysical. On this basis of interpretation existence is
constituted by societies or fields of occasions that endure, and not be individual
occasions. By this interpretation the metaphysical is constituted by individual
actual occasions that perish in becoming. This interpretation is complicated however
wdien .i/hitehead \xses the terms actual entitite and actual occasions interchangeably,
calling both of them the ’’final real things”®^ and also the ”Res Verae. ”^'^
It follows from, the discussion of the foregoirg paragraph that actual things
are also the final real things or metaphysical things. But it is to be remembered
that .Whitehead rirSakes a difference between the individual occasion and a group of
occasions. It is in viruue of this difference that Aliitehead moves away from any
suggestion of identifying the actual with the finally real.
The problem of interpreting iVhitehead is intensified by his failure to
specify the European metaphysical systems to which his remarks have reference. It
is possible that he refers to materialists have interpreted reality in terms
of the objects of sense. Yet Whitehead we observe holds that in ideally simple
84. AI, 262.
85. Ibid.
86. PR, 27.
87. PH,32.
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oases an ordinary physical object having endurance possesses personal order.
Thus the materialistic thesis is purged by »Vhitehead*s psychologizing. Each sense
object is to be interpreted accordingly as a society of occasions with a personal
potential, if not already personal. The grouping of occasions gives* them the con-
tent of actuality. Each phenomenal object is a grouping of occasicms. Hence, it
is a social structure. "Every actual entity is in its very nature essentially
social..."®^ Whitehead gives a general extension to the concept of the sociality
of every actual thing by asserting: "In fact, the society of each entity, actual
or ideal, is the all Inclusive universe, including its ideal froms."®® According
to this statement the concept of societies applies to the ideal as well as to the
actual. If the ideal be the metaphysical, then the difficulty in .Vhitehead’s po-
sition reappears. The reappearance of the difficulty will be noticed by recalling
that Whitehead contends at one point that societies are not the cample tely real
things.
On the basis of the discussion of -Vhitehead’s theory of societies of actual
occasions we may assert that his chief interest is in maintaining the concept of
order and complexity as parts of his doctrine of actual things. Order and complex-
ity belong to Whitehead’s general attempt to give a psychological undergirding to
his theory of the actual. This observation is one result of our inquiry in the
present chapter. It has been noted that Whitehead thinks of enduring objects in
tewis of societies of actual occasions. The grouping of occasions thus constitutes
an entity an enduring object. In keeping- with the progress of the analysis we may
make the farther observation that the actual occasion is a monadic sentient creature
whose functions involve a process of appropriating its environment, Whitehead con-
88. PR, 52.
89. PR, 309. See also HIT, 108.
90. H?.% 108.
91. AI. 262.
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slders an occasion of consciousness an emergent from this basic process of appropria
tion,^ In his doctrine of the subject-superject -Vhitehead is found arguing for the
primacy of feelings over a feeler, that is, a subjectL of feelings. In this chap-
ter we have cal led a ttention to .Vhitehead’s interpretation of actual occasions
as final real things, that is
,
metaphysical units. The character of dipolarity
(mental and physical) has been suggested in our treatment of »Vhitehead as basic to
the structure of an actual occasion. 2ach actual occasion of the world has its
mental and its physical poles.
From ^at has been said in the foregoing references relative to (VTiitehead's
psychological inteipretation of actuality we see that the lines of his investigation
lead into a larger orbit of thought which we shall designate as his philosophy of
natoire* The actual occasion in ’Whitehead's philosophy of nature is the problem to
be dealt with in the next chapter. In chapter four we shall be concerned with the
effort to determine what contribution <Vhitehead'8 theory of nature makes to a criti-
cal understanding of his doctrine of the actual occasion. Our first task in this
enlarged consideration of material will be an analysis of the actual occasion withl^
the system of those generic notions which -Whitehead calls categories. Our second
task will be to correlate the doctrine of the actual occasion with Whitehead's
interpretations of space and time, causality, change and permanence, continuity
and atomicity, and cosmic order. At this point we shall take up our examination
of the doctrine of the actual occasion within .Whitehead's philosophy of nature.
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Chapter IV
The Actiaal Occasion in Whi’lehead's Riilosophy of Natnre
1, The actiial occasion in. Whitehead’s Categories
i. General statement of the meaning of the categories in iThitehead ’ s
philosophy
In the introductory section of his treatment of the categories White-
head seeks to make clear the sense in which he uses the term category, "This
Chapter contains an anticipatory sketch of the primary notions which, constitute
the philosophy of organism, The meaning of primary notions is given specifi-
cation by Whitehead when he says that the purpose of his discussion is to maKe
clear the "generic notions inevitably presv^posed in our reflective experience -
presi5)posed but rarely expressed in explicit distinction,"^ On the strength of
these references we may say that for Whitehead categories are the basic and
generic notions required for a logical interpretation of experience. Categories
are foundational concepts in terms of which it is possible to give a logical con-
tent to our experiences. They are the primary presuppositions or first principles
in virtue of which things hang together in logical relationship, and without
which we are \anable to make order out of the occasions of experience. In various
systems of categories, including those of Aristotle, Kant, Bowne, Alexander and
Whitehead, there is one persistent problem of philosophy which is posed for
analysis. The problem of the categories is the problem of discovering a general
scheme of classification of experience, or the world of objects, or both. Accord-
ing to Aristotle the term category means the grammatical classification of the
1. PR,27,
2. Ibid.
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forms of speech, and also the ultimate modes of heing (general classes of objects)
that nay be asserted in predication.^ Kant thinks of the categories as the
’’originally pure conceptions of the synthesis ^ich the understanding contains
a pri ori . . . " - Bowne conceives of the categories as ’’those immanent mental princi-
pies ^ich underlie articulate experience and make it possible." These principles
are not principles -s^iich the mind uses to know wi th, but they determine the form
of knowing.^ Alexander calls the categories the "fundamental properties of Space-
Time."'^ The generic notions of .Vhitehead are not assigned a Kantian a priori
status, although they are said to be presupposed in reflective experience. .Thite-
head’s concern with creativity, actual entity, and eternal objects in his cate-
gories expresses mbre than determination of the forms of knowing suggested by
Bowne. The categories of creativity, act’jal entity, and eternal objects point up
the ideas of process, actuality, and potentiality. Alexander's thinking of the
categories as the fundamental properties of Space-Time is similar to .*111 tehead ’s
thinking of creativity as the most fundamental notion in the categoreal scheme.
.'i/hitehaad ’s treatment of the categories falls under four headings: the
category of the ultimate, the categories of existence, the categories of expla-
nation, and the tfategoreal obligations. The category of the ultimate (creativi-
ty) expresses the general principle presu^-poeed in all forms of existence. The
category of the ultimate and the categories of existence are central ?fiiereas
the last two divisions contain comentaries on these basic notions. ’(Thi teheed 's
treatment of the categoreal obligations suggest that by categoreal obligations
he means the conditions to v^ich the experience of sentient entities must con-
form. A chart of '/Thitehead ’s categories with a derivative table of definitions follow.
3, Aristotle, Cateerorles .lA - 15B,
4, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
,
A 79,80(B105),
5, Bowne, TTK, 59.
6, Bowne, TTK, 61,
7, Alexander, STD, v.l, 189.

ii. General Chart of Whitehead's Categories
(PR, 27 -42)
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Category of the Ultimate
Creativity
li/Iany One
Categories of existence
(i) Actual entities
(actual occasions) -
final real things
(ii) Prehension - concrete
facts of relatedness
(iii) Nexus - a pioblic
matter of fact - set of
actual entities in unity
of relatedness
(iv) Subjective form -
private matter of fact
(Repudiation of doctrine
of vacuous actuality)
(v) Eternal objects -
pure potentials for
specific determination
of fact - forms of
definiteness
(vi) Proposition - Impure
potentials for speci-
fic determination of
fact (a subject-pred-
icate relation deter-
mines the actual enti-
ties and eternal ob-
jects composing a pro-
r
sition)
Multiplicity - a
pure disjunction of
diverse entities, ( a
common experience is
ground for a mxilti-
plicity)
(viii) Contrast - a mode
of syntheses of enti-
ties in one prehension:
Categories of explanation
(i) Actuail world - process
- a becoming of actual
entities
(ii) Becoming
- process Ijy
which potential unity
of many entities ac-
quires real unity of one
actual entity
(iii) Novelty - result of
becoming
(iv) Principle of rela-
tivity
- principle of
immanence of actual oc-
casions
.
(v) Utaique origin of ac-
tual occasions (No two
actual entities origi-
nate from the same uni-
verse )
(vi) Potentiality - condi-
tioned indetermination
(vii) Ingression - mode by
which potentiality of
an eternal object is
realized in particulars
(viii) (a) Objectification
- external relations of
an actual entity (b)
Becoming - intern^ re-
lations of an actual
entity
(ix) Actual entity - how ac
tual entity becomes
(Being - becoming)
(x) Actual entity - con-
crescence of prehensions
(concreteness posited in
wholeness) (this category
repudiates doctrine of
vacuous actuality)
Categoreal obligations
(i) Subjective unity - com-
patibility for integration
(ii) Objective identity -
principle of non-duplica-
tion of elements in the
stage of satisfaction of
an actual entity
(iii) Principle of non-co-
alescence of diverse
elements in the objective
datum of an entity,
(iv) Conceptual valuation -
principle of union of form
and matter (union of ideal
and actual),
(v) Conceptual reversion -
the diversity of conceptual
experience derived from
eternal objects
(vi) Transmutation - Integra-
tion of contrasts of physi-
cal and conceptual feelings
in every actual entity
(vii) Subjective harmony -
mutual determination of
conceptual feelings by
rautufiJ. adaptation (princi-
ple of preestablished har-
mony in every concrete
thing)
(viii) Relevsait future -
those elements felt by the
present subject with ef-
fective intensity (those
elements liaving a predomi-
nant compatibility for en-
trance into an occasion)
(ix) Freedom (ercternal)
Remainder for subject-super-
j ect . Deteriaination (internal
)
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General Chart of V^liitehead * s Categories (con.)
Category of the Ultimate
Creativity
wlany One
Categories of explanation
(conj
(xi) Factors in a prehen-
sion - (a) prehending
subject (b) datum pre-
hended (c) subjective
form of the prehen-
sion
(xii) Classification of
prehensions (a) Posi-
tive prehensions (feel-
ing) (b) negative pre-
hensions (elimination
from feeling)
(xiii) Classification of
subjective forms (This
category repudiates
doctrine of vacuous
actxaality) (a) emotions
(b) valuations (c)pur-
poses (d) adversions
(e) consciousness
(xiv) Nexus - set of ac-
tual entities in the
unity of relatedness.
(Based on mutml pre-
hensions )
(xv) Proposition (Sub-
ject predicate rela-
tion between actual
entities and eternal
objects composes a
proposition)
.
(xvi) Multiplicity
(Groijnd of a multipli-
city is a commcn expe-
rience )
Categories of explanation
(con.)
(xvii)(a) Datum - an item
of experience (b) con-
trasts compose a datum
(contrasts are modes of
synthesis in one prehen-
sion)
(xviii) Ontological prin-
ciple
- principle of
togetherness of effi-
cient and final causal-
ity. (actual entities are
the only reasons)
(xix) (a) Actual entities
(final) (b) Eternal ob-
jects (final)
(xx) Fianction - contribii-
ting determination to
to actual entities in
nexus of some actual
world
(xxi) Actuality - a self
determining entity (com-
bination of self identi-
ty and self diversity)
(xxii) Becoming - transfor-
mation of diversity into
coherence)
I
Categories of explanation
(con.)
(xxiii) Actual entity (real
internal constitution) -
self functioning
(xxiv) Objectification -
functioning of one actual
entity in self creation
of another
(xxv) Development of an actual
entity (development is from
immediacy to satisfaction)
(xxvi) Genetic process of an
actual entity (Each element
in the genetic process in-
volves the reaching,not
elimination of contrasts,
(xxvii) Development of an
actual entity (Development
involves a succession of
phases in which new prehen-
sions arise by integration
of prehensions in antece-
dent phases.
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iii Table of definitions derived from ?/hitehead’s Categories
(i) Actual Entity
a, ActiJal occasion
b, Final real thing
c, How the actual entity becomes (Being - becoming),
d, Concrescence of prehensions
e, Iftiity of efficient and final causation (actual entities are the only
reasons)
.
f, A combination of self identity and self diversity.
g, A self functioning entity.
(ii) Becoming
a. Process by which the potential unity of many entities acquires the real
unity of one actual entity,
b.
.
The process of the internal relation of an actual entity,
c. Transformation of diversity into coherence,
(iii) Conceptual Valuation
The principle of the union of form and matter (the ideal and the actual),
(iv) Contrast
A mode of synthesis of entities in one prehension,
(v) Creativity
The ultimate principle by which the many (the universe disjunctively) become
the one actual occasion (the universe conjunctively)
,
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(vi) Datum
An item of experience.
(vii) Eternal Object
a. Pure potential for specific determination of fact,
b, A form of definiteness.
(viii) Function
To contribute determination to actual entities in the nexus of some actual
world
.
(ix) Ingression
A mode by which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in par-
ticulars.
(x) Many (the)
a. Entities in their relation of disjmotive diversity
b. The universe disjunctively.
(xi) Multiplicity
A pure disjmction of diverse entities,
(xii) Nexus
a. Public matter of fact.
b. Set of actual entities in the unity of relatedness.
(xiii ) Novelty
The result of a process of becoming
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(xiv) Objectification
a. The external relation of an actual entity.
b. The function of one actual entity in the self creation of another
actual entity,
(xv) Objective identity
The condition of non-duplication of elements in the final stage (satisfac-
tion) of an actual entity.
(xvi) One (the)
a. The singularity of an entity.
b. The universe conjunctively.
(xvii) Ontological principle
The principle of the union of efficient and final causation, (actual enti-
ties are the only reasons).
(xviii) Potentiality
A conditioned indetermination.
(xix) Prehension
A concrete fact of relatedness.
(xx) Proposition
a. Impure potential for specific determination of fact.
b. The logical form of the Subject-predicate relation v/hich is composed
respectively of actml entities and eternal objects.
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(xxi) Relativity (principle)
Principle of the immanence of actual occasions,
(xxii) Relevant Future
Those elements which are felt by a present subject with effective intensity
for entrance into its objectification,
(xxiii) Subjective form
a. Private matter of fact;th0 essence of the actual
b, A factor in a prehension,
(xxiv) Subjective Harmony
The mutual determination of conceptual feelings by mutual adaptation
(principle of preestablished harmony in every concrete entity)
.
(xxv) Subjective Iftiity
A compatibility for integration,
(xxvi) Transmutation
The integration of contrasts of physical and conceptual feelings in every
actual entity.
iv. The actual occasion and the category of the ultimate( creativity)
Whitehead’s concept of creativity is his answer to the question of what is
ultimate, that is, final and irreducible. The ultimate is described in various
ways by Whitehead, In a reference to Aristotle ,Whitehead says, "This category
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Up
.
.aaoiiiicoo lmj&^ lo con^tLaa^ odt lo cJqioaJblf
•
,
',.
'..fl
.
'*« •
"
5
-
"5'U
9wprk>JM (Ubqc)
'
i^^^
't^iaAtfcoJL uviJoell* diiyf ;}&«^(kre a doiifir stoaaole ;«30ilT
’
’-
') i '*'
^1 CiiiX eO^XaXte#
'..' 'A r t
; ..6
• *1
•.» <
.
w'lol 6Vl;}c9t<^£i (ijfcixz)
'
A
'
"'
i!-
* .'“j i
locrioa 9 .
a
\o ooaesaa lu ,«
.coiaodridnq z nl uo-toa^ A ,rf
*' •
XncdruiXi »vl.^9et^tr& (vlxr)
j ^-^<4
V . * - 4-
.• *.^*13
..
G/ixUa3ri£hA Iza^n a^ttLX^al Ltajf%w>a<;n» lo cioi&&aXzt^eb
, !^4a^oiIco Yiovt^ fii boftelXdaS^e'^dtq lo olqlDii
- A
*
^
.'
w
,
"^IcU &vl4oet^S (vxjc)
^
:tjj
4 ., '
'
* .ncjc4^3®4«l lol ^4iXJb(fJt4aq&oo A
V rfi
aQii^i3^iZ(tr.r£t (±73ac) -.-A
«
3
YttFo ai «3i/ijLfo»l i«f4qotiioo ba» liioieijrtqf 'lo lo axIT
,\iltuib Ijtti
.-V . ".|
*
'
’•
Lfc
'”'* "
• (Ztl'fUMmo,9^/sal^SiS odSt lo nolaaooo Liuioz oiQ .vi
tfi
.
- w
-
'
<il lo aojUeotjp mds oS .-itmisiz aJtxi ai lo 4q®onoo a
’
C‘ ^
auoArti5V nl todlaoeob el edT .eJjdlajbo'Wi-iWd Jlaoll ,«1
^o^oluo udl*** iuiodd^JUIS^aWoicl'JA ^ 6oa'>'relo*i z nl ‘',b4oilo;Mifli
9 ..*
69
of the ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of 'primary substance,'"^ Aristotle
gives the following definition of primary substance in his Mietaphysics ; ("By 'pri-
mary' substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of sometiling in some-
thing elsej i,e.,in something that underlies it which acts as matter),"^ Thus
creativity is the basic reality, the ultimate substratm, the essence of all
, mat-
ters of fact, and the only independent reality. At one point Whitehead calls
creativity "the one underlying activity. At another point he refers to it as
"an underlying eternal energy. Creativity seems to have the function’ of the
Platonic receptacle according to ’Whitehead's words tiiat "The general activity is
not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities,"^
Whitehead's creativity bears a resemblance to Alexander's Space-Time by being a
general metaphysical matrix. Creativity is the non-actual condition of the actual.
Vifhitehead does not make of creativity an 'unrelated one,' The tendency
toward a neutral monism in ^'ilhitehead ' s thought hardly goes to the extreme of an
unknowable, Tiiere is in 'Whitehead's discussion the reminder tiiat "tne creativity
is not separable from its creatures, The connection of creativity with actual-
ity is given prominence by VJhitehead as follows; "Creativity, many, one are the
ultimate notions involved in the meaning of tlie synonymous terms 'tiling*, 'being',
entity... By being involved in 'thing', 'being', and 'entity' the concept of
creativity is thus joined with tlie concept of actuality, Thingiiood is grounded
in creativity. The creativity expresses itself disjunctively and conjunctively.
It is in the disjunctive and conjunctive modes of creativity that VJhite-
head brings his discussion of the ultimate to bear upon his doctrine
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of the actual occasion, ”It fcreativitj^ is the ultimate principle by which the
many, which is the miverse disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which
is the universe conjunctively,"^^ Creativity is thus a bond uniting the many
and the one. The many and the one are aspects of the world which belong to the
\xltimate creativity. They are indeed called final ppposites in V’/hitehead ' s or-
ganic view of nature, "In our cosmological construction we are therefore left
with the final opposites, ,,disjunction and junction - that is to say, the many in
the one,,,"l® Connection of creativity with the actual occasion is also shown by
the statement: "It ^creativity J is a general metaphysical character wiiich underlies
all occasions in a particular mode of each occasion, Each occasion is hence a
mode of the ultimate creativity. Creativity is "the universal of universals
characterizing iiLtimate matter of fact,"*^ Creativity is according to this reference
that which characterizes every item of the actual world. Creativity is the most
general character of all reality. Existence is not separable from process which
is the eternal underlying activity. In any of its essences existence cannot be
abstracted from process, The existence of an actual occasion has its ultimate
source in creativity. The processes of actual occasions are the embodiments of
creativity which is inseparable from its creatures.
Apart from involvement in actual occasions creativity becomes abstract
potentiality. Being actual means for kVhitehead being concrete, that is, limited
and definite. The process of creativity is the uniting of the limited and the
unlimited, the finite and the infinite. Actuality as the union of the limited
and the unlimited is the very exemplification of potentiality. Definiteness is
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the qualification which actual! tj7 places upon mere potentiality, Whitehead is
essentially Platonic in his notion that definiteness is a qualification in ac-
tuality of that which is unlimited and infinite. He is Aristotelian in his notion
that the realm of the infinite and potential is in inseparable union with the
realm of the finite and actxial. Forms have their lociis in the world of particular
things. Particular things do not exist without creativity, "No entity can be di-
vorced from the notion of creativity, This repetition of the notion of an in-
separable relation between existence and potentiality, matter and form, is evidence
of Whitehead's organic trend of thought as applied to the first division of the
categories. Existence is activity. To be actual means to possess activity. Ac-
tualization involves selection of possibilities, hence, its necessary particularity.
Activity becomes particularized in actualization. Each actual entity, it may
therefore be said, is a particularization of the metaphysical character of all ob-
jects, that is, creativity. The plurality of objects involved in the creative pro-
cess Iholudeg certain stable elements. These stable elements belong to "the realm
of eternal objects which are vario\isly synthesized in these modes. Eternal ob-
jects constitute a guarantee of order and permanence in the realm of change and
novelty. It is in the virtue of eternal objects 'that creativity is process. Pro-
cess and existence require reference to each other. The notions of "existence and
process presuppose each other. This means in the language of the categories
that the category of the ultiniate requires the categories of existence, mid that
the categories of existence likewise require the category of the ultimate. We
shall now treat the categories of existence to determine their contribution to our
understanding of the actual occasion.
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V, The actual occasion and the categories of existence
(i) The actual occasion and the acti;a.l entity
.Vhitehead’s first category of existence is the category of the actual entity.
In the table of definitions derived from the oategoreal scheme we* notice that .7hite-
25
head defines actual entities as "final Realities or Res Verae ." There is finality and
irreducitillty In vVhi tehead 's concept of actual entities. The te'rm entity vVhitehead
points out is simply the Latin equivalent for ’thing* ( entitas ) : and follows his note
on etymology with the remark that "all thought is about things. "2- By the same token
of etymology to which 'vVhitehead does not make reference the term actual ^(actual is )
denotes an act or action. The actual is for Whitehead the active. This is shown by
25
the fact of Whitehead making the being of an actual entity its becoming. The
actual is the definite and the limited in the \inder lying activity.
The definition of the actual entity contained in the first category of ex-
istence suggests an interchangeable relationship bewteen the concept of actual en-
tities and actual occasions. The res verae are in 'Whitehead’s own terminology
"Actual entities - also termed actual occasions, 'Whitehead’s use of the term
actual entities is characteristic of his works before Process and Reality. In
Prooass and :<eali ty and later works the notion of acttial occasions shares the phi-
losophical stage with actual entities. According to Process and Reality Whitehead
replaces the vulgar tern ’sensible object* by the term ’actual entity’ in order
"to free our notions from participation in an epistemological theory as to sense-
perception,"^*^ The substitution of actual entity for sensible object is thus a
23. PR. 32.
24, CON
.
5.
25. PR. 33.
26. PR, 32.
27. PR. 113
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tonr de force to avoid epistemological dualism. Although seemingly identified
with each other by the suggestion of interchangeability, the terns actual entity
and actual occasion will be found in later references not to be always inter-
changeable, The distinction between these terms will have revelation value for
Whitehead's doctrine of the actual occasion.
The choice of the term actual occasion instead of the term actual entity
is a choice growing out of certain of VJhitehead's cosmological problems. One of
Ofi
these problems is that of substance, Aristotle's primary substance and
Spinoza's one groat Substance^® are for Whitehead the ultimate cjreativity or the
one underlyix^ activity. Creativity is involved according to Whitehead in the
30
notions of thing, being, and entity. Hence, the old substance-quality con-
cept is replaced in the xdiilosophy of organism by the notion of dynamic process.
The actual entity is conceived by Whitehead to be a process. In accomodating
his terminology to the notion of activity as the essence of the actual Whitehead
has created the term actual occasion, "Every actual occasion presents itself
31
as a process,.," The new on5)ha3i8 by .Vhitehead is in effect a declaration
of his Intention to liquidate the old concept of substance vhich has been associa-
ted with the term entity. The thlnghood of the actual entity is therefore
transformed into the eventness of the acttial occasion, "An adtual occasion on
the side of its full oonoreteness is that in virtue of which it is an event in
nature,"®^
An event according to 'Whitehead is an occurrence in which is cbntained
an assemblage of space and time. It is a unit process transcending any simple
28, PB, 32,
29, SM7, 99.
30, PR, 31.
31, SMW, 246.
32, SMW, 238.
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location, tiiftt is, it is a locus of the universe. ’’But tlie word event just
means one of the spatio-temporal unities,”®® The event as accepted hy White-
head registers his general agreement with the relativity doctrine of Einstein
and l!inkowskl. Whitehead at one point calls an actual occasion "the limiting
type of an event with only one rnemher,"®^ On this "basis an actual occasion may
be described as a simple event. Yet the occasion is complex, being in itself a
35
process involving a transformation of diversity and coherence. The event
itself is complex, being used by .Vhit^ead to cover a nexus of occasions,
The difficulty of the contrast between simplicity and con^jlexlty in an actual
occasion is reduced, if not obviated, by the dialectic of the process of ob-
jectification which involves negative as well as positive prehensions. The ac-
tual occasion is the prehension into a unity of spatial and temporal exten-
sions. The process of unification is a process involving self identity and self
diversity. These involvements of the actual occasion constitute the essence of
its objectification. The notions tised by TVhitehead in his amplification of the
concept of event point up the problems of Identtity,diversity, prehension, loca-
tion, and novelty. The general force of Whitehead's thought on the concept of
event, and hence, of an actual occasion, is to make clear his desire to let go
the substance idea. The choice of terminology is a token of intellectual
purging. Let us face another of the problems of Whitehead having their source
in the distinction made between aotml occasion and actual entity.
Another cosmological problem of *Vhitohead related to his choice of the
term actual occasion is his desire to adjust the Newtonian world view to
that of Einstein and linkowski. It is the problem of absolutism versus relativ-
ity, Newton's absolute place and duration are identified by .Vhitehead with the atomized
33. SM, 102.
34. PH, 113.
35. PH, 38.
36. PH, 113.
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quantum of extension, that is, with his own notion of the actiaal entity,^7
Motion does not for Newton apply to absolute space. By taxing over tiiis con -
elusion from Newton V/hitehead says, "thus an actual entity never moves, The
actual entity is accordingly always where it is. The term actual occasion is
substituted for the term actual entity by Whitehead in order to emphasize the
immovableness of the actual entity, "In order to emphasize this ciiaracteristic
[immovablenessJ by a phrase connecting the notion of ‘actual entity* more close-
ly with our ordinary habits of thought, I will also use the term ‘actual occasion
‘
in the place of the term ‘actual entity The characteristic of immobility
is made immistakably applicable to the actual occasion by ?iliitehead in the fol-
lowing reference; ”In the ‘organic ‘doctrine, motion is not attributable to an
actual occasion, Instead of moving, actual occasions are said by Whitehead
to become. "In the organic theory, they merely become, There is a becoming
rather than a moving of actual occasions. "Every actual occasion presents itself
as a process; it is a becoiaingness."'^^ Becoming means the "transformation of
diversity into coherence. ^he coherence referred to is the coherence of being
something actual and concrete. How there can be a becoming without change v/hi tp*-
head does not make clear. The difference between the two concepts marks a dif-
ference between the monads of Leibniz and the actual entities (actual occasions)
of Whitehead.
There is another case of distinction which ’^itehead makes between actual
entities and actual occasions. This case is his refusal to call God an actual oc-
casion while calling him an actual entity, Discussion of this distinction will
37. PR,113.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. PR,119.
41. PR,124.
42. SMW,246.
43. PR, 38.
44. PR,135
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be delayed until the next chapter,^® The second dominant concept in .Vhitehead*s
categories of existence is his concept of eternal objects, .Ve are told that
”lmong the categories of existence actual entities and eternal objects stand out
with a certain extreme finality. Attention will now be devoted to the actual
occasion and eternal objects,
(li) The actual occasion and eternal objects
The problem of the relation of actual occasions to eternal objects is
simply one way of posing the problem of the relation of matter to form, the limited
to the unlimited, actuality to potentiality. An illustration is found in the
problem of the relation of the plant to the seed. The problem of form and matter
finds expression in traditions of thought that were made classical in Plato and
Aristotle, In order to get a grasp upon the problem in <7hitehead we need to de-
termine the meaning of eternal objects, and to note vvh&t definitions of the ac-
tual occasion are relevant thereto.
Eternal objects are defined as ”Pure potentials for the specific Deteiv
4.7
mlmtion of fact or forma of definiteness,'*" They are called pure because in
themselves they do not involve any necessary reference to matters of fact. In
Whitehead's words "Any entity -whose conceptxial recognition does not involve a
necessary reference to any definite actual entitles of the temporal world is
called an 'eternal object,"*^® As ptire they may be called essences. They are
the forms ^Ich subsist independent of the actualities of the sensible world, ThQ
notion of potentiality included in the concept of eternal objects is brought
4.9
out by Vhitehead in a discussion of the primordial nature of God," Briefly
put the primordial nature of God is his "unlimited conceptual realization of
45. See pp. 122 ff.
46. PR, 33,
47. PH, 32.
48. PR, 70.
49. See pp. 126 ff.
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the absolute wealth of potentiality. "^0 The conceptual realization of God is
based upon his inclusion of eternal objects. These eternal objects are thought
by Whitehead to subsist as components in God's primordial nature. "The notion
of subsistence is merely the notion of how eternal objects can be components in
the primordial nature of God,"^l It is in this context that V/hitehead identifies
his eternal objects with Platonic Ideas,
The function of eternal objects is the determination of actuiality accord-
ing to form, Whitehead's word for this function is 'ingression, » If sternal
objects be as Whitehead says
,
"objects in nat^lre which do not pass" they must
always be ingressed in particulars, Vfliitehead gives this suggestion fullness when
he avers that "The eternal objects are the same for all actual entities." The
relevance of eternal objects to the processes of actUEilization seems to carry
with it the idea of incorporation in particulars. At least there is in every
eternal object some reference to actual entities. Every form refers to some
sort of realization, Every eternal object has relevance for the realm of de-
terminate being, Whitehead tends toward an Aristotelian solution of the problem
of form to matter. The theory of ingression is an Aristotelian supplaaent to
Whitehead's essential Platonism. Whitehead is a foe to those who would keep the
two realms in sharp separation. The terms imitation and participation used by
the classical philosophers do not seem to satisfy iThitehead whose tenainology
is more physicalistic. In any case there is in eternal objects the possibility
for actuality. This possibility for actuality is according to Whitehead that
which defines the metaphysical status of eternal objects, "Thus the metaphysi-
cal status of an eternal object is that of possibility for actuality, An
60, PR,521.
51. PR, 73,
52. Ibid,
53, CON, 143.
54. PR, 34.
55, MT,94,
56, SIvW,22.
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eternal object is therefore real as a possibility for something actual. By
possibility -Thitehead means ’’that in which there stands achievability, abstracted
from achievement,"^*^
Interpreting the actual occasion as an achievement, we may conclude that
its reality acquires the subsistence of eternal objects. Eternal objects are
the carriers of possibility in virtue of their being conceptual forras in the na-
ture of God, Because of their positive and negative feelings actual entities
show relative patience for various types of inclusion and exclusioii. Patience
for inclusion or exclusion is a variable function of every actual occasion. The
mode of the relative inclusion and exclusion of various possibilities is that by
which every actual occasion is defined, "Every actual occasion is defined by
how these possibilities are actualized in itself, The connection of actual
occasions and eternal objects is via possibility and potentiality. Into every
actual occasion there is an ingression of eternal objects. Eternal objects are
the ingredient possibilities of actual occasions. Actual occasions are the re-
lease points of eternal objects. The potentiality of eternal objects concretes
itself in particular actual occasions.
In comparison with other systems of thought "Whitehead’s correlation of
actual occasions and eternal objects has some similarities. The correlation
and
is auggestive of the Keuitian categories of unity^ limitation, inherence and
subsistence, possibility and impossibility.^^The notions of being and possibility
in Bowne's doctrine of categories are comparable with Whitehead’s actual entities
and eternal objects.^O Following tiiis consideration of the tMO mosu prominent
categories of existence and their relation to the actual occasion we shall treat
in an abbreviated fashion the remaining concepts under existence.
57. SMW,226.
58. SM,222.
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60. Bowne,TTK,70
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(iii) The actual occasion and the concepts of prehension,nexus,sub-
jective form, propositions, multiplicity,contrasts,
\7hitehead calls prehensions * Concrete Facts of Relatedness, Now the
essence of prehension is feeling. In our discussion of the actual occasion in
Whitehead’s psychology it was pointed out that the terra feeling has a close analogy
to the use of the term enjoyment by Alexander and the use of the terra intuition by
Bergson, An actual entity is described by Whitehead as "a process of feeling
the many data so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual satisfaction,"®^
Interpreting this passage we may say that being actual means having concrete exis-
tence, Actualization is enjoyment of specification and limitation. To feel is
to have a relevance for something. This relevance may be inclusive (positive) or
exclusive (negative).®^ An actual occasion is a prehending thing which embodies
certain concrete facts of relationship. In short an existence is a feeling unity.
It is an organism, "The category of prehension expresses -how the world is a sys-
tem of organisms,"®^ Prehension expresses how the world is a system of indivi-
duals in interlocking relationships, A prehension is a unified being hov/ever sim-
ple or complex. Apart from prehension there is no affinity of parts to constitute
an organism a functioning unity. In an expanded sense organic unity includes the
nexus.
The definition of a nexus which fits into Whitehead’s doctrine of the actual
occasion is that it is a "set of actual occasions or entities in the unity of re-
latedness constituted by their prehensions of each other,"®® This means that a
61, PR, 3k,
62, See pp.^^
63, PR, 65,
64, PR,66.
65, Brightman (ed,),P6IC,60,
66, PR, 55,
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nexus is an interprehending unity of occasions. Any group of occasions makes a
nexus when it has a common bond of feeling. Relevance of parts is accordingly
the social basis of existance, whether on the organic or inorganic level. There
are nexus of occasions in the world of microscopic and macroscopic activity.
Subjective form in contrast to nexus pertains to the internal constitution
of an active thing, Whitehead speaks of this category as the category of "Pri-
fiV
vate matters of fact,” ' This is the category of internal relations,whereas the
nexus is the category of external relations. It is in virtue of the category of
subjective form that the actual occasion may be called an atom. This category is
in effect a reassertion of Democritus minus the tradition of substance. This
category goes beyond Democritus by going beyond mere separateness of existence to
the notion of a private life for each actual entity. This category gives philo-
sophic status to a conclusion reached in the field of atomic physics, ’Thitehead
also shares the conviction that atomicity is correlative with relativity, private
life is correlative with public life. In the following reference he seeks to
maintain a mion of both aspects; ”The creatures are atomic. Atomism does not ex-
clude complexity and universal relativity. Each atom is a system of all things,
The nexus and subjective form are thus only two ways of conceiving of the operations
of creativity.
The operation of activity is the source of propositional activity as the
term is used by ?/hitehead, ”A proposition is a unity of certain actual entities in
their potentiality for forming a nexus,
A
proposition is thus a unxty of ac-
tual occasions considered in respect to the possibilities they entertain for a given
type of order. Propositions are the preliminary conditions of order in V£irious
realms of existence.
In his discussion of multiplicities Whitehead changes from tne considera-
tion of potential unity in propositions to the actual diversity of occasions.
67. PR,3£.
68. pRjSS*^
69. PR, 35.
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The category of miiltiplicity accordingly deals with »Piire Disjunctions of Diverse
Entities, In explanation of this category ^^hitehead states tiiat multi-
plicity consists of many entities and its unity is constituted by the fact that
all constituent entities severally satisfy at least one condition wliich
-no other
entity satisfies,"' The unity of multiplicity seems to be the minimum condi-
tion for the enjoyment of sociality by act^iai occasions. This unity of multi-
plicity is the prerequisite ef the togetherness of actual things, Tne mere no-
tion of certain things existing together is predicated upon some condition which
they severally satisfy, Thr s category is axiomatic in all fields of science oc-
cupied with the study of group life. According to Vfhitehead * s analysis of the
term contrast the notion means that each prehension has its mode by wiiich par-
ticipating entities become integrated, A contrast is in fact a ‘mode of syn-
thesis of entities in one prehension, There is a way of integration for
every synthesis of actual entities, Whitehead appears to reserve the term con-
trast for positive prehensions when he asse?’ts "That tne heightening of intensity
arises from order such that the multiplicity of components in the nexus can enter
explicit feeling as contrast , and not be dismissed into negative prenensions as
incompatibilities," '' On the basis of this statement it would not be amiss to
call a contrast a positive prehension. In a contrast a multiplicity becomes a
unity of compatible elements. Each contrast is an expression of a tolerance of
certain actual occasions for each other. Contrasts- imply tolerance and com-
patibility.
The several references to the categories of existence iii tne categories
of explanation maxe the latter categories little more timn a series of footnotes
on the former. In the foiio'wing division we shall deal with the categories of
70, PR, So,
71, PR, 36.
7^, PR, 33.
73. PR, 1^8,145.
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explfciricLtion as they relate to the doctrine of the act\ial occasion.
vi. The actual occasion and the categories of explajiation
The categories of explanation are designed by Tfnitehead.'to make clear the
basic concepts of the categories of existence j namely, actual entities and eter-
nal objects. The concept of the actual occasion hiis already been shov/n to be
linxed with these concepts, especially the concept of actual entity. The cate-
gories of explanation treated in this portion of our discussion will be studied
for their V6J.ue in contributing to our knowledge of the actual occasion.
The actual occasion is a creature. It is a product of creativity. The
actual world is a world of creatures emergent from the creativity txiat is ulti-
mate, The process of creativity according to Vhitehead's theory is the ground
of all actuality including actual occasions and actual entities. As emergents
"they l^actual entities] are also termed actual occasions. When essphasis Is
placed on the process and the becoming of actual entities they are tnen given
the caption of actual occasions by k/hitehead. It may be said therefore tiiat an
actual occasion is an actual entity with special qualifications. In our previous
discussion of the actual entity and the actual occasion some distinctions v/ere
presented, '^Jhitehead expresses a preference for the term actual occasion when
transition and instantaneousness ane to be accentuated.
Because of the accentuation of instantaneousness in the concept of the
actual occasion it follows that each actual occasion is preeminently a novelty.
Novelty is involved in the becoming of every actual occasion. Each actuiil occa-
sion is a creative advance into novelty. The universe of one actual occasion is
never the exact universe involvea in the creation of another actual occasion.
This condition is the basis of novelty and is suggested by ’ffliitehead iii the
74. PR, 35.
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remark that "no two actual entities originate from an identical universe,"*^
Each actual entity or occasion has its ovm circumstances. Each occasion has
its own line of inheritance, although it is generally related to all other oc-
casions, The doctrine of the interrelation of actiial occasions is \fhitehead's
doctrine of mutual immanence. Every actvial entity participates in the life
process of some other actual entity. No actioal occasion or no actual entity
lives alone. By this doctrine of mutual immanence iThitehead seeks to estab-
lish interconnection among actualities. At this point he differs from Leibniz
who required a doctrine of preestablishea heirmony for actualities without
mutual immanence
,
Actual occasions are coni^ected and relatively iiarmonious according to
iVhitehead in virtue of the etexinal objects which enter iiito their being, VJlien
these forms are thought of as elements in the structure of an actual occasion
or an actual entity they are said to be ingressed therein, Ingressioxi is the
term used to describe any mode of participation of eternal objects into actuali—
ties. As a category the concept of ingression offers an e:-cpianation of the
actual by reference to the ideal.
»«hitehead assimilates the concepts of being and becoming, Therdfore,
becoming is the core of existence of any actual thing, whether it be called
entity or occasion. The process of prehension is the means by which there is
the emergence of determinate things. Each emergent actual occasion is a nerve
spot of the universe. It registers the processes which iUtVe ramifications in
the distant parts of the universe, IVhen the registering is expressed negatively,
that is, by elimination of data, the action is called a negative prehension.
When the action is inclusive it is called a positive prehension, Thus Eegative
75. PR, 33, 34.
76. PR, 33, 34, 131.
77. PR, 35. See pp.§£
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and positive prehensions are ways of explaining affinities and aversions
on a
naturalistic level.
Thai© are according to .Vhitehead groups of actual occasions and groups
of actual entities. The relative affinity and the relative aversion of feeling
among actualities determine the type of grovp life they 1411 enjoy. Any mode of
group life among entities is a nexus. ’’Any set of occasions conceived as combined
into a unity will be termed a nexus, Thus the capacity for social life is a
quality of actual things. The togetherness of things as well as their discrete--
ness point to functions within the realm of existence. It is the problem of the
one and the many of which vVhitehead seeks a solution.
3aoh entity is described by iThitehead as actual when it ’’functions in re-
spect to its own determination."’’'^ This categoreal description as a thing applied
to the actual occasion ties it up with v/hitehead’s ontological principle. On the
80
basis of this principle there is a conjunction of efficient and final causation.
According to this principle the only reasons of things are in the things themselves.
The notion of entities as causes in themsalTas is the notion that one entity func-
tions in the self creation of another. In as much as the underlying creativity
is inseparable from its creatures j and in as much as eternal objects are always
ingressed in things, it follo\T3 that the reasons of things are immanent in the
81
things themselves.
VShitehead’s emphasis is on self-determination irtien he speaks of things as
being their own reasons. Self functioning is "the real internal constitution of
an actual ontity."®^ mtehead calls attention to Locke's use of the phrase 'real
internal constitution' by which he means their essence.' "And thus the real inter-
78. AI, 254.
79. PR, 38,
80. PR, 36,37.
81. See discussion of the actual occasion and the problem of causality
on pp.lOO ff.
82. PR, 38.
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nal (but generally In substances unknown) constitution of tilings, isdiereon their
83discoverable qualities depend
,
may be called their ’essence',” Locks in this
passage is referring to primary qualities of objects in contradistinction to
their secondary qualities* V/hitehead in dealing with this problem makes the ob-
servation that "Descartes and Locke maintained a two-substance ontology - Descartes
explicitly, Locke by Implication.” " 'The philc«cphy of organism is said by T^ite-
head to involve the adoption of the view that "Locke’s account of mental substance
embodies, in a very special form, a more penetrating philosophic description than
does Descartes’ account of corporal substance."®^ It is, however, the aim of
•'Whitehead to maintain a Leibnizian balance between Descartes and Locke. The start-
ing point in the realization of this aim is for VQiitehead "a generalization of
Locke’s account of maital operations,”®^ By generalizing Locke’s account of men-
tal operations V.’hitehead affirms sentience as a characteristic of every actual en-
tity, Descartes’ extended substance thus betfomes under iThltehead’s analysis en-
dowed with mental operations. From these observations concerning the organic
philosophy we gather that for «Vhltehead the real internal constitution of an ac-
tual entity is a subject having its own iranedlacy, '.Thi t ehead ’ s doctrine of pre-
sentational immediacy is an atten5)t to render superfluous the distinction between
the primary and secondary quality of objects, livery object is subject possessed,
this being the character of its internal constitution, An actua.1 occasion on the
basis of the twenty-third category may bo described as a subject with reference to
it« own immediacy and a suporject with reference to its objectification,®’^
Objectification is dealt with in the twenty- fourth category of explanation.
In the language of Whitehead objectification refers to ’’the functioning of one actual
entity in the self creation of another actual entity, ”®®Thi s category belongs to
Whitehead’s argument for determinism.There is a suggestion of determined sequence
85,
Locke, EHU, Book III, Chapter III, Section 15,
84. PH, 29,
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. See pp.Bl-5S;l61"'ff.for a treatment of subject and superject.
®®« PR, 38.
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and necessary interconnection of entities. The description of objectification
given in this category adds littie,however, to the discijssion of objectification
found in previovis categories of explanation. This category is the category
which restates the doctrine of inmianence. Objectification is simply another
designation for the continuity of occasions in nat\n*e. It may also be referred
to as a doctrine of ’participation 'of the organic philosophy.
In his discussion of categories \Yhitehead calls attention to the phases
of development of an actml entity. From its genesis of immediacy the actual
entity passes through a process culminating in objectification. According to
the doctrine here set forth evolution is applied to the microscopic order of being,
"This final phase is termed * satisfaction * In this final stage of realization
the actual entity fully feels or enjoys its environment. In another category
Whitehead ' maintains "Each element in the genetic process of an actual entity
has one self consistent function, however complex, in the final satisfaction,”^
The final stage of an entity is characterized by a resolving, though not an elimi-
nation, of contrast. Exclusion of data reaches a maximum consistent with the
determinate character of the entity. Inclusion of data also readies ite maxi-
mum consistent with the determinate character of the entity. According to the
twenty-seventh category of explanation "there is a succession of phases in which
%
new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedent phases,
This statement is an argument for continuity. The integration of successive
prehensions is the possibility and meaning of continuity between actual occasions.
The problem of integration is involved in the problem of space and time. V/hite-
head*s general acceptance of the theory of the assimilation of space and time es-
tablishes for him a basis for his doctrine of continuity. We shall now consider
fui'ther elaborations on the actual occasion by noting ite relation to the fourth
division of iiniitehead ’ s categories.
89. PR,38.
90. PR, 38, 39.
91. PR, 39.
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vii. The actual occasion and the categoreal obigations
The categoreal obligations are attempts at a more elaborate metaphysical
accoiant of actualities. The category of subjective unity is an account of those
feelings which at any given phase of an actual entity fail to he integrated, V.Tiite-
head says of these feelings that they ''though unintegrated by reason of the incom-
pleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of
their subject, The notion of being compatible for integration I interpret as
a suggestion of the possible relevance of the excluded datum of the negative pre-
hension of an actual entity. In negative prehensions there is an exclusion from
feeling. It is at this point that JJshenko has offered a penetrating criticism
of Whitehead, According to Ushemco, Whitehead fails to provide an adequate account
of the metsphysical statiis of the datum of eliminated feeling,®^ It was in the
discussion of the twelfth category of explanation that attention was called to the
problematic status of the excluded datum. This problem put in Hegel's mode of
thought we may call the principle of negativity. In tiiis same category the ex-
pression 'compatible for integration' is suggestive of an attempt by »Tiiitehead to
move towaxd a solution of the problem. The notion of compatibility for integra-
tion seems to involve the notions of potentiality and ca\isality which will be
treated at a later point of this discussion,^
According to the category of objective identity there can be "no duplica-
tion of an element in the objective datum of the ^’‘Satisfaction' of an actual entity
so far as concerns the function of tiiat element in the Satisfaction, ' V/hitehead
himself attempts a simplification of tiiis category by expressing the judgment that
each element has one self-consistent function in the satisfaction of an actual entity.
92, PR, 39.
93, Ushenko, "Negative Prehension", Jour,Phil . . 34 (1937), 263,267,
94, See pp ,100-10 5.
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in effect, this category expresses the principle
of non-anplicati on which is the
gnarantee of novelty in the processes of things. Hrtralty
is definitely Inclnded in
the experience of every object in the world of aotnality.
flrltehead attempts to
qualify the phase of satisfaction of each actual entity.
Satisfaction is the final
phase of the process in virtue of which an entity becomes
fully aotuallsed. In
this final stage there oan be "no 'ooalesoenoe' of
diverse elements in the objective
datum of an actual entity..."®® By ooalesoenoe in this
passage .’flntehaad means the
concept of diverse elements having an identity of function
v*loh rules out luoompatl.
ble tendencies. The denial of coalescence of Incompatible
elements is basic to
'Jlhltehead's conceptions of order and patterns of cosmic activity.®’
In the attain-
ment of satisfaction an actual occasion becomes a synthesis
transcending diverse
tendencies ohaiacterlstio of the earlier phases of its development.
This principle
of non-coalescence may te called a monism of the actual
occasion.
In the category of oonoeptual valuation Whitehead asserts:
*®Frora each ihy-
slcal feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual
feeling whose datum
is the eternal object determinant of fee definiteness of the actual entity
or of
the nexus physically felt."^® This statement carries the notion
of the derivation
of conceptual experience from pjRrsical experience. This is hardly
consistent with
the notion advanced by Whitehead that "the final reality is both
physical and
roaital..."^^ It is hardly consistent because the idea of derivation
implies primacy
which is apparently excluded by the assertion of a physicowmen tal
reality as final.
\7hltehead could reply that the notion of derivation simply defines
the order of
emergence of the qualities (physical and mental) that become relatively
prominent
in an actual entity. However, by his use of the term derivation
?feitehead opens
96. PR, 39.
97. See pp. 109-111 for a treatment of the problem of order.
98. PR, 39, 40.
99. AI, 245.
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his systen of philos ophy to the Interpretation that the ultimate reality is pri-
marily, if not predominantly, physical* In making a concession to emergence sVhi te-
heed is in danger of repudiating his ovm doctrine of qualitative monism, The
category of conceptual valuation also contains the idea that an eternal ol)Ject is
the datum of conceptual feeling* These words amount to a restatement of the
Aristotelian doctrine of the union of form and matter*
The category of transmutation is proposed hy '.Vhitehead to meet the diffi-
culty inherent in all monadic cosmologies* The philosophy of organism, admittedly
an atomic theory of actuality, is open to the difficulty of monadic cosmologies;
mmely, the integration of contrast of physical and conceptual feelings. In the
technical language of V/hitehead it is stated as follows:
'iVhen*.*one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially
hy a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feeling***
then in a subsequent phase of Integration of the simple physical
feelings together with derlvate conceptual feeling the prehending
subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a***
nexus containing those prehended actual entities* .*^^^
This means that conceptual feelings or experiences may be derived from physical
feelings, and being thus derived, they may be subsequently integrated with the
physical fueling and thereby transmute their datum into some nexus* This category
suggests transmutation bjr Integration* TVhitehead does not in the context of the
categories make clear how this suggested integration is possible, or how very
precisely it takes place* The possibility of contrasts, and even of incompatibili-
ties, is not definitely considered by way of explamation at this point* 7/hitehead
refers in this category to the attempt of Leibniz to solve the perplexity inherent
in monadic cosmology by his theory of ’confused* perception* Leibniz expresses a
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inilingness that '^the general name of monads or entelechies
shall suffice for simple
substances which have perception only...»101 The context of
this passage suggests
that by’peroeption only* Leibniz means confused
perceptions. It is the contention of
ttl02
’ffhitehead that Leibniz.however, "fails to make clear how
’confusion’ originates.
Leibniz refers the origin of all monads to the "continuous
fulgnratlons of the Divin-
jnay argue with AMtehead that the origination of confused
perceptions
is not made clear by Leibniz, fulgurations of the Divinity
notwithstanding. If trans-
mutation as set forth by Whitehead is original in the ultimate
creativity, its ap-
pearance in each actual entity provokes no serious metaphysical problem.
On this
basis it is conceivable that each monadic creature has a potentiality
for pjiysioal
and mental operations which emerge according to the nexus of which the
creature is
a member. It belongs to each monadic creature as a prehending subject that it
transmute its feelings into a nexus. It is not clear from ^at Whitehead says
whether it is simply by means of membership in a nexus, or by means of its
source
in the ultlnate process that transmutation of feelings arises in an entity. On the
one hand. Whitehead thinks of the entity Itself as a subject which transmutes its
datum. On the other hand, he thinks of transmutation as being inherent in
ultimate
reality. The final reality is both physical and mental, .'i/hitehead’s general posi-
tion of qualitative monism makes it highly probable that n^en he refers to a pre-
hending subject transmuting its feelings he simply means to assert that in the
evolutionary process there is an aacentuation of contrasts vrtilch are already poten-
tial.
The categoiry of subjective harmony sets forth the notion of the mutual de-
termination of conceptual feelings by adaptations vftiich are congruent with the
subjective aim of the conceptnal feelings. This category contains the stiggestion
that conceptual prehensions mf actual entitles determine each other by a process
101. Rand. M3P. 202.
102. PR. 40.
lOS. Rand. M3P. 206.
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of adaptation to the context of their mutual existence. This category and the first
category of subjective unity \7hitehead says, ’’jointly express a preestahlished har-
mony in the process of concrescence of any one subject. ’'^04 jq Cartesian mode of
expression, this would mean a compatibility of cogitations. Uniting this concept
with that of adaptation ^Thitehead reaches the notion of a preestablished harmony
within the process of actual things. Contrary to Leibniz's theory of an Imposed
preestablished harmony V/hitehead here finds the elements of harmony within the monads
themselves. In unity and adaptation actualities reveal qaulitles i^ich belong to
the ultimate ways of things.
According to vVhitehead, ’’The relevant future consists of those elements in
the anticipated futnre ^ich are felt with effective Intensity by the present subject
by reason of the real potentiality for them derived from itself. This means
that the future of any actual occasion is determined by those elements which have
predominant conpatlbility for entrance into that occasion. The expression ’effec-
tive intensity' used in this category of subjective intensity seems to be simply
a Way of referring to the idea of compatibility for integration. The relevant fu-
ture is the future determined by the intensity of the elements of the past. iSffec-
tive intensity means potentiality. Every actual thing has a future which is relevant
to its potentiality. The potential future is a qualification of the possible future.
The potential future is the conditioned future. Thus the problem of the relevant
future belongs to the problem of freedon and determination. .Vhitehead says, "The
concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and exter-
nally free."^®^ In a subsequent explanatory note '.Tiitehead comments, "that in each
concrescence i^atever is determinable is determined, but there is always a remainder
for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence. "^07 term con-
104. PR, 41.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
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orescenoe means the production of a novel togetherness, that Is, a new synthesis.
The term subject-superject refers to that which is a result of a process of ex-
perience. It is an entity as the end product of complex experience. An actual en-
tity is free as a subject and determined as a subjec t-super ject. It belongs to
the nature of an actual entity that its determination always involves elements that
are merely possible. Decision in the form of an actual entity involves a determina-
tion of the actual from the possible. The subjeot-superjeot is the determined en-
tity, Internal determination and external freedom of the actual entity are both
functions of the creativity of the universe. Concluding the discussion of the cate-
gories Whitehead makes the following comment: "The ^ihole of the subsequent discus-
sion in the subsequent parts either leads up to those categories of the four typos,
or is explanatory of them, or is considering our experience of the world in the
108light of these oaetgories,” This discussion of the actiial occasion in V/hitehead’s
Categories will now be supplemented by a series of graphic illustrations. Those
graphic illustrations will be followed by an atten^t to understand the actual occa-
sion in the organic view of nature.
108. PR, 42.
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ment of the categories
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In general actual occasions are actual
entities
Some actual entities are not
actual occasions
An event is a nexus of actual occa-
sions with temporal sequence
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(lil)
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(iv)
By means of the process of ingression
eternal objects, having their original
locus in the all inclusive creativity,
are given residence in actual occasions.
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Being is becoming
xi
No two actuol entities originate
from tile same 'world.
However, t;h9 worlds from which they
originate are mutually immanent.
(Worlds of A and B).
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2, The actual occasion and the organic view of nature
i. The actual occasion and ITiitehead's conceptions of space and time
Whitehead’s analysis of space and time is ultimately reduced to the
event-particle. The event-particle is an assimilation of space and time. This
assimilation of space and time is a complex which is doubly definable, "Each
event—particle is as much an instant of time as it is a point of space, This
means that the event-particle is an integration which has the double characteristics
of spatiality and temporality. This view of event-particles is in centain respects
close to Alexander ’ s view' of point-instant«=: as manifestations of the interdependence
of space and time. In describing the point-instant Alexander makes tne remark,
"I shall say that a point occiirs at an instant and that an instant occupies a point.
Event-particles like point-instants ate the ultimate elements presumed in a four
dimentional manifold of relativity. In this manifold space is finally not discrimina-
ted from time. Space is temporal, and conversely time is spatial. The viev/ held
by both thinkers is that apart from each other space and time are not characteristi-
cally themselves. The event-particle is an"instantai»eo\is point-flash,"^^ The
vivid phrasing of 7?hitehead emphasizes his acceptance in general outline of the
assimilation theory. Every point flashes, that is, temporalizes. Every flash points,
that is, spatializes, WTiat is actual is conjointly spatial and temporal. The event-
particle is a cross section of the world possessing dixration and extension in a locus.
It is a unit in the structure of reality. In the language of the categories an
event-particle may be called a concrescence. It is a concrete particular, an atom
in the manifold of nature, "An event-particle is an instantaneous point vie'wed in
the guise of an atomic event,
109, C0N,173.
110, Alexander, STD,v,l,p,48,
111. CON,173.
112. EPK,121.
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The atomic event is durational. It enjoys a certain quantum of physical
time. Every actual entity is a diirational whole. Every actual occasion is also
a druational whole, Whitehead's insistence upon the durational character of nature
is to be observed in his agreement with Bergson's protest against materialism,
"I agree with Bergson that raaterialisin as the simple location o‘f instantaneous mate-
rial configurations is to be protested against, "US Those who posit substance
where only event-particles of space-time exist are guilty of what Whitehead calls
"misplaced concretion, They are guilty of misplaced concretion because there
is no solid core of a thing in itself. The thing in itself is a process of becoming
and perishing. On Whitehead's view an event-particle is simultaneously in more
than one locus. An event-particle has tiie character of "occupying instantaneously
a certain point in space of 'a ' and also in the space of There is no
simple location of the entities in nature. The idea of simple location is thus set
aside in the pW-losophy of organism. Actual occasions cannot on Whitehead's view
be defined in terms of simple location because they are the durational v/holes of
nature. There are no particles at absolute positions. The denial of simple loca-
tion by Whitehead is negatively a part of his argument against materialism. Posi-
tively it belongs to his dynamic concept of space-time. Nature is made up of enti-
ties which are always passing. This perpetual perishing of entities excludes
eternal objects which are elements in nature that do not pass. Time is perpetually
perishing, and events are always superseding each other. At the base of space-time
is the ultimate creativity. Creativity is actualized in space-time paruicles.
In his doctrine of space-time V/hitehead considers the present as only a
"wavering bneadth of boundery between the two extremes of memory and anticipation, "116
115. SM??,72.
114. Ibid.
116, EPK,53.
116. CON, 69.
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Actiial occasions of experience belong to d\arations. The specious present is the
unit of experience. It includes memory of the past and anticipatioai of the future
,
”The past is immanent in the present by reasons of the relationships which it will
have to the future. It thereby includes in itself the necessities to which the fu-
ture must conform, ’i^itehead's doctrine of immanence amounts to the suggestion
that experience is time-transcending and space-treoiscending. The essence of the
present is to be a relatum of events. Each actual ocasion has memory and anticipa-
tion bound together in an inseparable linity. The conformity of actual occasions
to each other is rooted in the immanence of the past in the present and future.
Each occasion precipitates itself into the events of the future. Each occasion
supersedes other occasions and is in turn superseded by other occasions, \Vhite-
head's notion of the supersession of events is equivalent to Locice's notion of
perpetual perishing, ”By Locke, the phrase, ‘perpetual perishing’ is used in the
same sense as ’supersession' here, "US In the process of a perpetually perishing
time each event gives away to its successors. It is hov/ever objectified in those
successors for which it has relevance. Objectification is a concrete way of ex-
pressing immanence. Supersession is a way by which ^.Vhitehead spells out a synonym
for continuity. The epochal or the atomic character of time as described by White-
head is however in contrast to the continuity of time. By his theory of atomism
Whitehead makes distinctions in the otherwise seamless garment of space-time,
Whitehead introduces into his discussion of time a distinction between time
and eternity. In speaking of the physical and mental poles of experience White-
head says, "The actus.l entity is in its physical pole in time, and in its mental
pole out of time,"^^ This distinction is probably made by Whitehead because he
IITJ. AI,250,
118, Brightman (ed, ) ,P6IC,59
119, PR, 380,
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thinks of the mental pole as being the seat of eternal objects ingressed in actual
occasions. Although always ingressed in actual occasions, eternal objects never-
theless are thought of by ti/hitehead as those elements in natiare wlxich do not pass.
In a sense therefore they are extra-temporal f&r lYhitehead, ”I use the phrase
’eternal object’ for what in the preceding paragraph of this section I have termed
a ’Platonic form’,'’120 Platonic forms stand in contrast to the changing order of
the world. The forms are eternal and above the passage of time. The d-ualism of
time and eternity are made explicit by Plato when he speaks as foliow's: "But he
resolved to make a moving image of eternity, and as he set in order the heaven
he made this eternal image a motion according to nuaber while eternity rested in
unity; and this is what we call time,"^^l V/hitehead ’ s doctrine of eternity is
suggested in his comment that "there are no novel eternal objects,"^^ Eternal
objects are thus considered the permanent elements in the cosmos. The distinction
made by ’«7hitehead between the temporal and the eternal is simply a reflection of
his attempt to solve the problem of change and permanence or change and identity,
^Vhitehead says, "Things which are temporal arise by means of their pai-ticipation
in the things which are eternal, The Platonic notion of participation brings
into relief the problem by suggesting one method of interpreting the metaphysical
in
relation. The relative ^adequacy of this dualism is a problem that opens ?/hite-
head’s doctrine to doubts as to the genuineness of the unity of the actual occasion.
On the whole we are left wondering what eternity adds to occasions which could not
be added by time, Whitehead’s refuge is in the timelessness of objects in the ac-
tual occasion. As treated by V/hitehead the problem of causality is intimately
related to the problem of time. Our aim in the subsequent discussion of causality
120, PR, 70.
121, Plato,Timaeus, 37E,
122. PR, 33,
123. PR,65,
— .Lr -n -.t
^
^*^000
.
-i*w#^\7v**4 (*i i/^-^ciwc • *'!«£ ^ ' A .v 1V/^0aI^-LA .** *A^‘ «. 'wK5
.
..--q^ iun ul e‘ii:j»-a cA fcw^feiaeli' :^- l V-i ^
1
l't»£!:,<t HVfilii i «:ox7i.a‘2 lo dqiiTj^^*’’ .l..-4c:i'i • >. J ni w'.^ii iol XjiriL‘03 ’
jo arA'ro ;-i;'- ' :I L:.<yio «i; v-': ^iiiQJ>?J.^ -i'’,’:k.o': ;;InoJ.-_'i' li
«
lo ^ . i'J '-• -^. .-0 ... :.J -v.i.jj . .^ , .?*»o*i (Vl*! .bl-ron sff.'t
j.; 'j’7'- :o'*o.'.'c*i c. .. ’ii ii 'iiT it - .'
'
'ii w'.c ‘lD.;;e> ;
>
v^i. i»-*JO- r^iT-' wu:*.t
i 3;{t Ti'v .li fca i dii br^ *> n> a ..J iHjvXvc-^T
'fax j'5;v.*:*'i ’'^^/i:..':--‘c! -t,!. -. rpiw ii - .'-7iu.i ;i r^'^x.-iKl .l,u*:*jj - .jiiJ ;l
wi ^7ifr*7_‘s. o ’ o^CiilOw -U\.. ^'" '.'-^iv ^k j £;4 '-i ri.'" 't.tJj'Ji/
_i , -.w c' «
X
^•^-.'' xsvcKi. c-i - : 1- 7 ' 4 ^u^‘. -lOt n— >j 03J)P'2
V ---4x*ii.' is-'i'" . ._._ri> J J.v‘;id.;,x.‘o iA... .m-ieq aili O-'- ;-i.,;i05 .->4 »’ii. ,*.09^00
io Ni.c; - - X X -T-vJ^ Uia Xft'xoqtiv^s) e^it :u.:€>' "^d I
^
.
.Jjiai. X :'
.
:- ;<- t<c.<y. /:2r ’'u*, u,Ci?xis ic s^&ido-:; diid svloz oJ oi4
“cidjSHj.oxd'i-si \.-(/..* ,w''ii-;c> vo fH.t'ili j :-:o^u©4 a:i£ dolur ^sv.-- i.idrfsdip'-
?-.'.;i*:' ;H:x4..-.ixu- C-i..q io ooi^oa oJLroJol^: jiH i^*r :.1.A% typMU^ nl
lr.uX2iCi>ii.iax.i -..'1^0 >jiIJ:©-:4i.'4.;i 'iO -.c*iwi'C. vd . ...jdc-cj <.j-’.l
•
-
‘
* ni
-jjiiidn c.x;ii|0, .:5x';c)‘xq ;’ aX <sl-iJ Ic- ’^t-i-J:'«bJi,ovi.rx- ial .ficldw?*!
,
'
.
-
..'*•020. Xav.Xw..’ 'rA-7 ’’vlnx .;-.4iy -y &' ...}.i.*^-j.t>.'.<^ !^.»lv oC .,> ? .’ot -4 ». L...^ii
w...: i.J^'f.3 aclXvf ^..v j-.xoc'. ..-4 ..-
v
'.'.
-o,. - 2Jo;'-o i<; crid r.i -i
.;^_j:tl i .‘j2 -c. cu^IiJc’zq 0 : 14- >;,v:
.IX O’" *»Ioflv- ,w;:iJ .‘.3
' u *-L':Zifjr- v « 7 4 '^v ijd
.'inJlsi. ^yf lyv.t.:2X? sA . .!-.,_.-;ir,2C J 'wd
•a.^0 . xiJ io 4diCT^*i^ o3d --»J bod^Xo-i
,3VS- .J:-l
'
'i
will be to determine its meaning for Fnitehead, and its relation to tjie doctrine
of the actual occasion,
ii. The actual occasion in 7.1iitehead » s theory of caiosality
The problem of causality is one of the persistent problems of philosophy.
It is the problem of the interconnection of events and entities, Every attempt
to account for the world or any part of it involves tne question of caiasality.
The 'earth, air, fire, and water' of Empedocles constitute a proposed solution of
the problem, »Yhitehead has brought to the discussion of the problem of causality
an approach conditioned by recent developments in the physical sciences. The
stage is set by V^hitehead for a discussion of the problem of causality vdien he
says, "There is nothing which simply happens, ”1^4 Something is always and every-
where happening in nature, Viiiitehead suggests in the main a dynamic view of na-
tiare and the notion of an immanent causality to replace respectively tiie static
view of nature and the notion of a transcendent causality, Viihitehead oases his
theory of actuality largely upon a theory of conformation. The necessity of con-
formity of subsequent events ’to prioraevents rests in the natiare of the prior
events themselves. Every past event sets a condition to which the present and
future must conform, "Every partic\ilar entity lays upon the universe the obliga-
tion of conforming to it," The obligation of conformity is to be identified
with what V/hitehead terms the ' ontological principle' or the 'principle of efficient
and final causation, The meaning of the ontological principle is that "Ac-
tual entities are the only reasons, so that to search for a reason is to search
for one or more act\aal entities, The obligation to conformity accoraingly
124, SI«IE,38,
125, SHE, 39,
126, PR, 36,37,
127, PR, 37,
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arises from the nature and content of actual entities themselves. This means
that causality is immanent in the entities themselves. "Conformation of the
present to the past belongs to the ultimate nature of experience.
hhite-
head's principle of conformation is counterbalanced by his principle of poten-
tiality iii terms of which there is achievability apart from acnievement. Free-
dom has its source in the realm of the merely possible. Once emerged an actuality
conditions its successors. On the basis of what has been said we may conclude
that vVhitehead finds the source of conformation of actiJal entities to actxjal en-
tities in the nature of eaperience. Experience as the term is \ised hy IrQiitehead
covers the whole range of the nature and the behavior of entities. It is of the
nature of all actual entities that they prescribe a possible sequence of events,
that is, a possible world. There are routes of energy peculiar to various occa-
sions, Each event contains the reasons for those events which follow its route
of development or realization. Necessity is internal. It is imposed from within,
"The notion of causality is merely a special way of considering the iiomanence of
the past into the future, The possibility of the immanence of the past into
the future follov7s from the nature of experience. The fact of immanence necessi-
tates conformity.
The possibility of immanence VVhitehead attempts to provide for by tne ap-
plication of the notion of memory to actual occasions. Each actual occasion pre-
serves the memory of its predecessors in becoming what it is. This preservation
of memory is identified, at least partly, with causality, "Thus physical memory
is causation and causation is objective immortality. Physical memory is based
upon passage in nat\ire and the interpenetration of events. In virtue of becoming
objectified in other events, each event thereby conditions the future of the events
128. SME,46.
129. AI,259.
150, Brightmanfed.' ),P6IC,62
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upon trtiich it impinges. In the same context of his dlsotission of
pjiysioal memory
and causation Whitehead speaks of canscioua manory. Conscious memory is "that
131
partial analysis of causation fftiich is effected hy the associate mental occasion.
In the case of consoiOTJS memory there is according to Whitehead the objectification
of one occasion in another, that is, the Immanence of the past in the present
and
future.
As I see matters, Whitehead’s doctrine of causality in nature depends al-
most completely upon his notion of physical memory. 'There is a carry-over or in-
heritance from one event to another. Expressed in Whitehead’s theory of time, it
can he said that there is an Immanence of the past in the present and future. How-
ever, to endow physical entities with memory makes of them super-entelechies. It
is a crucial question in AMtehead’s psychological physicalism whether or not
there is a true analogy between physical sequence and conscious memory. The question
of the analogy between physical sequence and conscious memory becomes crucial if
r/hitehead’s generalization of sentience is to be maintained. Recognition as a mark
of conscious memory is seemingly absent from physical entities. .iTiitahead fails
to bring to his concepts of inheritance and temporal immanence of occasions evidence
urttiich solidly supports the thesis of memory in nature. It may be said that .Vhite-
head's claim of analogy involves a highly questionable extension of the term memory.
Whitehead’s notion of immanent causality is finally joined with his concept of God.
The primordial nature of God as the locus of all eternal objects is the source
of all possibility and the core of all potent! ality.^^^ Whitehead is a naturalist
in holding to determinism in nature. He Is an idealist in holding that the ultimate
reference to the sequence of events is in God. Whitehead states his own position
131. Bri^tman(,ed."J',l?6I(5^/62,
132. See pp.l26 f&for the discussion of the primordial nature of God.
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phllosophioally vfeen he says, •One task of a sound metaphysics is to exhibit final
and efficient causes in their proper relation to each other.-l^^ The context re-
veals that .'/hitehead is straggling to avoid the overstressing of final causes re-
sulting from the influence of Aristotle, and likewise the overstressing of effi-
cient causes resulting from the influence of modern natural science. Whitehead
Intentionally takes a middle-of-the-road position. Here as elsevtoere one gets the
notion that Whitehead *s strategy is that od providing a larger base of thought in
the hope that differences will thereby be reconciled.
There is not only conformity expressed in Whitehead’s doctrine of causality,
but also novelty. The contingency of nature does not however lead Whitehead to
argue for a vitalistlo solution of the problem. Vitalism is opposed because it has
historically been set forth as a substitute for mechanism. The world is not to be
bifurcated into life and matter. Only a ’both-and’ view of mechanism and vitalism
reveals the true nature of our world. •’We re<iuire that the deficiencies of our
concept of physical nature should be supplied by its infusion with life. And we
require that on the other hand the notion of life should involve the notion of
physical nature. Whitehead is here voicing a demand for a metaphysics of na-
ture i^ich is broad enou^ to include a genuine synthesis of nature and life.
Whitehead blrmtly attempts to make a show of his more Inclusive metaphysics by ad-
mitting tliat the electron runs blindly, within or without a body, but that it al-
ways runs according to the plan of the whole to whidi it belongs. In the higher
organisms •’this plan includes the mental state. ”1^^ The total scheme of nature
thus includes life with its higher ranges of conceptuality. i.Vhi tehead ’ s double
assertion of contingency and conformity makes him the supporter of freedom within
limits. Each actual entity as a causa sul Is thought to be self-determining.
ISS. PR, 129.
134. MP, 205.
135. SIW, 111
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Tet this self-determination is limited by the plan of any given whole to #iich
an entity belongs. Thus there is an allowance made by *Vhitehead for purposiveness
in organic systems. The mutual immanence of actual occasions conditions the free-
dom of any occasion in the actual world. 2aoh entity has placed upon it by the
ver^/ existence and immanence of other entities a dQgree of necessity to conformity.
There is however a measojre of freedom in the non-conformity of novelty. Ultimate
causality «Vhitehead finds in the total range of creativity. Causality in this
finalistic sense is based upon the plan of the )i^olo. There is thus a general de-
termination within ^ich there is a measure of freedom for individual entities.
The opposition between vitalism and mechanism is thus converted by '-Vhitehead into
the relation of complements. The ultimate whole, yet non-actual entity, is crea-
tivity. All things are in the grip of this all-conditioning creative advance.
In discussing the justification of expectation -Vhitehead brings to a focus
his analysis of a particular instance or occasion in the causal process. The
analysis of the actual occasion becomes accordingly the means of understanding a
part of Whitehead’s doctrine of causality. As a single instance of causality the
actnal occasion Is Incomplete. No single instance of causality can be complete
for causality has to do with a nexus, that is, a continuum. There is a related-
ness embracing all events in a causal nexus. Bach actual occasion is a relatum.
It is effect and ca\ise. Hume’s difficulty of justifying expectation is made acute
on the basis of a mere accumulation of instances. The solution of the problem is
1S6
found according to Whitehead In ’the intrinsic character of each instance.’
The intrinsic character referred to is its relatednesa.^®’^ The mutual immanence of
act-ual occasions is the ground of interconnection of events. 'Vhitehead’s discussion
of the problem of causality leads to his discussion of change and permanence.
136. Proc.Arist.3oo. .2g (1922-23), 14.
137. Ibid.
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The general bearing of .Vhi tehead * s notion of charge and permanence upon his doc-
trine of the actual occasion will be the guiding interest in the immediately fol-
lowing treatment.
iii. The actual occasion and the problems of change and permanence
•
The problems of change and p annanance are recognized by Whitehead as
having general significance for all philosophies of nature. At these two polos of
thought stand Heraclitus and Anaxagoras for change and permanence respectively.
Whitehead considers creativity and process to be ultimate. Furthermore, some-
thing is always and everywhere going on. In his critique of mathematical theory
we note Whitehead's comment j "The lirtiolo essence of the notion of 'twioe throe'
is process. ..and 'twice three' expresses its special form of process."'^ Thvis
the mathematical processes are interpreted as 'foims of transition. Transi-
tion belongs to the real. All of the universe is in passage. It is in transi-
tion or passage that •we reach a connection of nature with metaphysical realities.
Passage is not to be identified it seems with change and motion. White-
head speaks of process as a 'perishing* when the notion is applied to actual oc-
casions. The real internal constitution of every actuality is perpetually per-
ishing. 1^1 It has been pointed Out that Whitehead uses the term actual occasion
to emphasize the immobility and changelessness of actual ocoas ions.^^^ In com-
paring his theory with that of Leibniz, -Whitehead says, "it differs from Leibniz's
in that his monads change. In the organie theory they merely become. Hew
there can be passage from one entity to another without change is not clear. By
his theory of becoming *Vhitohead tries to preserve a balance between an ab-
solutistio and a relativistic view of space and time. The monads of the
138. I*P, 123, 124.
139. T.H!, 112.
140. con, 56.
141. PR, 32, 43.
142. See pp.72 ff,
143. PR, 124.
140
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organic philosophy hecome, and their verj’ hecoining is also their perishing.
The present state of every actuality is nerely a wavering hotmdary "between
the past and the future. There is hardly any true stability. *«liat looks
like stability in the actual world is only ’a relatively slow process of
atrophied decay. Thus stability is simply apparent.
"iThitehead seems however to put in a defense of stability and per-
manence in the statement: ”The change of an object is the diverse relation-
ships of the same object to diverse events. iThat is called change is
nothing more than the diversity of relations of an entity to a variable
context of events. The notion of 'the same object' la open to interpre-
tation as substance. It is relative to such a tdiase of the organic phi-
losophy that Sidney criticizes "^itehead. There is according to Sidney a
residual of substance in Aliitehead's system. "Tailtehead is spite of his
protest reintroduces substance under another nan®. For him the xiltimate
substrate of things is energy of s one sort."^^ I concur with Sidney to
the extent that Whitehead may be thought guilty of using the vocabulary
of robatantlalist philosophy in the discussion of his dynamic concept of
creativity. He refers to creativity as an' underlying creativity.
"Shitehead's suggestion that there is something uiiderlying. although
that underlying something is not in itself concrete,makes the organic
concept of creativity liable to interpretation as substance. It is the
function of the concept of substance that it gives fixity and general
reference value to concepts about the jhenomanal world. In denying substance
144. PCJR, 69.
145. SPK, 6S.
146. Sidney, "The problem of substance
Phil. Rev .. 45 (1926), 585.
147. SliW, 248.
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as a valid concept ^iteiiead wakens his case by using such suggestions as
’underlying* and ’the same object.* Sophisticated with reference to substance,
iVhitehead’s somevdiat loose use of terns shows nevertheless that he is not fully
emancipated from the spell of the substance philosophy. The actual occasion
Is a term created by /^liitehead to express his repudiation of substance.
Having repudiated sunstance, Whitehead does not mean to deny permanence.
The eternal objects are the permanent elements of actualities. It is in virtue
of the ingression of eternal objects that actual occasions possess identity in
the midst of change. It is said of each actuality that it ’’retains its own
individuality in this variety of existence. The retention of individuality
seems to me to be the essence of Identity, and hence of permanence. Whitehead’s
concept of individuality is based on the concepts of atomicity and continuity.
Ve shall now deal with the actual occasion as it relates to these concepts.
iv. The actual occasion and the opposites of continuity and atomicity
The problem involved in the correlation of continuity and atomicity
is the demand for interconnection and sequence versus the demand for individual-
ity and elbow room in the total scheme of actuality. Whitehead points up the
problem at hand by saying that ’’Continuity concerns what is potential, \rtiereaa
actuality is Incurably atomic.”^ Actuality is always the definite and the
specific. .Whatever is actual must take some definite form. To be actual is
necess isari ly to be something individual, hence atomic. Actuality is incurably
atomic. Elbow room is to be maintained if a guard is to be kept up against the
non-entity of confusion. "The mere fusion of all that there is would be the
non-entity of indefiniteness.
148. Sohilpp (ed.), P.V, 679, 680.
149. PR, 95.
150. 3MW, 1S2. See also AI, 251.
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vVhile gnarding against fusion into indefiniteness, Whitehead neverthe-
less does not intend to sacrifice his theory of interconnection. The concept
of continuity is a complementary doctrine to that of atomicity. «/hitehead thinks
that the concept of continuity is derived from the possibility of dividing the
world into always smaller, parts. "The possibilities of division constitute the
external world a continuum.”^^^ It is vi th reference to this possibility of
division that ViTiitehoad further reveals his concept of the actual occasion. **It
is for this reason C potentiality for division J ,... that the phrase ’actual oc-
152
casion’ is used in the place of ’actual entity.’” If the possibility of
division constitutes the external world a continuum, then it follows that actual
occasions are always possible. Continuity and atomicity are thus conjoined and
mutually required in the organic philosophy. Whitehead leaves the problem of
continuity and atomicity with the observation that they are final objects or
poles. Atomicity is the universe conceived in disjunction, vrtiereas con-
tinuity is the universe conceived in conjunction.
”Creativity ”, it has been noted, ”is the ultimate principle by which the
many which are the universe disjunctively, becomes the one actual occasion,which
is the universe conjunctively.”^®^ According to this note on creativity the aim
of the creative process is the production of conjunction out of disjunction, that
is, relative order out of relative disorder. Let us now examine .Vhitehead’s
theory of order in the hope of arriving at a larger view of the actual occasion.
151. PR, 96. See also Brightman, P6I0, 64.
152. PR, 119.
15S. PR, 518.
154. PR, 31. See discussion of creativity on pp. 68-71,
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V, Actual occasions and cosmic order
The problem of order is a problem of historic sijgnificance. It received
expression in the mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and in the concept
of change according to law set forth by Heraclitus. The problem of order is given
a setting by Vfhitehead who cautions that "‘order’ is a mere generic term, there
can only be some definite specific ‘order’, not merely ’ order ’ in tlie vague,
This analysis in terms of specific types of order gives concreteness to White-
head’s discussion,
Vrtiitehead’s discussion of the problem of order has another advantage in
his suggestion that order is relative to disorder. There is relative order and
there is also relative disorder, "There can be no peculiar meaning in the notion
of order unless this contrast holds. Without tnis reference to the con-
trast of relative order and disorder it can only be said of either dhat it is
given. The problem is the attc.inment of order out of disorder.
Following the Platonic tradition of the Timaeus (30A) VThitehead says,
"The present cosmic epoch is traced bach to an aboriginal disorder, ciiaotic ac-
cording to oin* ideals, "^^7 Whitehead proclaims this notion of advance from
relative disorder to relative order as being "the evolutionary doctrine of the
philosophy of organism, "1^8 There are several grounds of order mentioned by
Whitehead, The first groiuid of order is "adaptation for the attainment of an
end. "^9 All forms of order inhere in adjustment toward the realization of an
end. The second ground of order is relative to the end of adaptation. In the
language of Whitehead "this end is conceived with gradations of intensity in the
satisfactions of actual entities,.. "18^ Each entity strives for self realization.
155. PR, 12 8,
156. Pfi,127.
157. PR,146.
158. Ibid.
159. PR, 127.
160. Ibid,
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It may be said to attain satisfaction in its objectification. There are degrees
of intensity in the urge toward fioll realization. Order requires gradations of
process. The third ground of order requires the blending of contrast, or the
elimination of incompatibilities. In speaking of the tnird ground of order kifhite-
head says that 'the multiplicity of components in the -nexus can enter explicit
feeling as contrasts, and not be dismissed into negative prehensions as incompati-
bilities,"^®^ According to this statement order seems to depend upon the presence
and unification of contrasts. Only the thoro^aghly incompatible elements are elimi-
nated from the context of a given order. This concept of the bases of order sug-
gests a dialectical character for process. The distinction between contrasts and
incompatibilities is a distinction which marxs the difference between order and
disorder. The fourtn groimd of order mentioned by vrnitehead involves the idea
that the stage of realization or objectification of an actual entity contains
feelings for inclusion into ever new contexts of existence. The fourth condition
of order is the subject-superject level of existence. Stating tne foiirth condition
Whitehead says, "That intensity in the formal constitution of a subject-superject
involves the appertltion in its objective functioning as a superject, This
fo^l^th ground of order is feeling carried to its logical conclusion in the fmction-
ing of an entity. This logical conclusion is the felt urge by which the culmina-
tion of one piiase of an entity becomes the basis of tne entrance of the entity upon
a new function, that is, a novel existence. This fourtu stage is a synthesis be-
coming in %\xcn the thesis of a new evolution into a superject, /ihitehead’s discus-
sion of the grounds of order thus contains Hegelian elements of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis, although these elements fail to get explicit mention. The thesis of
the subject contains contrasts in its antithesis. The full realization of the su-
perjective stage is a new level of order including but partially transcending the
contrasts, This is essentially the pattern of prehensions followed in tlie process of
161, PR,128,
162, Ibid,
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the evolution of nature.
In his treatment of the problem of order >7hitehead puts forth a theory
of ’hierarchies of order.’ These hierarchies express the characteristics of
various types of order that emerge in the assemblage of events. He are told by
Whitehead that there are ”an indefinite number of typas of objects. The types
of objects form an ascending order or hierarchy of ^ich each member presupposes
the type below. The base of the hierarchy is formed by the sense objects.
This statement carries the idea of emergence and progression. Fran sense objects
at the base there is a progression which includes life, mind, and consciousness.
Consciousness is thought by Whitehead to be the crown of the levels of existence.
’’Consciousness is the acme of emphasis.” " It is also spoken of as ’’the stqpreme
vividness of experience. -'/hen Whitehead says, ”Apart from the intervention
of God there could be nothing new in the world and no order in the world, He
theweby makes God the foundation of novelty and order in the world. This sugges-
tion of God as fotindational for order is a logical sequence from the statement
that eternal objects are "components in the primordial nature of God."!^’^ White-
head thus gives the problems of novelty and order a setting which requires reference
to his theory of value. T^is tendency in .’•'hitehead * s thought has been observed
as a general character of most of the concepts Included in his philosophy of na-
ture. The doctrine of the actual occasion is Involved in the various problems
Wliioh require according t o Whi tehead ’ a analysis a reference to his theory of
value, and particularly to his idea of God.
Preparatory to our examination of Whitehead’s theory of value, let us in
a brief manner take account of the argument of the chapter which is being brought
to a close. The general aim has been to explore and appraise the idea of the
163. CON, 149
164. AI, 231.
165. 171.
166. PR, 377.
167. PR, 180.
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actual occasion in the context of Vftiltehead’s philosc?)hy of nature. The
fundamental position of the actual occasion in ^Tiitehead * s scheme of categories
is suggested in his definition of creativity as the ultimate principle hy which
the many, which is the universe disjunctively, becomes the one actual occasion,
which is the universe conjunctively. By his doctrine^ of the actual occasion
iThitehead purports to weld together in one metaphysical scheme the concepts of
the physical and the mental, change and permanence, continiiity and atomicity,
conformity and novelty, space and time, relative order and relative disorder.
To carry out his aim of synthesis in the doctrine of the actual occasion 7ftiite-
head introduces a distinction between the actual occasion and the actual entity.
The difficulties inhering in this distinction wl 11 be more thoroui^ly examined
inrour general critique. The doctrine of the actual occasion is the vanguard
of ^itehead's attack on the soholastic-Lockelan doctrine of substance. The
theory of the actual occasion we found to be essentially a dynamic view of
actuality in #iich being is equated with becoming. The synthetic function as-
signed the doctrine of the actual occasion is made conspicuous in (Vhitehead’s
theory of ingression. It is in the process of ingression that 7/hitehead seeks
a functional union of form and actuality,
Ouj* treatment of tlie doctrine of the aot\ial occasion In this chapter sug-
gests that the organic metaphysics develox)Od up to this point would be less co-
herent without such a doctrine. Without the doctrine of the actual occasion
the organic philosophy appears to be without any measure of minimum actuality.
The actual occasion may thus bo called the unit of actuality in the organic
philosophy. It follows from Whitehead’s use of the actual occasion in his at-
tack on substance and simple location that wihtout this doctrine his philosophy
would be without adequate defense against traditional materialism.
Our general task in the advancing chapter will be to determine the meaning
of value in the organic philosophy, and also to determine the significance of
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aitehsad's theory of valuo tar his dootrlos of tho sotosl occasion.
The analysis
of material "111 Inolnde a dlscaaslon of Shltehead's
idea of God and the relation-
ship of God to th.0 world*

CHAPTEE V
The Actual Occaelon and Whitehead’s Theory of Value
1. The Actual Occasion and the Character of Value
i. The meaning of value in the organic philosophy.
Whitehead finds the meaning of value in a relation to fact.
In the absence of fact, that is, some form of existence, values can have
no meaning. Everything that exists has some value. To he is to he of
some value. There is a form of value, more or less intensified, in every
existence. This is true because existence involves relations. Everything
that exists has relations with other exlstents. The upholding of value
in any unit of existence "involves sharing value -intensity with the
universe."^ The sharing of value Intensity with the universe is a means
of developing value experience in the individual. Value emerges in the
relations that have reference beyond the private psychological field of
the experiencing subject. Thus value inheres in a relation to fact.
O
"Value refers to Eact, and Fact refers to value." In this statement
/
by Whitehead there is a mutual reference of value and existence. We
may say therefore that in the absence of value there can be no significance
in fact. Value and fact always have reference to each other. The
relevance is mutual. The notion of relevance is made into the notion of
identity by Whitehead 'in the remark "Value is the word I use for the
intrinsic reality of an event, An event is a nexus of occasions.
Actual occasions thus belong to the intrinsic reality of an event.
It follows then that values and actual occasions refer to each other. In
fact, values are in actual occasions as such. This is explicitly Whitehead'
1. MT,151.
2. Schilpp (ed.), PW,681^.
5 . SMW,151.
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position as is shown in the statement: "For the actuality is the value. 2very
aotual thing is a value. In this account of value one may see the emergence of
Whitehead’s realiam. In speaking of this objective theory of value Mary Evelyn
Clarke says, "Its esse is no more nerclpi . or intelligj . sentiri . than the of
objects or their properties is neroinl."^
Whitehead’s definition of value stands in contrast with Brlghtman’s. Accord-
ing to Brightman, value in its original form is "Whatever is actually liked, prized,
esteemed, desired, approved or enjoyed by amyone at any tiiae."^ In this assertion
we have Brightman’s notion of a value claim. Value claims, however, become true
values only when coherently criticized in the light of rational norms. The process
of criticism and systematization is on Brlghtman’s view necessary to the proper in-
terpretation of values. The soope of true value is for Brightman the scope of ex-
perience organized in accordance with norms. In general Brightman tends toward a
personalistlc interpretation of value. According to this interpretation all values
are personal consciousness, and all norms are personal Ideals. By positing value
as the intrinsic reality of an event ’<Vhitehead, in contrast to Brightman, gives
evidence of a tendency toward impersonalism in his interpretation of value because
actual occasions, the scene of value events, are far less than persons.
According to »Vhitehead: "Each occasion is an activity of concern."'^ This
concern of each occasion is an expression of its value. .Vhitehead gives qualifica-
tion to his notion of value. The actual occasion is concerned not merely with itself,
but it is "concerned with the universe."® Herein lies the application of the theory
of prehension to the various things of the world. Each actual occasion has a feeling
relation, positive and negative, with other actual occasions. It belongs to the actual
4. SIW, 149.
5. Clarke, SLV, 193.
6. Brightman, PR, 88.
7. Runes (ed.), TCP, 143.
8. Ibid.
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occasion as a value that it harbors concern for other occasions.
A character of value that we might expect to find in a treatise
on the subject is its ideality. By this I mean the character of value
in virtue of which it transcends a particular instance of its application.
Whitehead Includes this clmracter of value in his analysis when he says
that "Value is in its nature timeless and immortal. Its essence is not
rooted in any passing circumstance."^ Although values refer to the world
of passing fact, they nevertheless have "an essential independence of any
moment of tlme."^^ Values as here used by Whitehead may be called
universale. As such they cannot be confined to any one actual occasion
or any one actml entity, although they are always relevant to particular
actual occasions or actual entities. Values persist beyond the immediacy
of the present. The immediate and passing has value because it shares
in that which is Immortal and permanent.
There is in every experience of value an element of pleasure.
It is the pleasure of anticipation, or the pleasure of realization of the
object of interest. This element of pleasure is called by Whitehead
"absolute self enjoyment."^ In each occasion of existence there is
a certain enjoyment that is immediate and private. This is self concern.
Value is that which is added to existence through the realization of
alms. As a living whole each acttial occasion achieves a measure of
value. In the process of actualization each entity experiences a mod-
ification of existence. This modification of existence is in effect the
opportunity of that entity to develop its content of value. Although
Whitehead considers values timeless, he nevertheless holds that value
9.
Schllpp (ed.), FW, 684.
10. Ibid.
11, Runes (ed.), TCP, 154.
( a
T irr L>ati v„' td -ts v J- rlj f-'^Irv >o lod’OiniJv^ A
r>r;X ./ lo 'intjxrir^.fo Q.'tt fT'V’rT I -old^ ’'.: . jE-iXI '.'I li i:>s{,d'A;a orfl no
.rfo^;.^o• oJ'l ’to a .do^dv ‘to SiJw'Uv ai
6^.03 6,i :Torl»/ aiirtCaat^ a til 'zl mjLrrf to •f^^^iJ^Jodo ^Irit ^dtfjCanl bae.de^tnV
V
on o.t -'•JjXrjsat' iJT ..[‘ tiotfui* ns?rt;^iLl^ snw^/in Bv*! ;rl nt ’t'X:)V" Jati*
1
“'
^
<
;.»I'iov tyd& o * d -jL/y j'^lA *’ . "OffM^woionlo ^{ ’ '
lO eon©.’
'
’
'Ttu»3'» nj?” evarf H3'-.*£Pui'i©y*.fl v.i dw
,
3nXn3-c^ lO
0 ‘X ;a" ;vj3W cn^-d «*« npbC-T' ^'^'’.©eXj lo .:n©'-o!a
rtcZ .: vo :0 :?r:o 6pnt?.-sjo ©d ioua aA . ~ I f*j*ieTXnii
•:
-Xi/cZd'’- 51 oX vCtcvcIe'i 6V'*v.r8 e-iji: ^,*df diJ.x.diCa Lsatoa ©nx 'rjia -io
c.’ii ft.'foxod 4^«le*ie'X 3<MrXsV .3©Iii^n© £/.» ‘ob no anoisoooo
I
r.c"w*’, v: .:. rt:oi;»ni suIbv ii\l ,nZ.{&oT « iaZZaa;;:’ eif. . ^ 'dd' to
.dn'Ti j.Titvx 5ai X ftX'xoinn; n : .iot.i'«f nX
.©'U'aoel-i to X.tort' i • n’' ';* c<-on©Zns<T5© i'iBtf© .£.' aZ
;iiX lo rtolc^a^XXi^iJ'i to Oijti, .'jZj 'ydt no ‘d"?! ’ ©1: tc.' ©“ura^ol'i erfd a£ dl
Xw baLl^ 'j qX 'c drtft:39C' aZdT .daanodfil lo dpo{,do
«ii en©t{5 otirr^X i>‘o lo dojRf*_trl ^” . .ntaraxo^fit© ll©« ©duXoarf^”
. rrc' 0.n''o 'tZ*- j: fjLifX .©d'^v lriP' f n.« ©d<!to' : X al d orid o'n©nTxot,ii3 ciadneD a
to noXd iiZXiion ©tid rf - _ i:* >«od it- ce od &©fcftn ai .do.Mv dfrid ai anX.-iV
1. o u 3 r. v3ido;j :tox .^ooo Lr-;..'70B doB© ©Xorfw a nA .aai-*!
- or ''. ne'DneZ-i--k“-.co 'CJx fxtv ."'o''© no' ' rtXlX/Mf ‘o .'• '’
j
aa^'JonT -uU al .©cXar
v.i- >r : £9 <iZ uJt or/CToJ;.!^, lo £Sf)ld©''. ’IXtoc aZffl’ .ponedaix© lo xxoid*»£lX
l^coddX'i .©ul^v to d^redfcyo adZ 'jol^'-'foh od !c;di.;ii9 d-dd lo X'^Xm/dnoqcra
©i'Xw dnrXX' gfXod QaeCnddnoFen aiL ^E ioXoftiid aat'Xnr onooZ'Utoa £»99ri©d£iX«
V •V’^' ,»:a J . / ) rqXirfoa .?
,
.xrldl .^X
.41X ^‘IDT O Hcrx- . :X
The ideal is\ „12
"assumes the function of modification of events in time.
accordingly always relevant to the actual in which it is ingressed. Value
transforms existence. It is upon the modification of events that the
possibility of value devolves in the actual world. The intention toward
h15
realization Whitehead calls "the basic character of the world of value.
It belongs to the character of the value process that there are entities
with intentions toward realization. It follows therefore that concreteness
is a value, potential at least, for only thus can there be achievement in
addition to achievability. Mere creativity and achievability abstracted
from concrete achievement do not mean value according to Whitehead. In
the concrete the possibility of value beccanes real, that is, real value.
Value develops in the imposition of limit upon the unlimited, definiteness
upon the indefinite. The values derived from actuality are acquired
through definiteness. Value in a general sense is a function of limita-
tion. In an essentially Platonic mood Whitehead holds that value is
"the outcome of limitation. Limitation is necessary to value because
it defines a mode of realization and satisfaction.
The realization of any value requires the elimination of certain
factors. The tendency to exclude some elements is a condition of value
experience for any actual entity. Speaking of the realization of values
Whitehead says, "Such realization Involves the exclusion of discordant
values. In all harmonies there is a synthesizing of contrasts. In
the achievement of values there is a dialectic of contrasts, yet a general
movement toward some dominant scheme of relatione. In terms of prehension
12. Schllpip (ed.), PW, 686.
15. Schllpp (ed.), PW, 687.
11^. SMW, 151.
15. Schilpp (ed. ), PW, 685.
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this means negative prehensions hy which there Is an elimination process.
Incompatlhllltles are ruled out. Values result frcan coordination. This
coordimtlon Is the essential character of the world of value. The
notion of the coordination of values has a parallel in Brightman’s notion
of the coalescence of values. Values require each other. The integral
relation of values has its correlative in the integral relations of
actual occasions. The concept of harmonious relationship Whitehead expresses
on moral and non-moral levels of existence.
The notion that the realm of actuality "contains evil as well
as good" provides the source for the discordant and recalcitrant elements
of existence. Discordant tendencies are considered pervasive by Whitehead.
This is the problem of frustration with its ramifications in religion euid
morality. "The essence of life is to be found in the frustrations of
established types of order. Values emerge in the process of adjustment
to and reconstruction of established types of order. Whitehead’s claim
that there is an affinity between order eind goodness'^ makes the frustra-
tion of value a possible, if not a probable, source of evil. The insistence
upon novelty provides in Whitehead's thought a coimter balance for the idea
of order. In fact there will always be a measiire of non conformity in
the very emergence of novelty. The character of value therefore includes
possible divergencies from any established order. The tendency toward
divergence inheres in the constitution of each actual occasion. The
tendency toward divergence goes to the foundations of the problem of
value. In the analysis of actual occasions presented in the next section
16. Brlghtman, PH, 100.
17. MT, 119-
18. MT, 105.
'nbJtJ'OG u'fuocj’flstib. rl LiiLsrusq a. I 'uX'Ty to no! J£«r*f>*tooo odj’ to
JLrcio Jnl otCf , iiD.ao owLef'f BOt'tijr tv oofwoael 30 0 dciJ to .'
to Qxsoli’jslo'i tuU at cvltaS.o'ir^oo aJl aart aei-Irr to rr tl.’ilei
ica vviiailffW' c ? Kni vt^nX#.-: aoolfiowoid to ^^^ocnoo eifr .x'zotr.aooo liwioo
.?oflotf£.irf» to oXeTei Iirsor*-.:.r. f ji3 I-3^oic f»
XJ.ev ao IlYO aniiiJaoo** to clDjo'I orfJ' Jadv* iiol^on ^rfi
«^£»n3l-> Jxxm;tloIa6ft-i one d'oebnooatd ttj'I o^*yxc.'Oo otW aeft^sro1q aa
. Odds;! tfW 'd ovii^evjorj i»iei'i«aoo a^'lonfsfiaet ^neftriooel’^I .eoae^a^xs to
Lnn rt! arsotJ’eolt tiiai ucft cttiw fK>it st.tctr^l to aeltJb-ta at ntdT
to 3noi^£r:^etrtt erl^ nl t asrot ocf el efX lo aoaeao® offT** . /^lIjTiots
J’riip«».+0!f{,5« to eoe.oo'i'^ odf til ©yi't''’Ot© as;:!/^ ^^‘’ . '.atl'to t* aoov.i^ SedatXtfeta^
ti-oXr. . ’ r oodecf X*f« .'le^o o ackTV.^ rsoid’oxnc^aaoo-o'x 5n» ot
9.i;t selat has leriio aeo.id’otf votsiite ne al e^ed;! &edS
oono^aranr odT .XiT® to oo*aroa ^©Xcf;?>:fo'?:'7 n &oa. tX ^'‘X'fiaeo^ 3 eoIi^Y to aotS
xisifi edv lot ©o»oiIj9J io;Jaaoo -C e'brodecJtdV al enXivotcr c^Xovon
r .1
soJ>o'IoaX ct/Xisv ': r'stoinsri'J ortT .•'tlevoa to oOi-ie »'io£0© ^•x©v ©d^
b*i*«v.ot ^Oiift&nej c-ti f»©iaiItfetao ‘irra co'it Goto •s.'i'ievife oldieaoi
*v?i .rjo^o'sooe leuioe doQ';-to xK'ttiiitd’eaoo ©lid ai arr^idnl eoae'^ievLb
. V •
to steXoo-'.q ed^ Ic a.'.vXtiaaiiot i*df oS 5©o? ©one^ibTjuo L’lsneof
cc-li'ooe X\©a ©ri^ at iiO^'fxec;©'iq eiK^Zaf’ooo Xew^oo tb Bisv.I/5a3 nl .«u£ev
.OCX, . 91^ .nxsciJ^t'i
-
.?IX
,
1K
.’lOX
'I
rx
we shall relate the concept of the actual occasion to the foundations of
value as outlined in the organic philosophy.
ii. The Actual Occasion and the foundations of value
Value has its foundations in the process of actualities.
It emerges out of process as creativity actualizes itself. Since the
process referred to is that of events^ and events are composed of actual
occasions, it may he concluded that actual occasions are in the value
process. Whitehead seems to go heyond the actual occasions to that of
which they are the embodiment. Value is made to rest in the creative
process Itself. The ultimate reference of value requires in Whitehead’s
system reference to the ultimate category. "Creativity alms at value.
This means that the aim at value is characteristic of the process of
creation as a whole. This view is an Important note on Whitehead's tele-
ology. It indicates nothing, however, about the nature of value as such.
However, it discloses a view of the world which discounts any suggestion
that values are alien. It can be put down that for Whitehead this
striving toward value is an endless and all-pervasive process. God and
the world "are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the
•tPO
creative advance into novelty. At its foundations the value process
is essentially an unrest. Creativity issues in a definite creation in
every new occasion. This new creation houses an increment of value
derived from the world process. Whitehead thus gets value into the
world by considering it as a characteristic tendency of the ultimate
forever embodying itself in the occasions of process.
19. Schtipp (ed.), PW, 688.
20 . PR, 529.
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For the embodiment of value In such an order Whitehead resorts
to an explanation in terms of a theory of Identity, Identity thus becomes
a crucial problem in the organic theory of value. Transitory occasions
seem hardly to provide any solid ground for the establishment of identity.
However, Whitehead sets forth the idea that actual occasions "unite
themselves into sequences of personal identity." The personal identity
here announced by Whitehead is an emergent. It is a case of the feelings
producing the feeler. The carriers of value are personal entities. The
reference to the capacity of the members of a personal ccmplex to sustain
identity is grounded upon the doctrine of their mutual immanence which
has been treated already. It is through the Inheritance from occasion
to occasion that there is the possibility of saneness and identity. On
the personal plane Whitehead calls this "a most remarkable character of
the world of fact."^^ It is through Identity that there is a partial
negation of the transitory character of the universe. The emphasis upon
Identity in his theory of value suggests that Whitehead looks to the moral
experience as that means by which we may transcend the passage and transi-
tion of the phenomenal order. It is in the value experience that we lay
hold upon the timeless. Although by personal identity Whitehead does not
necessarily mean that consciousness is Involved, his theory is neverthe-
less weighted in favor of an idealistic interpretation of the cosmic order.
It at least siaggeets that there is a personality potential in the consti-
tution of the universe. Personality is at least one of the types of
value produced in the universe. Whitehead *s pielse of personality as an
21. Schllpp (ed.), PW, 688.
22. Ibid.
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extreme example of the Buetained realization of a type of value has an
Idealistic force which is not diminished hy the fact that he finds in
predominantly physical occasions a correlative process to personal
identity. On the contrary the idealistic force is increased 'because it
indicates the at-homeness of persons-lity . The concern’ for and aim at
values can thus hardly he incidental. Whitehead is at this point too
cautious to put the full weight of his naturalistic philosophy upon
personality. However, he does feel that a reasonable account of the
universe must grant personality to be indicative of value, or the
possibility of its realization.
The existence of value requires that we go deeper than
personality to the prehenslve character of all actual entities. It is
in the process of prehension, negative and positive, that there is
determination. Positive prehensions establish a foundation for values
by relating compatible elements into an organic whole. Negative pre-
hension establishes a foundation for values by eliminating from a complex
of experience those items that are not compatible with that complex.
In his theory of prehensions Whitehead at times seems to reduce the
world process to a vagueness from which it would appear difficult to
derive value. It is in his note on blind prehensions that there is re-
vealed the source of the caution previously referred to. On the basis
of such prehensions Whitehead .asserts: "There is a process of nature
which is obstinately indifferent to mlnd."^^ Chranted the difficulty,
Whitehead takes refuge in a faith that God exercises tender care that
nothing be lost.^^ The theory of The Given held by Brightman has
2k, Proc. Arist. Soc. , 22 (1921-1922), 221.
25. PR, 525.
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possibilities of rellevli^ tension at this point in Whitehead’s analysis, Aooordlng
to Brlghtman God’s ’’creative will is limited both by external necessities of reason
and by eternal experiences of brute fact,”^^ !Phese limits he calls ’’The Glven.”^*^
Put into Whitehead's teiroinology The Given would be constituted by the limits Inherent
in creativity as it beconfis actualized in a world of brute fact. The primordial na-
ture of God which Includes eternal objects and the potentiality for all creative ad-
vance in the face of the obstinate indifference to mind might bo considered a White-
headian equivalent to The Given. Whitehead's twin problems, blind prehensions
and obstinacy to mind, might find a more reasonable explanation if some such doctrine
as the irrational Given in Brlghtmai’s thought wore expounded or accepted.
With the inclusion of eternal objects in actual occasions the emergence of
value becomes simply a product of the eternal relevance of the ideal to the actual.
The participation of eternal objects in actualities places the value process into
a context which is inclusive of the existence of God. In the organic philosophy
the problems of the meaning and foundation of value rest finally upon the conception
of God, In the further analysis of central problems wo shall offer an interpretation
of the actual occasion in connection with 'Whitehead’s doctrine of God,
2, The actual occasion and the nature of God
i, God as an actual entity
The being of God is not questioned by ^^hltohead. On the contrary his
chief interest is the setting forth and clarification of his concept of God. In a
very explicit statement on the actuality of God Whitehead declares: "God is an
actual entity. Prom our study of the categories of '.Vhitehead we observed that
the actual entity is classified under the categories of existence. God is considered
26. Brlghtman,PH, 300.
27. Ibid.
28. See pp.l26 ff. for a discussion of the primordial nature of God.
29. PR,20,
30. PR, 32, For a treatment of the categories of existence see pp. 68-77,
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"by Whitehead as one actml entity among other actual entities. It
is to he noted that "every actual entity, including God, is something
individual for its own sake.”^^ God is a being having concreteness,
and as such conforms to the general character of all actual entities
.
To be an actual entity is to possess an internal constitution that is
essentially dynamic. Every actual entity is in its singularity some-
thing apart from the rest of the universe. In virtue of its prehensive
character every actual entity binds the whole universe into its being.
Otherwise stated, every actual entity places upon the universe the
obll^tion of conformity. The one prehends the many, and so is involved in
the essence of many actual occasions.
In contrast to the notion that God is an actual entity White-
head holds that the notion of actual occasion does not apply to God.
«32
"The term actual occasion' will always exclude God from its scope.
This qualifying statement involves a reservation by Whitehead in the
use of the term actual entity. Although Whitehead at times uses the
terms actual entity and actual occasion synonymously, he nevertheless
nukes differentiations between them. These differentiations were dealt
with in an earlier section of this investigation.^^ When Whitehead wishes
to emphasize 'becoming* and the 'perishing' as characteristics of an
actual thing he uses the term actual occasion in preference to the term
actual entity. Actual occasions perpetually perish. Their becoming
is also their perishing. It is Whitehead's point to avoid this
characterization of God. Hence, he refrains from calling God an actual
occasion. Leaving the distinction between actixal entities and actual
occasions as simply a matter of emphasis, leaves open the serious
question of exactly where the line is to be drawn. The fact that at
51. PR, 155.
32. Ibid.
35* See pp. 72 ff
.
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tlmeB the two terms are used synonymously (l.e., it is actual entities
or actual occasions in the categories of existence) points up the problem
when distinctions are introduced. It is doubtful that Whitehead has
Hade his position crystal clear. Is it ten^jorality or perpetual
perishing which is excluded frcan God?
According to Whitehead, God*s existence includes eternal
objects. There is no indication in Whitehead* s account of the
inclusion of eternal objects in the natui^ of God that they are
entities having a content foreign to the essence of God. The primordial
nature of God is one with the ultimate creativity. Thus God is pre-
supposed in Whitehead *8 conception of the actual world. In a note
on the primordial nature of God Whitehead speaks of this part of God*s
nature as ”hie complete envisagement of eternal objects . "5^ Eternal
objects are germane to the being of God. Because the residence of
eternal objects is in the being of God, Whitehead conceives of God
as transcending the limits of actual occasions. Although involved in
actual occasions, God is for Whitehead nevertheless beyond any given
actual occasion. In fact it would be consistent with Whitehead to
assert that God is the metaphysical ground of all actual occasions.
His being is not however to be conceived as completely unconditioned.
Being one of many entitles God is conditioned by every other entity.
Every actual occasion places upon God a limitation because of what
it is. God is the concrete universal that embraces, within limits,
all of the concrete entities.
The significance of God as an actual entity is at least
3h. PR, 70.
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partially suggested "by Whitehead when he calls God the principle
of concretion. "Throughout this exposition of the philosophy of
organism we have been considering the primary action of God over the
world. From this point of view, he is' the principle of concretion.”
By calling God the principle of concretion Whitehead means that God
is that principle in virtue of which there is a creation emergent
out of creativity. God is the entity "because of whom potentiality
“becomes actuality and the indefinite “becomes definite. God is the
order of conceptual forms through which ultimate creativity realizes
a system of actuality. In one description of God as concrete and
actual Whitehead says "He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual
feeling at the “base of things. In this capacity God is represented
in his primordial nature “by reason of which "there is a relevance of
eternal o“bJecte to the process of creationj "57 God it may “be said
is the causal nexus which Whitehead poses “between potentiality and
actuality. However, it will “be shown in our su“bsequent discussion
of God that he includes on Whitehead’s “basis “both potentiality and
actuality. Whitehead’s use of the term actual entity as descriptive
of God gives him particulailtj}, thereby saving the notion of the “being
of God fron an incluslveness which is the fusion of all things. Such
a fusion is for Whitehead the essence of a non entity. On the moral
plane Whitehead there“by saves his notion of God from “becoming a
complicated mixture of good and evil. This same thesis is expressed
on a moral level hy Whitehead who says that "It is not true that he
is in all respects infinite. If he were, he would be evil as well
as good. God is something decided, and thereby limited.
"
5^ God
35.""THr32j:
36. PE, 522.
37. Ibid.
38. EM, 153.
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as an actual entity is thus not an all-inclusive absolute, hut a
limited being excluding some elements or qualities in the cosmic
process. We shall now examine in a general way Whitehead's notion
of God in our search for more understanding of his doctrine of the
actual occasion.
*
ii. The manifold character of God
The character of God is discussed by Whitehead under the
following aspects of his nature - primordial, consequent, and super-
Jective.^^ The character of God's primordial nature is the charac-
teristic assumed by creativity at the conceptual base of things. "He
is the unlimited actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things."^®
This statement about the primordial nature of God means that God is the
ultimate mtlona.lity of the universe. As the ultimate rationality of
the universe God is the realm of ends in terras of whose being there
emerges definite occasions in the total process. According to Hart-
shome, "Whitehead takes care of the non -emergent and etenml character of
God in his notion of God's primordial nature. In the capacity
of hie primordial nature God determines the characters assumed by
actual occasions in the general course of their activity. Creativity
as creativity is without character, or at least without definiteness.
Creativity assumes forms of definiteness in the primordial nature of
God. "The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity
of a primordial character. On the basis of this statement the
emergence of qualifications and distinctions within creativity express
what is essentially a result of divine action. It might be said also
39 . PR, 15^^,155,521-521^.
1
^0 . PR, 522.
l+l. Hartshome, "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy."
Phil. Rev
., 314-0.
1^2. PR, 522.
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that the primordial character of God is how creativity becomes a specific
for an indefinite configuration of energy. In his primordial nature God
is "the absolute wealth of potentiality. "^5 wealth of potentiality
in God is the total range of possibilities in the universe. It is because
of the primordial nature of God that creativity %b expressible in actual
occasions. Because of the primordial nature of God eternal objects have
relevance for possible occasions. God in his primordial nature is the
Logos of the world. Whitehead's discussions of relative order in the
world and the development of conceptuality lend support to the notion of
a rational principle in the constitution of things. God is the beginning
of cosmic order which becomes evident in the relatione of actual occasions.
The primordial experiences of God includes "among their data all eternal
objects. The Inclusion of eternal objects in the primordial nature of
God connects God with every actual occasion because every actual occasion
has an involment of eternal objects. ^5 primordial nature God
contains the possibilities of actual occasions, yet his existence is not
prescribed by, not limited to, any one actual occasion. In his primordial
nature God represents the permanence of the universe. Actual entities per-
petually perish. They represent the flux of the universe. The eteinaal
objects that abide through flux are entities in the primordial nature of
God. These eternal objects are also the permanent ingredients of creati-
vity, the patterns to which actual occasions conform. God in his pri-
mordial nature is creativity as the metaphysical condition of all
actualities. However, Whitehead is careful to remark about God that "he
is not before all creation, but with all creation. This means
k3 . Pfi,522.
PB,134.
See ppJ)’6ff.for a discussion of actual occasions and eternal objects.
kS. PR, 521.
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that God ae an actual entity does not go hack of the creative process
of all actual entities. Nevertheless, he does in the mere fonns in-
gressed in creativity antedate any particular actual occasions of
creation. Actual occasions are only implicitly in God’s primordial
nature. Explicitly actual occasions are in the cpnsequent nature of God.
In his approach to the consequent nature of God Whitehead refers
to God’s dipolarIty. This reference to the dipolarity of God is made hy
way of an analogy between God and other actual entities. In this case
Whitehead says that "the nature of God is dipolar
. By the dipolarity
of actual occasions Whitehead refers to their mental and physical aspects.^^
The mental or conceptual pole of God is his consequent nature. In des-
cription of the consequent nature of God Whitehead says that he is "the
realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through
the transfonnation of his wisdom. According to this statement the
consequent nature of God is the development of the actuality of the
world from the mere potentiality of creativity. In hie consequent nature
God weaves hie physical experiences into the conceptual experiences of
hie conceptual nature. In God’s consequent nature actual occasions
emerge ae definite matters of fact in the space-time process. The con-
sequent nature of God is derivative from the creative advance of the
world. God whose being is the final source of potentiality is the
causality which accounts for the routes of actual occasions. In God’s
consequent nature actual occasions become eminently concrete entities.
In his consequent nature God becomes partly determined by the actual
occasions which emerge.
.
The consequent nature of God originates with
47. PR, 524.
48 . PR, 425.
49. PR, 524.
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the physical experience which he derives from the temporal world. These
physical experiences are Integrated with the conceptvjal patterns. White-
head associates consciousness with consequent nature of God, whereas no
such association Is made In his analysis of God's primordial nature. In
this latter phase of God's natxire Whitehead says of God that he Is
"primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious. In his
consequent nature God Is declared hy Whitehead to he ^detennlned. Incomplete,
<51
consequent, everlasting, fully actual, and conscious.**"'^ Eelatlve to
actual entitles we note hy contrast that God In his primordial nature
Is deficient In actuality, and In his consequent nature he Is fully
actual. Actuality thus distinguishes God's primordial from his consequent
nature
.
The significance of actual occasions In the character of God
receives further treatment In Whitehead's discussion of God's super-
Jectlve nature, ”The superJectlve nature of God Is the character of the
pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent
creativity In various temporal Instances . "5^ According to this statement
the superJectlve character of God Is God In the fully realized satis-
faction of his being. In our discussion of the superject of experience
It was noted that the feelings evolve the feeler. The superject ( subject-
superJect) emerges from the world. In the philosophy of organism there
Is a reversal of the Kantian principle of the primacy of the subject Into
the primacy of the object expressed as follows “the subject emerges from
the world - a "superject" rather than a 'subject. '"53 Following this
50. PK;524.
51. ibia;’. .
52. PE, 155.
53. PP,136.
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mode of thoiight we may say that God hecoiaeB In his superJectlve nature
the evolved subject of the world. He is one among an Indefinite number
of subjects evolved. God the subject In hlis.primordial nature Is the
ground of the process of actualization. God the superject In his super-
Jective nature Is the chief derivative of creativity. God and all other
actual entities are in the grip of the creative advance into novelty.
The narrowness of God’s superJectlve nature Is his limitation to those
experiences that arise in the attainment of Increased satisfaction and
value. The width of God’s superJectlve nature is his inclusion of all
organisms that participate in the creative advance. It is in the super-
Jectlve nature of God that each actual entity has its objective im-
mortality. In God each actual occasion perishes, yet it is because of
God’s superJectlve character that the value of each perishing occasion
is transmitted into the essence of succeeding occasions.
In the course of the treatment of the character of God it
has been observed that God’s nature covers the life history of every
actual occasion. In continuing our treatment of the problem of the
actual occasion and the nature of God we shall consider some antitheses
between God and the world suggested by Whitehead.
ill. God and the World
The notion of God as an entity distinguishable from the
world as such provokes the question of God’s relation to the world.
Whitehead is not a pantheist, God being on his theory one entity among
others. Hence, there is for Whitehead the problem of the relation of
God to the world. Whitehead gives an iamedlate toning down of the
possible antitheses by the suggestion that "In each antithesis there
is a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast.
PR, 528.
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Whether car not the oppositions are in the final outcome antitheses or
simply contrasts is a matter calling for appraisal in the course of the
discussion. The focal issue in either case will he the understanding
of the doctrine of the actual occasion. It is to he kept in mind that
God for Whitehead is not an exception to all metaphysical principles
invoked to save their collapse. Instead God is fear Whitehead the "chief
exemplification" of metaphysical principles. 55 Each of the categories
is therefore thought to he applicable to God who in hie being demonstrates
each category supremely.
(a) In the first contrest Whitehead says, "It is as true to
say that God is permanent and the world fluent, as that the world is
permanent and God is fluent. "5^ The problem here stated is essentially
the problem of peirmanence and flux which was treated in the last chapter
on the organic view of nature. 57 it eeems to be that Whitehead *e intro-
duction of hie idea of God into the analysis of the problem provides the
means for a more coherent interpretation of the opposites. Permanence
and fluency are both applicable to God according to Whitehead. In
traditional theological discussions the assertion of God's permanence
has usually been followed by the denial of fluency. The Arlstotalian
God was supreme permanent essence above fluency. The God of Whitehead
is permanent in the sense that the eternal objects subsist in his nature.
The world of occasions is permanent in the sense’ that eternal forms
are always given in actual occasions. God is fluent in the sense that
he is in the urge of creative advance. Admitting fluency, Whitehead
nevertheless does not call Grod ein actual occasion. God is fluent but
55. PR, 521.
56. PR, 521.
57* See pp. J05-I07.
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not perpetually perishing. The world is fluent hecause it is constituted
hy actual occasions that successively change. In God the passing actual
occasion hecomes immortalized. "He saves the world as it passes into
the immediacy of his own life.
"
5® Every actual occasion is saved as it
passes into the immediacy of God’s life. The valuee of fluent occasions
have their conservation in the divine existence. The many are immortalized
in the supreme actual entity.
(h) Whitehead continues his contrasts hy saying, "It is
as true to say that God is one and the world many, as that the world is
one and God is many. "59 in his first category Whitehead refers to
creativity, many, and one as ultimate notions. category
that Whitehead suggests that the one becomes many and the many become one.
Creativity is at the base of all transformations. Yet it is to be remembered
that on Whitehead’s treatment God is the primordial condition of creativity.
God is one in comparieon with the world of actual occasions by being the
most eminently concrete of entities. This stateiaent and the one which
follows make up a double-barreled monism. The world of actual occasions
is one in that there is continuity in the flux of occasions. God is
many by sharing in the actuality of individual and discrete entities. "God
is primordially one — in the process he acquires as consequent multi
-
plicity."®-^ This means that God in hie primordial nature is one, yet in
sharing the life of each actual occasion he becomes multiple. The one
is accordingly expressed in a Spinozietlc plurality of modes. Thus the
being of God parallels the contrast of the many and the one in the world.
58 . PR, 529.
59. PR, 528.
60. PR, 31.
61. PR, 529.
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The world is many hecause it contains an infinite variety of fundamental
particulars. It may thus he called a pluriverse. Yet these particulars
of the pluriverse are assimilated in the being of Gtod.
(c) In another contrast Whitehead holds that "It is as
true to say that, in comparison with the world, God. is actual eminently,
as that, in comparison with God, the world is actual eminently . The
problem of the eminent actuality of God has been considered in the dis-
cussion of God*s consequent nature. God it was noted is deficient in
actuality in his primordial nature, but fully actual in hie consequent
nature. Whitehead here departs from Plato who in the allegory of the cave
thinks the world as less than real. The world is eminently real in the
sense that it contains the entitles which are basic in the cosmos flux.
Eminent actuality thus characterizes God and the world. God and the world
are also characterized by their mutual immanence.
(d) "It is as true to say that the world is immanent in
God, as that God is immanent in the world, God is an actual entity.
Each actual entity, although atomic, is thought by Whitehead to prehend
other actual entitles. This means that each actual entity is relatively
Immanent in every other entity. According to Whitehead Immanence is a
characteristic of an object "as a realized detenalnant . "^5 God and the
world are thus Immanent in each other by being the realized determinants
of each other. Whitehead may accordingly be called a two dimensional
absolutist. By his twofold assertion he exposes the other side of the
Boyce’s Absolute. It is upon this notion of Immanence that Whitehead
62. PR, 528.
63. See pp .12 8, 129,
64. PR, 528.
65. PB,336.
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proposes to solve the prohlem of causality.^ On this hasls God,
being one ajuong many other actual entitles, is Immanent in those actual
entities. As such God would he in a manifold of mutual determination.
God is immanent in each actual occasion being the ground of its passage
into novelty. The world isi immanent in God in that* its physical and mental
facts are constituents of his experiences,
(e) Whitehead holds to the mutual transcendence of God and
the world as well as to their mutual Immanence. "It is as true to say
that God transcends the world, as that the world transcends God."^^
By transcendence Whitehead refers to that characteristic of an object
"as a capacity for determination."^® God has the capacity for the deter-
mination of the world of actual occasions because he contains in himself
the realm of possibilities, that is, eternal objects in his primordial
nature. Thus God is the final determination of the actual occasion. God
transcends the world of occasions by being their final determination.
God is Independent of the world in the sense that hie being
contains the range of achievabillty apeirt from, any particiilar achievement
in a concrete entity. God*e primordial functioning is in ideal separation
from any object of the actual world. God's capacity for the determination
of the world renders him transcendent over the world. As conceived by
Whitehead, God's transcendence, however, does not Involve his being meta-
physically Independent of the world. God is the principle of concretion in
virtue of which there is an eternal relevance of form to matter. The
eternal objects in God e^re in process of ingresslon into actual entities.
66. See pp. 100-104.
67. PR, 528.
68. PR, 566.
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The world transcends God in that the world has a capacity for the
determination of God. It may he said that the capacity for determination
is a characteristic of The Given as proposed hy Brightman. God is a
derivative from the world process, being the evolved superJect. This is
the significance of the superJective character of God. Every actual oc-
casion has in it some capacity for the determination of God in that it
places upon the universe the obligation of conformity. However, it might
be said that the world of occasions is presupposed by the ultimate creati-
vity. Only in his primordial nature is it possible to think of God as
ccanmensurate with, and possibly identical with, the ultimate creativity.
"The creativity is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes.
All actual entities share with God this characteristic of self causation.
It is evident from this statement that Whitehead in one phase of his thought
conceives creativity as inseparable from the creatures, being individu-
alized in each occasion as its causa sui . If each occasion is a causa sui,
it is not clear what ontological value there is in a general creativity
which Whitehead’s first category suggests. The general principle of creati-
vity appears to serve the purpose in Whitehead’s philosophy of providing an
ultimate for all contingent entities. Accordingly, it may be said that for
Whitehead contingency requires an ultimate. The ultimate creativity functions
as the final causality which is the basis of the existence of each actual
thing. The thesis that each actual occasion is a causa sui leads Whitehead
to idealize the ultimate creativity. Although idealized, creativity is
conceived by Whitehead to be exemplified in each actual occasion. The ul-
timate qualifies every contingent entity. Creativity seems thus to have in
Whitehead’s system the ontological value of being the final condition of the
69. PR, 539.
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self-determination within each actual occasion. A note on transcendence
follows from the observation of creativity being the causa sui of each
actual entity. "For this reason every actual entity also shares with God
the characteristic of transcending all other actual entitles, Including
God.?^^ On the basis of this statement we may say that God and the world
are mutually transcendent. Each is a cause within itself, yet each has
the capacity for the determination of the other.
(f) In his final contrast Whitehead states, "It is as true
to say that God creates the world as that the world creates God."^^ God
creates the world in the sense that his decisions for the relevance of
eternal objects to actual entitles determine the structure of the concrete
world. The charecter of the created world of actual occasions is pre-
determined by the character of God*s primordial nature. Actual occasions
constitute the world in response to which God becomes what he is. Thus
the world creates God by being the ground upon which creativity derives
its divine superJect. This divine superJect is the achieved reality of
process. In this contrast Whitehead departs conspicuously from super-
naturalists. Yet he is a supBrnaturallst in holding that there is coi
ultimate creativity not identified completely with God or the world.
In the various contrasts treated in this section Whitehead is
faced with the problem of bringing into a coherent system several elements
that have been almost irreconcilable in the history of metaphysical and
theological speculation. It may be held that the antithetical character
of the relatione remains in spite of Whitehead’s preferred term "contrast",
and also in spite of his attempt to show that the same descriptive terms
are applicable to God and the world. Whitehead does not seek to preserve
70. PR;S39
71. PS, 528
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the being and character of God by explaining away actual occasions. At
the same time he does not seek to preserve the reality of actual occasions
by explaining away God. It seems to me that in his attempt to take God
and actual occasions into a total framework, he at least establishes a
suggestive approach to the many problems of internal and external relations
which are Involved. Apeirt from creativity and its expression in the being
of God there is in the organic philosophy no adequate account of actual
occasions, or the values which emerge from them. In hie attempt to make
his account of actual occasions adequate we have observed that Whitehead
finds their potentiality in an ultimately conditioning creativity. In the
actual world creativity expresses itself as the underlying activity at the
base of each passing occasion. There is not an actual occasion which does
not have reference to the ultimate creativity.
By making the primordial nature of God the acquirement by creati-
vity of a primordial character, it follows that God becomes for Whitehead an
exemplification of metaphysical principles. This is demonstrated in White-
head's notion that in God there is a mutual reference of what is ideal and
what is actual. It is in God that eternal objects as pure potentials become
specific for actual occasions. In the consequent nature of God Whitehead
makes definite the determination of the actuality and value of all occasions.
Actual occasions are explicitly detemined in the consequent nature of God.
Without creativity with its primordial and consequent expressions in the being
of God, it is difficult in Whitehead's philosophy to account for the becoming
of actual occasions. The character and value assigned to actual occasions by
Whitehead involve the larger context of his organic metaphysics.
Our discussion of the actual occasion in Whitehead's theory of
value has taken us into a consideration of the final appeal of the organic
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metaphysics. The argument of Whitehead from the standpoint of this chapter
goes back to the claim of value for each actual occasion by making value the
intrinsic character of an event. The notion of the objectivity of value is
thereby reduced primarily to a spatio-temporal concept. In the development
of his doctrine of the actual occasion we noted that it involves according
to Whitehead a dialectic of contrasts. Creativity is thought by Whitehead
to aim at value. In each actual occasion there is a process of aiming at and
achieving value. The assertion of an aim at value in creativity necessitated
a consideration of Whitehead's discussion of God eind the world. It is in God
that the creative value process becomes qualified in each actual occasion.
God is the eternal ideal of the value process.
The various approaches to the actual occasion up to this point of
our investigation aj:*e in need of a general critique in order to throw the
analysis into a total perspective of evaluation. In the forthccming chapter
we shall seek the fonnulatlon of Judgments which will give us the most ade-
quate general appraisal of Whitehead's doctrine of the actual occasion.
A large part of the chapter on general critique will be devoted to
a discussion of difficulties in Whitehead's doctrine of the actual occasion.
The treatment of difficulties will be followed by a discussion of seme valu-
able reorganizations of thought having their source in the doctrine of the
actual occasion, and general appraisal will close with remarks on agreements
and disagreements with Whitehead, and the giving of a final estimate of the
actual occasion.

Chapter VI
A General Critique of the Doctrine of the Actual Occasion
^ 1. Introductory note on the present chapter
The purpose of the present chapter is to offer a general evaluation of
the doctrine of the actual occasion In relation to the problems of the organic
philosophy vftiioh arise from a consideration of the actual occasion* The dlffi-
ctQtles in the doctrine of the actual occasion suggested by the analysis as a
^ole will be pointed out. The work of evaluation will include a treatment
of reorganizations of thought irtilch are provoked by ’.Vhitehead ’ s doctrine of the
actual occasion. The analysis of ’.’i/hi tehead 's doctrine of the actual occasion
in the foregoing chapters constitutes an accumulated critical backgrotmd upon
which we may observe the general outline of the organic philosophy. Our first
task in this general critique will be centered in an attempt to present some of
the difficulties in the organic system which are either provoked or accentimted
by V.lii tehead’ 8 doctrine of the actual occasion.
In our treatment of difficulties we shall deal first with creativity
which, as the tatimate, is Involved in any statement about actual things. The
fact that dipolarity is thought by .'(lii tehead to characterize all actualities
that emerge from the creative process gives this doctrine considerable signifi-
cance in the evaltiatlon of the actual occasion. Dipolarity will therefore be
examined as a possible source of difficulty for ’.Vhitehead * s doctrine of the
actual occasion. The discussion of the basic character of the actual occasion
necessisarily involves the distinction made by V/hitehead between the actual oc-
casion and the actual entity. This distinction is brought to a decisive issue
in ’Vhitehead’s refusal to call God an actual occasion. In our general critique
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we shall seek to evaluate Vfliitehead’s choice of terms (actual occasion and actual
entity), and to determine the adequacy of the doctrine of the actual occasion re-
sulting from Whitehead's refusal to apply the term to God. Involved in 7/hitehead's
description of God as an actual entity and not an actual occasion is the problem of
perpetual perishing. In our general appraisal we shall consider the notion of per-
petual perishing and the closely related notion of objectification. The doctrine
of the superject it has been shown involves the idea of objectification. The
doctrine of the superject as a possible source of difficulty will therefore be in-
cluded ini'our general criticism. The problems of internal and external relations
bear upon mostoof the problems dealt with in the organic philosophy. Because of
their generally Inclusive scope, and particularly because of their possible bear-
ing upon the doctrine of the actual occasion, we shall consider the problems of
internal and external relations in our attempt to formulate a general appraisal
of the actual occasion.
The material on sources of difficulty will bo supplemented by a discussion
of some valuable reorganizations of thou^t having their source in the doctrine
of the actual occasion. The points that will bo noted in this section on reor-
ganization of thought Include the following: the actual occasion and the synthetic
interpretation of the nature of experience, the actual occasion and the dynamic
foundation of actuality, the denial of simple location and the space- transcendence
of actual occasions. Our general appraisal will close with remarks on agreements
and disagreements with Whitehead, and the giving of a final estimate of the actual
occasion.
2. Some difficulties in 7fliitehead's doctrine of the actual occasion
i. The concept of creativity as a source of difficulty in Whitehead's
doctrine of the actual occasion
The Newtonian physics was a great source of the mechanistic doctrine.
It Was in the work of Heisenberg that the scientific basis for vitalism and inde-
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termlnism was provided. The study of the organism by Driescsh added weight to
the vital! Stic proposal for meeting the issue provoked by mechanism. In his
philosophizing ^itehead seems quite aware of the issue between these schools of
thought. He insists that an adequate metaphysics must include nature and life.
By his selection of creativity as ultimate -Vhitehead seeks to bridge the gap be-
tween mechanism and vitalism. As has been noted Whitehead finds analogies to
creativity in the Aristotelian primary substance and in the one great Substance of
Spinoza, Creativity is spoken of as an underlying eternal energy or activity,
We have noted that Whitehead, although holding that this oiltimate creativity is
not an actual concrete entity, holds nevertheless that creativity is in every
actual thing that is, or that becomes. Hence, it is necessisarily involved in
any consideration of the actual occasion.
The philosophical decision of >7hitehead to accept creativity will be
criticized at. the point that it does not bridge the gap between mechanism and
vitalism for which it was designed. If this can be shown, then the doctrine of
the actual occasion will accordingly be defective, I hold thqt the doctrine of
creativity tends largely toward a vitalistic solution of the problem of phenomenal
activity. There is in creativity. a resemblance to the Bergsonian dlan vital.
In the notions of creativity and 4lan vital there is a certain detachment of the
ultimate principle from the realm of the concrete. The creativity proposed by
Whitehead has the detachment of an abstraction. In this function of ideal detach-
ment it is similar to the Space-Time of Alexander, Through his principles of con-
cretion, prehension, and becoming vVhitehead proposes to relate his ultimate with
the matter of fact realm of existence, aod is the principle of concretion, and
It is through him that there is a relating of every actual thing to the ultimate
/
potentiality. By divine action potentiality is concreted into individual actual
occasions. Exactly how this relating occurs is not made clear. Vagueness at
this point makes the becoming of actual occasions a matter of uncertainty. Granted
that we cannot go b^ind acttial occasions or actual entities, it is still a matter
J
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of anxious inquiry how these occasions or entities are related to the
creativity
from which they are at least ideally separable. 'Phe notion of prehension is a
guarantee of interlocking relationships of actual entities or occasions. God as
an actual entity is conceived by »Vhitehead to be in a prehending relation with all
other actual entities. His being is interlocked with every actuality of the uni-
verse. As primordial God is identified by .Vhitehead with the one underlying eter-
nal activity by which all actualities are energized. Thus it is in God that
Whitehead relates the ultimate creativity to eachraatter of fact in the world. In
spite of this function assigned to God by ~;hitehead, the ultimate creativity as de-
scribed in the organic philoso^iy appears to be essentially an abstraction. These
considerations lead to the suspicion that creativity has not rendered the service
expected of it. namely, bridging the gap between mechanism and vitalism.
Kechanism is allowed by V/hitehead who holds to regularity and dependability
in the routes of occasions. -Ha&t is more emphatic is that according to Whitehead
these occasions run blindly. However, vitalism is added to mechanism byt the
claim that this blind running is nevertheless according to the plan of the body
or society to which a given occasion belongs. The opposition between the concepts
of mechanism and vitalism or teleology .Vhitehead converts into the relation of
complements.Holding to mechanism, .Vhitehead asserts that occasions run blindly.
Holding to teleology, Whitehead asserts that the actions of occasions are accord-
ing to the plan of the organism of #iich they are members. The swing to vitalism
seems great In that the ultimate activity, while expressing itself mechanically
in actual occasions, is seemingly in the truest sense above mechanism. There is
determinism in that there are regular and predictable routes of actual occasions.
Furthermore, each actual occasion places upon the world the obligation of conform-
ity. Being concrete means being something specific and definite, hence, determinate.
Conformity and definiteness belong to the mechanism of actual occasions.
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From what has teen said we may judge that 7/hitehead desires to keep faith
with the mechanists as well as with the vitalists. His principle of the immanence
of causality and the inner determination of each actual thing lends force to his
vitalistic persuasion. The actual occasion may he called an individual edition
of a vital cosmic urge, that' i^.creativi ty. It thus inherits some of the weaknesses
of the doctrine of creativity as pointed out in the foregoing discussion. The ac-
tual occasion is a hybrid creature conceived in the freedom of creativity and born
into the world of the necessity of actuality. This account of the philosophical
genealogy of the actual occasion reveals tiie complications involved in .vlii tehead *
s
attempt to unite the opposites of determinism and indeterminism, necessity and
freedom, mechanism and vitalism. In the last analysis «Vhitehead joins these ob-
jects In such a way that each is Incomplete wbthout the other.
In addition to the difficulties already mentioned there is the further
difficulty that creativity is conceived as operating in a strange world. It was
mentioned in a previous discussion that creativity operates within vi^at may be
called The Siven.^ If creativity operates in a world ’obstinately indifferent
to mind', the emergence of occasions in higher conq^lexes involvong mind places
upon Vhitehead a heavy burden of explanation. It is the burden of explaining urtiy
mind; should emerge or survive ^en there is so much against it. This is a problem
in teleology reaching down into the actual occasion irtiioh after all is a concrete
expression of creativity. This strain in '.Vhitehead *s thot^ht is considerably re-
duced by the theoiy that there is a polarity of the mental and the physical in
each actual occasion. Mnd is accordingly,* made to reach down into physical things.
There is a mutual reference of the mental and the physical. Creativity in its
1. See pp.121,122.
2. Proc.Arist. 3oa.. . 22 (1921-1922), 221.
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possession of the conceptuality ani potentiality of eternal objects is expressed
in the actual world of each occasion* >Vhitehaad*s attempt to solve this problem
of creativity operating in an alien world passes into his doctrine of a God ^o
is tenderly concerned that nothing be lost.® The actual occasion is accordingly
in a world not completely hostile and not completely amicable to its habitation.
That there is a considerable measure of hostility puts the doctrine of the actual
occasion in peculiar circumstances. The peculiarity is for V^itehead simply a
matter of brute fact. It is the my things are, and the my creativity must
(Operate.
From this discussion of creativity ws may say that I'/hitehead's organic
philosophy has its ultimacy in an appeal to a non-actual entity, a substratum
of activity. The vatlmate abstraction of creativity reduces it to ideality.
However, as a substratum it is also interpreted by <t/hitehead as an eternal undei^
lying activity. Creativity is the fluent energy at the base of every quantum
of actuality, ilach actual occasion is considered a quantum of fluent energy .
The metaphysics of the actual occasion is accordingly involved in a complication
which runs throu^ the organic philoscphy. aVhltehead tries to resolve this com-
plication in his theory of ingress ion. The theory loses some of its force by
.Vhltehead*s notion of eternal objects as pure potentials, and also by the notion
that creativity is not separable from its creatures. In view Of the fact that
every creature (actiial entity or actual occasion') is thought by .Vhitehead to have
a combination of the mental and the physical in its constitution, lot us now di-
rect attention to difficulties involved in this aspect of i'/hitehead’s thou^t.
It will be noted in the course of the following discussion of the difficulties of
di polarity that some of the difficulties in the concept of creativity are carried
over into the concept of dipolarity.
3. PR, 685

ii. The concept of dipolarity as a sourfie of difficulty in -Thitehead’s
doctrine of the actual occasion
The notion of dipolarity is Ti/hitehead 's ans\TOr to the problem of the re-
lationship of the mental to the physical. It is an answer which pulls together
characters of the universe long conceived in metaphysical separation. In the
history of modem philosophical thought from Descartes to the present there have
been several tsrpes of solutions proposed including parallelism, monism of mind,
monism of matter, interaction, and double aspect. Berkeley represents mental or
spiritual monism as a solution. Hobbes is a representative of materialistic
monism. The Ocoasionalists of the seventeenth century, including Bekker and
Geulincx, held to a parallellstio view in the notion of a separate status for
mind and body. The Ocoasionalists held that through the power of God operating
on the occasion of the will there was effected an action of the body. Spinoza
held to one Substance, mind and matter being mere attributes of the one Substance,
Leibniz sought a solution of the problem in the notion of a preestablished har-
mony instituted by the TTonad of monads.
In order to understand Whitehead's proposal for a solution we shall have
first to make clear his theory of poles. The most concrete fact, or any instance
of experience, "whether that instance be God or an actual occasion of the world
is dipolar."'^ Bipolarity refers to two qualities in the constitution of the
organism or actuality irtiose behavior is under consideration. These qualities
may also be thought of as attributes or aspects of the entity in question, xhat
the notion of dipolarity Is applied by Whitehead to actual occasions is also
4
observed in the following: ’’we .must hold that each occasion is dipolar, and that
one pole is the physical occasion and the other is the mental occasion, "6 in
4. PR, 54.
5, Bri^tman (ed.), P6IC, 59,
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this passage it seems that .Vhitehead interprets the physical pole as the whole
occasion looked at physically, or in terns of the ^lysical quality of its experience.
Similarly the mental pole is Interpreted as the whole occasion looked at mentally,
or in terms of the mental quality of its experience. The poles thus are not
qualities of an occasion standing apart from eacli other', hut ways of interpreting
the behavior of the actual occasion. The mental and the physical are thus con-
joined and separable only by a process of abstraction. -Thitehead comes to this
Interpretation of the poles when ho says , "according to the philosophy of organism,
physical and mental operations are inextricably intertwined..."^ Dipolarity is
thus suggestive of an indissoluble relation. t/hitehead’s idea of the close to-
getherness of mental and physical operations is also expressed in the statement:
"There is an essential reference from one world to the other."’^ From bodily or
physical occasion to mental occasion there is a connection. .Vhitehead gives his
suggestion of interaction a picturesque forcefullness when he says, "The physical
occasion enters into the mental occasion as already actual and as contribution to
its ground."® The notion of one occasion entering into another is definitely
suggestive of an Interaction of the mental and the idiysica^. The mental and the
physical poles of an occasion have an essential reference to each other that
can on the basis of .irhitahead *s own suggestions be interpreted as interaction.
This theory of interaction stands in contrast with .Vhi teheqd ’ s other notion that
mental and physical polos are simply ways of interpreting the total actions of
an entity under varying conditions. The organism as a whole is capable of acting
mentally or physically, also mentally and physically.
In the case of the intaractionistic interpretation of dipolarity '.Thite-
head at least borders on that theory which he wishes sincerely to avoid, namely.
6. PR, 496.
7. RT.I, 103.
8. RJf, 116.
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Isi furea t Ion, 'The notion of there "being a reference "between the physical and the
mental is evidence of the physical and the mental heing thought of in some measure
of separateness. If Descartes bifurcated nature, .Vhltehead by his theory of
Interaction is under a strong suspicion of following the same course. The fact
that the two poles are inextricably bound together does not erase the issue in-
volved in their relative separateness. Either one without the other would possibly
be for ."Whitehead an ’unnatural’ situation, IJevertheless
,
the fact of a distinction
between the two polos intensifies the problem of their metaphysical status. These
two polos belong according to -Vhitehead in the class of final opposites.^ God,
being an actual entity, has also the characteristic of dipolar! ty.^® Hence,
dipolarity remains unresolved in the final entitles, .Vhitehead does not explain
either the mental away in favor of the physical, or the physical away in favor
of the m€ntal. The tendency toward either a mental or a physical monism is thus -
rejected by "Thitehead, V/hitehead is accordingly opposed to the mentalistlc and
the materialistic traditions. His position is that of analysis by integration.
To give these poles metaphysical status seems to me to make bifurcation unavoid-
able, or to reduce the analysis to a defense of a neutral monism. The dipolar
occasions become in effect neutral entities. At this point ".Thitehead in his
analysis appears to be close to Hussell who in his interpretation of miai and
matter makes the following assertion; "the two will be brought together, . .by dis-
playing each as a logical structure composed of ^at...we shall call ’neutral
stuff, The same line of thought is manifest in a reference from Holt: "and
so, as already stated, I have adopted the name ’neutral stuff. ”’12 jn the case of
^Itehead as well as in the cases "of Russell and Holt actuality seems to be essen-
9.
PR, 518.
10. PR, 54.
11. Russell, A!% 10.
12. Holt, CG, 136.
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tially neither psychical nor physical, hut a stuff from which both qualities
emerge. The ultimate creativity is the gro\incl of the psychical and the physical,
yet in Itself is in ideal detachment from the psychical and the physical.
opinion is that the general course of \Vhitehead*s philosophy of nature places
him in special danger of neutral monism. Each actual occasion is expressed in
mental and physical patterns or operations. The essence of the physic©^mental
relation is left obscure in vVhitehead’s notion of an ultimate creativity.
On a behavioristic interpretation of IVhitehead ’s theory of dipolarity the
poles belong primarily to the interpretation, and only secondarily to the entity
itself. When an entity acts in a certain way - conceptually - its activity may
be described as miental. When an entity acts unconceptually its action may be
described as physical. In either case it is a matter of interpreting activity
in an objective way. The distinction between these types of behavior is mainlj^
a matter of creating a convenient symbolism. ’ATiitehead * s emphasis upon the pri-
vate psychological field as the beginning of the empirical approach makes a
strictly behavioristic approach to the problem of dipolarity untenable. Every
actual occasion has its own privacy, that is, its subjective intensity. In
vouchsafing' privacy to the actual occasion 7/hitehead by inference repiodiates a
strictly behavioristic interpretation of the mental and physical poles. Involved
in Whitehead's thought on dipolarity is the opposition between his subjectivism
and objectivism in analysing the constitution of every actual thing.
There is a further difficulty in '.Vhitehead’s doctrine of dipolarity con-
tained in the assertion; "But what I am denying is that some correlation with
mentality can be proved to be essential for the very being of a natural fact."l®
This quotation supporting metaphysical realism appears to stand in contrast to
another assertion by Whitehead that "There is an essential reference from one
world to the other. The discussion from earlier paragraphs of this section
15. £roc.Arl3t.Soc ..22 (1921-1922) ,222
14. HIT, 103.
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has shown TOiitehead to "be In favor of a definite correlation of the mental and the
physical In every occasion. When Whitehead denies necessary correlation ho is
trying’ it seems to he faithful to what ho conceives to he a methodological technique.
The technique consists in thinking of nature homogeneously and heterogeneously. In
a definite statement about the homogeneous method of conceiving natxire ’^/hitehead
says, ’We can think about nature without thinking about thought is what I mean.
Then wo are thinking ’homogeneously’ about nature,”!^ In contrast to this homo-
geneous method of conceiving nature Whitehead says, ”It is possible to think about
nature in conjunction with thought, that is, about the fact that nature is thought
about. In such a case I shall say that we are thinking ’heterogeneously’ about
nature.”!^ It follows from these descriptions of method that Whitehead’s denial
of correlation with mentality as essential to the being of a natural fact has a
possible defense. Yet the definite waj; in which Whitehead binds the mental and
the physical poles together (inextricably Intertwined), one would think that any
suggestion of denying the correlation of the two would be met with a rebuff. Even
if it be said that the homogeneous method is merely a matter of positing nature,
it would bo true novertiieless that Whitehead’s general conoept ot nature includes
the mental as well as the physical. The psychic is in nature and not added to
nature. The tendency of vVhltehead ’s thought is toward panpsychlsm. Each occasion
in nature is sentient and dipolar, "All wo knew of nature is in the same boat,
to sink or swim together, If all we know of nature is in the same boat, then
it is difficult to deny the essential correlation to mentality of every natural
fact. The making of this denial is a difficulty in WM tread’s doctrine of the
dipolar! ty of the actual occasion.
The difficulties to vftiioh attention has been called in this part of our
critique have ramifications throu^out vVhitehead ’s philosophy of nature. In trying
15. CON, 3.
16. Ibid.
17. CON, 148.
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to achieve a synthesis in his philosophy of nature hy the theory of dipolarity
Whitehead seems bent on taking mind as a part of nature at every point of the
evolutionaiy process, .Vhi teheed says of the simplist forms of existence in
nature: ’’T'.fental ity is merely latent in all these occasions as sttadied hy phy-
slcists and chemists.”-^ By his defense of the latency ‘of mentality Vi/hitehead
is aiparently in intellectual fellowship with Strong who states: ’’The term
soul-dust’ would come nearer to expressing the exact idea; for the elementary
particles of which this dust consists are the occupants of spatial points.”^®
The latent mentality of '.Vhi tehead ' s theory is comparable to the soul-dust of
Strong’s theory, Whitehead’s iJanpsychism is least defensible with respect to
those extremely simplified occasions in what is called empty space. In the cases
of both thinkers we have an atteii5)t to achieve a synthesis which involves the
use of materialistic concepts. The minimum danger of such an effort is terminologi-
cal confusion. The category of substance seems not to be completely abandoned.
In matters of terminology there is another source of difficulty in .Vhitehead's
doctrine of the actual occasion. This difficulty hinges upon the distinction
which (Vhitehead makes between the actual occasion and the aotte.1 entity. Exemina-
tlon of this distinction as a possible source of error in ’.7hi tehead will be the
next problem of this general critique.
iii, Tho distinction between the actual occasion and the actual entity
as a source of difficulty
(1,) The choice of terms as a source of difficulty
Whitehead is faced with a difficult problem in his philosophy of nature
as ho reconstitutes the actual entity into the actual occasion. The problem is
to Salvage the materialistic concept and blond it more nearly into the current
18. IT, 230.
19, Strong, EOT/^ 283,

relativistic concept. As has "been noted, ’.vhitehead uses actual occasion and
actual entity synonymously, especially in his categories of existence.^ Both
are called res verae and the ’Final Reali ties, ’^1 T/hitehead chooses the term
actual occasion instead of the term actual entity fl^en he wishes to enphasize
the following characteristics of the actual entity; becdtningness,'^'^ immovable-
ness, 23 extensiveness (spatial and terrooral ) ,^ - and potentiality for division.
In one stretch of discription we may say that an actual occasion is a monadic
sentient entity with the characteristics of becomingness, imraovableness, spatial
and temporal extensiveness, and potentiality for division.When an actual entity
has these qualities it is no longer to be called an actual entity, but instead it
is to be called an actual occasion. The concept of the actual occasion involves
an accentuation of the qualities that characterize on the ^ole the dynamic
relativistic view of nature.
Becomingness is a term vhich is used to accentuate passage, transition,
and perpetual perishing of the entities of nature. In the notion of Immovable-
ness Vvliitehead is presenting us with an organic edition of the Newtonian absolute
space grafted upon a concept of the world as dynamic and plenary. As Immovable
an aotTial occasion is simply vhat it is, and where it is. Spatial and tenporal
extensiveness is a hyphenated concept (spatio-temporal) and indicates '.Whitehead's
acceptance of the theory of the assimilation of space and time. In virtue of
spatio-temporal extensiveness an actual occasion transcends simple location and
has dtiration. It is a space-time cortqplex. The notion of potentiality for divi-
sion is a way of stating continuity from occasion to occasion. Potentiality for
20. See pp.
21. PR, S2.
22. PR, 124
22'. 113
24. PR, IIS
25. Ibid1
.
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division suggests ultimate limitation in the conjunction of events. V/ith these
qualifications and special functions the actual occasion is loaded with responsi-
bility for service in the organic philosophy. Creegan finds the source of the
actual occasion in .Thitehead *s phenomenology of aesthetic experience and in the
psychology of William James, particularly in the concept* of the specious present,
The reference to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience includes broadly ’.Vhite-
head's theory of feeling as applied to actual occasions. Feeling is a mode of in-
gression of eternal objects in actual occasions. Jith such a mixed origin the
theory of actual occasions is liable to difficulties.
It is especially with reference to immovableness of the actual occasion
that attention is directed to a possible difficulty in Whitehead's doctrine,
Whitehead's purpose in this sit\jation is to a^Jjust Kewton's descriptions to the
organic theory. In makii^ the adjustment Whitehead accepts Newton's proof that
motion does not ajply to absolute place, vftiich in its nature is immovable.
Absolute place or space is defined by Newton as follows: "Absolute space, in its
own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and
immovable,"^® By absolute motion Newton means "the translation of a body from
one absolute place into another. "^9 Although TThitehead charges that Newton's
absolutes are abstractions v^ich fall \inder the fallacy of misplaced concretion,
he nevertheless tries to make an adjustment with Newton in his doctrine of the
actual occasion. The actual occasion in a Newtonian framework of absolute space
is denied motion. Actual occasions do not move; they merely become. They per-
petually perish upon being bom. Their generation is a function of God as the
principle of concretion. God as the principle of concretion is equivalent to
God as prime mover in the cosmology of Aristotle. 30 iphe denial of motion in the
26. Creegan, "The Actual Occasion and Aottaal History," Jour.Phil ,. 39
(1942), 268.
27. PR, 113.
28. Newton, J-tP, 6,
29. Ibid.
30. PR, 374.

163
actual occasion does not seem to me to fit very well into the assimilation theory
of space- time which is also a part of vVhitehead's doctrine of the act\ial occasion.
The doctrine of absolute space upon which the imovableness of the aotvial occasion
is based is hardly acceptable within the scope of the relativity doctrine. The
doctrine of relativity involves a repudiation of space as absolute and also of
tl^e as absolute. In his denial of any instantaneous configuration of particles
at a given locus it is my thorght that .Vhitehead thereby denies any logical neces-
sity for the Newtonian absolutes. The desire to hold to the absoluteness of space
or time indicates ’.Vhitehead ’s desire as an empiricist to guarantee a locus for the
ultimate data of science. Tfeck appropriately canments on A’hitehead by saying,
"Whatever counts in the universe must be real soraei^ere . the only real things, then,
have a spatio-temporal character."^ Granting that something is always and every-
where going on, it is a peculiar turn of thought that '.Vhitehead should defend the
notion of immovablensss which he links with the ITewtonian absolute space. In view
of this seeming conflict of thought between absolutism and relativism I do not
think the theory of the actual occasion is a thoroughly cogent theory. The dis-
tinction between the actual occasion and the actual entity has another possible
difficulty in ViHiltehead * s denial that the term actual occasion applies to God,
notwithstanding the fact that the term actual entity is so applied. '.Ve shall con-
sider this point in the next topic of our discussion.
(li) The difficulty in »Vhltehead*8 refusal to call God an actual
occasion
'^itehead’s refusal to call God an actual occasion is contained in the
words: ”The term ’actual occasion* will always exclude God from its scope. "32
The exclusion of God as an actual occasion v^ile holdii^ him to be an actual
31. ?,feok, AE, 41
32. PR, 135.
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entity complicates the problem of the actml occasion. The problem of the actual
occasion is complicated because the refusal to apply the term to God -tends to lift
God out of the time process, God as an actual entity has for ^liitehead the status
of being non- temporal. ”God is that non- temporal actuality i»hich has to be taken
account of in every creative phase. It is true that the actual occasion is
chatacteristioally a perpetually perishing entity,and that the description of Ggd
as an acttel occasion would force an interpretation ^ioh »Vhitehead wishes to es-
oape. His wish to escape a description of God in terms of perpetual perishing is
attested by the fact that he calls God an non-temporal actual entity.
It is to be remenbered that according to <Vhitehead the being of an actual
entity is its becoming.^ God as an actual entity shares with other actual en-
titles the characteristic of fluency. If this is not so, it is hard to understand
what rifhitehead means whai ho says, ”It is as true to say that God is permanent
and the world fluent, as that the world is permanent and God Is fluent.”*^'' It is
also a matter of account that .’Whitehead thinks of the ego of a given specious
present as an actual occasion, *TJaoh time he^ Descartes^ pronounces *1 am, I
exist,* the actual occasion, which is the ego is different, and the *he’ irtilch
is common to the two egos Is an eternal object or, alternatively, the nexus of
successive occasions,**^ Now if God’s consciousness has any resemblance to ours,
the *I am* is a variable of successive occasions. God’s experience thus becomes
occasional! zed, even though ho is not in his very being simply an actual occasion.
In a note on 'perpetual perishing’ Whitehead comments that "no thinker thinks twice...
No subject experiences twice. This is ^at Locke ought to have meant by his doc-
trine of 'perpetual perishing j'”’ If by perpetual perishing Whitehead waild
33. RI5, 95.
34. PR, 34,35.
35. PR, 526. See pp. 131,132 for a discussion of this contrast.
36. PR, 116.
37. PR, 43.
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refer to the fluency of experience, there seems nothing to prevent this application
of the concept to God. Whitehead’s refusal however to limit the "being of God to
the fluency of an actual occasion is to he noted in the fact that it is God in whom
the eternal objects reside. God's primordial nature is the source of eternal ob-
jects. ?hua it is in God's primordial nature that he is a non-temporal acttiality,
and as such he can not be called an actual occasion. His being includes actual
occasions. The refusal to call God an actual occasion thus puts the fluent charac-
ter of actual occasions in relief. For them becoming is also perishing. They
stand in contrast to that which is eternal, or to that which neither survives nor
perishes. In his primordial nature God is the primordial creativity. This call-
ing of God an actual entity emphasizes actual entities as enduring objects which
are composed of actual occasions.
Prom the observations made on the distinction between actual occasion and
actual entity it appears that '^?hi tehead ' s refusal to call God an actual occasion is
generally a defensible position. However, as has been pointed out, the refusal
is attended by difficulties In the metaphysics of Whitehead, These dlffioultiis
are a part of Whitehead's attempt to deal coherently with the problems of fluency
and pezmianence, the actual and the non-actual. The problem of perishing and
objectification is a part of the set of problems that are involved in the treat-
ment of the distinction between the actual entity and the actual occasion. Ve
shall now seek an evaluation of the concepts of perishing and objectification as
they relate to the actual occasion.
Iv, Perishing and objectification of the actual occasion as a critical
issue in the organic philosophy
The perishing of the actual occasion it was noted in the preceding dis-
cussion Was the characteristic accounting principally for .Vhitehead's refusal to
call God an actual occasion. Actual occasions become, and perish upon becoming.
It is in the becoming and in the perishing of the actual occasion that //hitehead

points up the problem of passage in nature, or repudiates the notion of substance
as conceived by materialists. In the notion of the actual occasion there is no
uunohanging subject of change. Vi/hitehead thus defends himself against the idea of
substance. Becoming is the process of potentiality receiving limitations, the
merely possible passing into a mater of fact status. fhe actual occasion pre-
eminently points up the problem of transition in nature.^® ^Sveiy actual occa-
sion presents itself as a process: it is a becomingness.'*^^ The becoming and
the perishing of an actual occasion constitute one act or a series of acts looked
at frcMn two points of observation. In as much as the present is considered mere-
ly a wavering boundary line between the past and the future, it may be said that
the present state of an actual entity is the wavering boundary line between its
becoming and its perishing.
The concept of perishing does not carry for TThitehead the notion of
annihilation. It would probably bo closer to Vhitehead’s thotght to say that the
actual occasion decays. In the decay of actual occasions there is the breaking
down of an arrangement or structure. It is the passage of a combination which
defines the mode by vi^ich eternal objects are ingressod into the limited. In re-
ply to a question on entropy put to him at a symposium <Vhitehead said, ”A typo of
order arises, develope its variety of possibilities, culminates, and passes into
the decay of repetition without freshness. That type of order decays, not into
disorder,but by passing .into a ndw typo' of order,'“^The reference to a society of
actual entitles or actual occasions is the significance of .V'hitehead's point in
this connection. Yet the suggestion of ’passing into a new typo of order' ex-
presses the notions of continuity and persistence which are embodied in the life
process of an actual occasion. In as much as energy passes from occasion to occa-
sion the perishing of an occasion may bo thought of as a transformation of energy,
38. SeeppilOb-lOVfor a treatment of change and pennanence,
39. 3?.W, 246.
40. Lee (ed.). Symposium . 28.
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Perishing is thus not a process involving the complete surrender of all that may
he described as the content of any actual occasion. This remark brings 4s to
a possible difficulty in vThitehead’s theory of perishing, namely, the problem
of unity and identity.
It was pointed out in our discussion of the dis.tinction between the actual
41
occasion and the actual entity that the linking of occasions is by eternal objects.
The nexus of actual occasions consists in the Ingression of eternal objects. It
has also been nothd that there is for '.Vhitehead unity in the passage of occasions
ranging from mere blind prehensions to the acme of emphasis in consciousness.
The acceptability of 'whitehead ' s notion of identity on the plane of the physical
Involves a difficulty not fully escaped by his ascribing of sentience to the lowest
levels of occasions. Bowne makes the point that impersonal things "have their
A,Z
identity solely through the intellect i^^ich constitutes them identical."" Ac-
cording to Bowne chaise and identity are irreconcilable on the impersonal plane.
vThitehead counters by a virticle increase in the term personal and by the finding .
of sentience in the general scope of what is called nature. Purtherraore, there is
no hard and fast line separating in '.Vhitehead ’ s thought the personal from the im-
personal. Identity is thus defended at any level of nature. (Vhitehead 's attempt
to solve the problem of identity rests not only upon his concept of expreience in
nature, but also upon his notion of the ingression of eternal objects. Being
elements in nature #iich do not pass, eternal objects constitute the abiding fac-
tors in the processes of changing occasions. '.Vhitehead ’s handling of the problem
of identity may be thought of therefore as embracing the search for a solution on
the psychical as well as on the physical plane. On the physical plane the appeal
to analogies establishes merely the probability of a general extension of sentience.
On the psychical plane there will have to be a greater ©nphasis by '.Vhitehead upon
41, See pp,72,150 See also PH, 116,
42, See pp. 47,105.
43, Bowne, Tletanhysics . 62.

158
Intelligence as operative in the process of the ingress ion of eternal objects.
Another problem arising out of the same context of thought in 'iVhi tehead * s philoso-
phy is the problem of objectification. At this point we shall call attention to
difficulties in the notion of objectification.
There are at least two difficulties I think involved in the notion of ob-
jectification, The first difficulty is centered in the question of the ontologi-
cal status of the objectifies occasion. The second difficulty is centered in the
question of novelty. In order to establish a setting for the criticisms that
follow we shall state the meaning of onjectlflcation. According to tiie doctrine
of supersession one entity or actual occasion is followed by another. >7hen an
actual occasion perishes, it is thought to have a heritage or a remainder in the
life of the occasions which supersede it. Every occasion has some relevance for
some other occasion. It prehends them in a process of interrelation. There is
continuity in nature, ard this continuity is based upon the living of one occasion
over into the life of another occasion. There is mutual immanence of actual oc-
casions, In cryptic style '.Miitehead asserts that objectifieation means "being
present in another entity,'"^ The theory of objectification is Thitehead ’s
answer to the problem of sequence, and also the problem of interconnection in nature,
tiVhen '^^hitehead holds that events conform to their predecessors he is stating ob-
jectification in the present tense. The question of the ontological status of
the objectified occasion is a source of difficulty in ’.liitehead *s theory, as wo
shall now see.
If we call the original occasion 'a-j^* and its objectification some
questions that arise are as follows: What is the status of *a2*^ "/hat is the
mode of life which ’a^* enjoys in 'ag*? Is ’a^^’ bodily and concretely in 'a2*,
or is it only an abstraction that *aj^’ is in 'ag*? If ’aj^* is actual in its
44. PR, 80
c
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iW original state, is it also actual as a constituent of 'ag'? It is to "be remem-
* lered that the perishing of ’a^^' is a prerequisite of its objectification in *a2'»
In the Sophist Plato deals with the sane question, n^ely, the ontological status
IJ
'
of ’'iVhat is not.' It is posed specifically as the problem of error. The
Eleatic Stranger tells Theatetus in the Sophist that it. is hard to think of false-
f hoods having real existence "without being caught in a contradiction by
the very
3 utterance of such words. The problem of the non-actual or objectified occasion
jfi may be met by thinking of it as a potential in the new occasion. Accordingly,
jl *a^' would become a potential in * 3.2 '
•
V/e have observed already that by potentiality
I Whitehead refers to achievability apart from any specific achievement. Whitehead
employs eternal objects in the function of potentiality. Eternal objects, it will
be recalled, are defined as pure potentials for the specific determination of fact,
that is, forms of definiteness.^^ How then are objectified occasions related to
eternal objects? Both may be said to be ii^ressed in a particular occasion. By
definition there is a distinction between actual occasions and eternal objects.
There is no reason in .Vhitehead's theory to think of the identification of actual
occasions and eternal objects. It is true however that although actual entities
perish subjectively, they become objectively immortal. The occasion as objective-
ly immortal is nevertheless not to be Identified with the occasion as stjhjectively
perished. Furthermore, the notion of becoming immortal does not warrant the idea
that objectified actual occasions and eternal objects are Identical.
I In a critical review of Whitehead's theory of objectification Has comnentsj
>1
"we cannot say that a part remains ^«ftien the actual entity perished. A part of an
I
entity is nothing at all. Thus perishing an actual entity can leave no legacy
i for its successors."-’^ Das is perhaps a little extreme in his judgment. The
i perishing entity on ^.Vhitehead's theory may be thought of as a contribution to a
45. Sophist . 236E.
46. PR, 32.
47. Das, P.V, 180.
i
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« growing future. Thus its remains are constituted
hy its potentiality for the
f modification of subsequent occasions. The recognition of
remainders is an essen-
I tial part of any
reasonable theory of nature. The recognition of remainders is
I the
recognition of something of the past in eveiy event. It follows
from White-
• head’s theory of time that there is in every occasion the relation
of some past
J
event to its successor. .Vithout a theory of remainders from
past occasions every
event would stand isolated. The perishing of an actual occasion
constitutes that
occasion an inheritance for the becoming of another occasion. In his
criticism
of Whitehead at this point Das fails to appreciate the full
significance of WhiteQ
head’s claim of reminders. This feilure is due to a very strict
interpretation
;
of ’-Thitehead’s doctrine of pwishing . If perishing is to be thought
of as pre-
cluding any possibility of remainders, then novelty can have no basis of
explana-
tion in the past history of events. It is to be kept in mind, the
criticism of
!:b8 notwithstanding, that Whitehead's doctrine of events is relational
as well as
atomic. Events have Interconnection as well as individuality. The
adequacy
of the organic system will now be judged in terms of a specific treatment of
w novelty as a possible sotirce of difficulty in Whitehead.
w Novelty is another problem having its source in rftiitehead’s doctrine of
5
perishing and objectification. As noted in the previous paragraph there are re-
malnders. However, occasion ’ag’can never^becmehelyi^at^^A^J.-was.The immortality
I ?
i'l Of occasion ’ai’ requires from .Vhitehead’s point of view a
process of transforma-
i tion. By passir^ into the life of its successor every occasion
experiences a
I i
transformation. In his category of transmutation .Vhitehead applies his theory
I of transformation to the
passage from one grade of existence to another. At any
! level of existence Whitehead thinks of novelty as a permanent possibility
involved
>
in the process of objectification. Novelty is potential in the transf oimatlon
prooess of every actual occasion. Novelty presents a problem however for the
objectification of the actual occasion. As new occasions emerge, and in turn
become objectified in succeeding occasions, it seems that there would be a grow-
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ing content of the repetitive in each developing ac trial occasion. Hence, the
possibility of novelty might be conceivably decreased. This seems supported by
7/hitehead’s admission of entropy.’ However, it is in the context of his discussion
of entropy that V/hitehead speaks of the decay of one order ’’passing into a now
type of order. This passage is intensely suggestive of .1/hitehead 's metajdiysi-
cal resourcefulness in incorporating scientific thotght into the structure of his
philos(^hy. The passage referred to suggests that in .'/hi tehead • s concept of re-
mainders there is the notion of being ’left for’ rather than being merely ’loft
over.’ The remainder of every perishing occasion is’left for’ a siKJceeding oc-
casion, In his discussion of the manifold character of an actual entity V/hite-
head says, ’’it has the character given for it by the past,"-^ This passage in-
dicates that each actual entity has the present condition of its existence in its
linkage with its predecessors. The determination of the relevance of remainders
for the present process of an actual entity is a function of the positive and
negative prehensivo qualities of the entity. In every case of objectification
there is involved a union of sameness and novelty. In his analysis of the func-
tion of prehension 77hi tehead embroils himself in difficulties vftiich reach deeply
into his metaphysics. .Ye shall now turn to the problem created by Yhitehead In
granting feelings priority over the feeler. The difficulty involved in this
grant of priority will constitute the following effort at apparaisal,
V. The theory of the superject as a source of weakness in the doctrine
of the actual occasion
It was shown in the oahpter on .Yhi tehead ’s psychology that ho holds the
subject to be a derivative of experience.^ Otherwise expressed, the point is
that the feelings evolve the feeler. .Vhi tehead tries to make his position clear
48. Lee (ed.). Symposium . 28,
49. PR, 1S4.
50. See pp, 51 ff
.
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by a comparison with Kant. "For Kant the world emerges from the subject; for
the philosophy, of organism the siibjoct emerges fron the world, a superject
rather than a subject. The term superject is thus .'^liitehead 's word for the
ordinary term subject, that is, the experiencing entity. At tiijes in accomoda-
tion to ordinary iisage he calls the superject or subjec’t-s\jperject merely the sub-
ject. Pafiked into the term superject is the reversal of a jiiilosophical position,
a return to pre-Kantian (e.g. ,Leibnizian) ways of thought. .'-Tiitehead in accord
with Leibniz emphasizes the priority of feelings over a subject of feelings, that
is, a feeler. In his analysis .Vliitehead is struggling- against several jhilosophi-
cal doctrines. He is against the notion of a sunstantial self, that is, a self
independent of an3 prior to all experience. The critical work of Hume revealing
the indefensibility of the old concept of the self helped iVhitehead to brace him-
self for a full repudiation. In the superject theory -Vhitehead is also anxious
to build up a defense of his realism as it pertains to the independence of the
object. It is an objective view of nature in which all that was previously held
to be subjective is really ’out there’ in nature. By this shift in thoiight v'/hite-
head furthermore proceeds to remove what may be called the dualistic veil between
subject and object. In 7?hitehead’s own characteristic way of posing the epistemo-
logical question we note
,
"I never could see T#iy we should be born dreaming of
another world. All of these shifts of thought and repudiations of previous
positions are compressed into the teiro superject.
In criticizing .Vhitehead I do not take up a defense of the substantial
theory of the self. I shall not argue for the primacy of the subject. In fact,
I think that the weakness of .'1(111 tehaad as well as his oppoaents rests in the in-
sls tense upon ’primacy’. To argue for the primacy of the subject places upon
61. PR, 135, 136.
52. Schilpp (ed.), P;V, 386.
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one the responsibility of dealing in the last analysis with a vacuous actuality.
?o argue for the primacy of the object or experience weakens the teleological
character of the organic philosophy by ascribing aims to vague feelings or to
feelings characterized by only a slight degree of c onsci ovisness. Gentry speaks
accusingly of >Vhitehead as follows; "Whitehead drops the subject as an existent
presupposed by its experiences vflille retaining essential functions of the subject
>
53
as ordinarily conceived." In defense of .Vhitehead it may bo said that on the
theories of the dynamic basis of actuality anj the perishing of occasions (includ-
ing occasions of consciousness) there can hardly bo any subject functions as or-
dinarily concelTOd. Any functions having reference to or depending upon a sub-
ject as a substantial entity do not appear to be retained b.y .Vhitehead. There is
however in V^liitehead ' s conception of the primacy of experience a difficulty which,
as already noted, involves the teleological character of tiie organic philosophy.
The difficulty in the notion of priority could be met in part by a re-
modeling of the terminology. Instead of «aying that priority belongs to the sub-
ject or the object, we could say that contenporaneousness belongs to subject and
object. The subject emerges with its experience. Experience emerges with its
subject. Subject and object emerge together. As I see the issue this way of
solving the problem avoids the teleological weakness of the notion of the priority
of experience over a subject of experience.
The teieologioal question drives us back in the final analysis to some
ultimate._ The God of Whitehead as the principle of concretion is involved in the
teleology of every actual entity or occasion. ViTiitehead * s notion of priority of
experience over an experient,of feelings over a feeler, reduces the teleological
availability of God as the principle of concretion. It may be suggested that
God guarantees the emergence of feelers in virtue of the feelings that conetitute
53. Gentry, "The Subject in ’-Thi tehead ’ s Philosophy," Phil.Sc . .11 (1944) .223.
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his own being. This suggestion is complicated however by the fact th%t ‘White-
head posits a creativity which is the potential source of all prehensions includ-
ing those of God as an actual entity. Thus it appears that the emergence of
feelers from feelings has in the last analysis to be referred to creativity. 7.hite-
head's notion of the non-actual character of creativity tends to accentuate rather
than solve the difficulty in question. The subject-object( su'dject-superject)
problem is one aspect of another problem, namely, the problem of internal and ex-
ternal relations. The criticisms which follow in the next division will deal
with this problem with special reference to the difficulties which it contains for
7rtiitehead’s doctrine of the actual occasion.
Vi. Inadeqtiacies in '.Vhi teheed ^s theory of internal and external relations
with reference to his doctrine of actual occasions
(ij Inadequacies of the doctrine of internal relations relative to
actual occasions
An organism as interpreted by \Vhitehead has a quality of ^rtioleness
which differeltiates it from any of its parts. This marks it as a system of in-
ternal relations. The togetherness of an entity is a mark of its internal rela-
tions. The subjective unity of an entity or an occasion is that to ^ich 7/hi te-
head has reference in his discussion of internal relations. The subjective unity
of an occasion centers in its self functioning. "This self functioning is the
real internal constitution of an actual entity."^ >7hltehead's acceptance of
a doctrine of internal relations is expressed in his espousal of atomism. He says
'The ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism.”^^ It is in virtue of its internal
relations that an actual entity or an actual occasion is something in itself.
54. PR, S8.
55. PR, 55.
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‘.Vhile espousing: the unity of the actual occasion as an organism,Whitehead
nevertheless runs the risk of having this unity dissolved hy his claim of opposites
for eveiy actual occasion — physical and mental, abstract and concrete, the temporal
and the eternal, freedom and necessity, flux and permanence.
How the actml occasion can ranain solvent with so many drafts upon its
unity is a matter that must give cause for concern. In our critique of dipolarity
it was found that the mental and the physical as poles are not above the suspicion
of bifurcation. In an attempt to carry the fight against dartesian dualism to
its uttermost Whitehead makes the demand of simplicity and calls for a qualitative
minism. "The presumption that there is only one genus of actual entities constitutes
an ideal of cosmological theory which the philosophy of organism edeavors to conform.
The one genus cbvioudly has two aspects. 'iTiat the genus is in itself is not re-
vealed in this reduction to simplicity. The unity of the genus is thus threatened
by ambigui ty.
Our discussion of objectification drew into relief the contrast of the
abstract and the concrete. .Vith ingenuity Whitehead works to keep these con-
trasts in unity. Every actual entity Includes the abstract in the eternal ob-
jects which it harbors. Every actual entity emerges from potentiality and
creativity. One is led to think that .Vhitehead at times grounds his actual
entities in an abstract creativity and delivers them upon perishing to an ab-
stract objectification. .Vhile admitting abstraction into the occasion, .Vliite-
head is nevertheless an indefatigable defender of the concrete. He is always
conjoining the terms actual and entity, or actual and occasion. It is periraps
a nark of virtue in .Vhitehead 's doctrine of actual occasions that there is
thought to be a union of the abstract and the concrete, Universals are always
in things according to fVhitehead. However, it has been noticed in our discussion
of ingress ion that the unity ascribed to the actual occasion is not easily main-
56
56, PH, 168.
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tained. If ingress ion means initial fusion of the abstract and the concrete, we
would have a distinction without a difference. If ingression does not mean
Initial fusion, we have a problem on our hands which has become classic in the
tradition of Plato, Cn tiie union of the abstract and the concrete Whitehead
follows Aristotle rather than Plato, For Aristotle ahd '/hitehead the concrete
has in it the Forms, Some^ere down the line, however, A/hitehead, as well as
Aristotle, finds it expedient to apeak of pure Form. This expediency comes to
light in Whitehead's suggestion of purity in the definition of eternal objects
as "Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact,"^*^ This e^ediency
comes to light in Aristotle's conception of God as Pure Form. The unity of the
temporal and the eternal is one wl th the problem of the concrete and the abstract.
The concrete is durational and epochal. An actual occasion is also an epochal
occasion. The abstract is eternal. It remains unaffected by passage. It is
not contrary to *Vhltehead to say that actual occasions are dwellers in time but
harbingers of eternity, I think Whitehead's doctrine of the unity of the actual
occasion suffers here because the traditional distinction of time and eternity has
been associated with a disjunction of the two.
The unity of the actual occasion has been conceived by V/hitehead to require
necessity and freedom. As a causa sui each actual occasion is free. Every or-
ganism determines the paths of the electrons that belong to it. Each actual oc-
casion imposes upon its constituents a certain definiteness. This means deter-
minism for the parts, yet freedom for the organism. This is only half of the
description of organic behavior. Every organism places upon the universe an
obligation of conformity. Every organism has degrees of relevance to every other
part of the universe. Herein is to be found the mixture of necessity with freedom.
57. PR, 32
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Every actual occasion contains a unity of necessity and freedom in its leing.
Necessity seems to inhere in its internal relations. I question the notion that
there is real tmity of necessity and freedom in the actual occasion. It appears
to me that if there is any force in the notion of ’obligation to conformity* the
actual occasion is not the full determinant of the beh&vior of its constituents.
These constituents are partly determined by the Influence of outside occasions.
Every occasion is partly determined and partly free. No occasion is totally de-
termined because no occasion is indlstinguishably in another occasion, except per-
haps an objectified occasion. Sven here there is a sugsestion of separateness
in that it is called an element in its successor. ^itehead at this point fails
to escape fully a notion which he proposes to repudiate. It is the notion of
vacuous actuality, that is, the notion of an entity having merely passive endurance.
An objectified actual occasion can have but a passive or formal endurance in its
successor. Although an element in the potentiality and becoming of its successor,
the actual occasion is Idealized in the process of perishing. The notion of a
formal or idealized status for the actml occasion thus involves V/hitehead in the
notion of merely passive endurance, hence, vacuous actuality. It is in virtue
of objectification and prehension that each succeeding occasion has placed upon
it the necessity to conform to some preceedirg occasion. It is interesting
to observe by comparison that Kant kept necessity in the natural order i^ile urging
freedom in the moral order. v/hitehead places both freed an and necessity in every
actual occasion of the natural order. The union is not a very stable one,. Never-
theless, it is a standpoint with high potential value for any philosophy of nature,
Tfe shall now deal with some of the inadequacies of -Vhitehead’s concept of external
relations with special reference to the actial occasion,
(ii) Inadequacies of the doctrine of external relations relative to actual
occasions
?\ich of Trtiat has been said in the previous discussion of internal relations
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can also be repeated under the concept of external relations. In order to avoid
repetition we shall concentrate on what seems Inadequate from the standpoint of
external relations. The issue in question is negative prehensions as it is re-
lated to excluded data. It will he rememhered that every actual entity prehands
58
positively and negatively. To ho is to he something decided. 2voi^ decision
involves an inclusion and an exclusion. In the philosophy of organism there is
no all-one. iShitehead accepts the position of quantitative pluralism as well
as qualitative monism. These are basic choices, and abiding by them ?i/hitehead goes
on to work out his theory of prehensions.
Every prehending thing excludes what is Incompatible with it. .'.liat is
excluded by a prehendlr^ entity has not simply the status of being excluded. I^
is the view of Ushenko that while negative prehension avoids certain defects of
traditional idealism (the notions that everything is connected with everything
else, and that in order to know anything one must know everything) it is itself
not free from difficulty. "The status of the datum eliminated by a negative
prehension is extremely obscure. since according to the philosophy of organism
there is nothing actual which is not felt. Being eliminated, it is not felt,
yet as datum it must in some sense be felt."^^ Ushenko finds it a problem to
determine the status or disposition of that irtiich is excluded from an entity by
its negative process. In saying that according to the philosophy of organism
there is nothing actual which is not felt Ushenko might have added - felt by
something. Thus the notion of* ’being eliminated’ can include being felt by
something else or in another complex, Ushenko is not satisfied with what he
calls .Vhitehead’s defense of his position in terms of a distinction between
initial data and objective data. "There is a transition from the initial data
to the, objective datum effected by elimination. . .The objective datum is the per-
58. See pp. 41,79.
59, Ushenko, "Negative Prehension", Jour. Phil , . 34(1937) ,266,
I
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spective of the initial dattun,'’®^ It seems to rr© that in his discussion of initial
data and ohjective data 7,’hitehead is merely repeating his doctrine of the ohject-suh-
ject character of experience which he applies to all entities. Two terms in the
quoted passages from Process and Realit,v bring this out. They are transition and
perspective. The objective data i (feelings) have the subjective datum( feeler
)
as their perspective. The process of transition involves elimination of some
data. TJhitehead's words appear to be simply a statement of the problem. TJshenko
still wants to know about tiie datum eliminated. Although not answered at this
point in Whitehead’s treatment, I think his doctrine of relevance is the real
answer to Ushenko’s inquiry. The answer may run something like this: what is
eliminated in one complex of actml occasions because of its non-compatibility
may be included in another complex of actual occasions because of its compatibility.
There are no feelings incompatible with all act^jal entities any more than there
are any actual entities that include all feelings. On this point I think .Vhite-
head's doctrine stands protected against Ushenko's attack.
The appraisal of the organic concept of the actual occasion in this part of
our treatment has centered in a discussion of difficulties. We have tried to
take account of the bearing of these difficulties upon the general coherence of
the organic system of thought. In our review of creativity it was observed that
the doctrine is at tines obscurely treated. There is some vagueness as to its
essence or the relationship it has to i^at is actual. In our examination of
dipolarlty we no the d that .’/hitehaad ’ s proposal for solving the problem of the ul-
timate nature of the relationship of the mental and the physical can hardly be
called successful. Complications have been noticed in .Vhitehead’s distinction
between the actual entity and the actual occasion. This distinction as a source
of complication is especially noticeable in 7/httehead’ s refusal to call God an
\
60. PR, 338
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actiial entity. Farther difficulties in the actual occasion have been shown in
this section of ouj:* appraisal to be connected with 7fliitehead*s treatments of in-
ternal and eiternal relations. V/e shall new seek to enlarge the scope of our ap-
praisal of Vvliitehead’s doctrine of the actual occasion by consideration of the
actual occasion as the basis for some reorganizations 6f philosophic thought.
5. The actual occasion and some valuable reorganizations of thoaght
i. The actual occasion and a synthetic interpretation of the nature
of erperience
The doctrine of the actual occasion is a doctrine of experience. 3xperience
means feeling as it is generally used in '^fhi tehead ' s psychology and philosophy of
nature. Feeling covers for Whitehead a wide range of behavior expressiiag relations
both internal and external. In his synthetic approac to experience Whitehead
stresses the wholeness of the nature of experience. Every occasion of experience
Is a togetherness of feeling. Every prehension is a feeling unity. Experience
occurs in wholes, each occasion being a whole.
The terms Whitehead uses to describe experience indicate a tendency in
his thought toward an organicist interpretation. Experience is variously termed
a drop, rhythm, throb, concrescence, psychological field, and duration. Each
of these terms illustrate the fundamentally synthetic approach of "Whitehead. In
each case there is a radical departure from the analytic approach to experience.
There are for Whitehead no isolated sensory elements and no separately functioning
parts belonging to apy occasion of experience. Interpreting occasions of experience
as organisms, each element is interpreted by iVhitehead as a functioning part of
a whole. It belongs to the nature of experience that it occtirs In unities. It
Is characteristic of the gestalt point of view that experience develops con^lexes
In which there is a dominant unity. .vhen Whitehead calls actual occasions drops
of experience he is intending to call attention to their relative togetherness.
61. See pp .40-45 ; 53-55.

171
i
A rhythm is a felt grasp, a tmification extending over a duration. The psyoholo-
I
gical field is a standpoint. Every such standpoint is a perspective upon a spe-
I
cific world. The term throb is suggestive of the feeling tone of all experience,
f and also its durational character. In these synthetic interpretations of experience
I
Whitehead’s organioism is applied to the structure of experience.
’.Thitehead goes to the point of applying his organicism not only to ex-
perience as it is usually interpreted in introspective psychology, but he expands
it to include the realm of nature. Prehension is the term \^ich Whitehead uses
to endow all nature with feeling. Nature is interpreted by Whitehead as a com-
plex of prehensive (sentient) unifications, Each occasion is a sentient unifica-
tion. The doctrine of nature as a complex of prehensive unifications is called
by .Vhitehead provisional real ism. It suggests epistemological realism. The
analogical method is used by Tfliitehead in working out parallels between the beha-
»
vior of organisms as studied by the physical and biological sciences and the
science of psychology. It is the position of .Vhitehead that there are sound
analogies between the mental and the physical. He feels that genuine analogies
are discoverable. Hence, the possibility of rendering the mental and the physical
as attributes of the fundamental eternal energy or creativity. Russell thinks
that Whitehead’s extension of the concept of f&eling or emotion to cover the be
havior of physical objects (as commonly understood) is a step in the direction
of anthropomorphism. It is thus a retreat from strictly scientific method in
the interpretation of nature. According to Hartshorne the system of .Vhitehead com-
\ mlts him to the position of ’’the unqualified Inclusiveness of prehension,”^® Thus,
I
the whole of nature is a prehending system,
i
I
62. SW/, 101.
63, Hartshorne, ”0n some Criticisms of Whitehead’s Philosophy,” Phil, Rev .
.
44 (1935), 344.
I
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I think that the reorganization of thotight around the possibilities of
analogy between the mental and the physical is a valuable point of view suggested
by 7/hitehead in his doctrine of the actual occasion. .Thetherr there be an -unquali-
fied extension of psychological terms, such as feeling, is a matter I think which
awaits ftirther scientific investigation and philosophic reflection. There is
the possible danger of over-endowing the actual occasion with kinds of experience
that are peculiar to organisms with high mentality. This is especially evident
In iVhitehead's account of the extremely simple occasions that belong to so-called
empty space. At this point iVhitehead's psychologism seems least defensible. An
attempt is made by mitehead to reduce the difficulty of his theory by the notion
of grades of actual occasions.^^ In atqpport of .Vhttehead it may be said that
Heisenberg's principle of IndeterminAnoy is favorable to the organic interpretation
of entities in nature. ?'axwell's theory of demons, although tending toward an ex-
cess of the imaginative element, is nevertheless suggestive of possible analogues
to be found in the atomic world. In so far as VVhltehead's theoiy-of the actual
occasion is suggestive of a procedure for correlating the mental and the physical,
it has some value for the reorganization of philosophic thought. Throughout the
scope and gradations of actual occasions activity is always present, vVe shall
now consider iVhitehead's thesis of activity as the source of a valuable reorgani-
zation of thought.
ii. The act^ial occasion and the dynamic foundation of’actuality
iVhitehead's acceptance of a dynamic theory of actuality has been pointed
out in many places of our treatment of the actual occasion. There is in ’iVhite-
head's organic philbsophy the notion of a general activity in virtue of which
there is passage throu^out the realm of nature. The potentiality of creativity
64, PR, 269
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Is not only expressible in specific actualities, but it is in fact always expressing
Itself in concrete organisms. The experimental work of Addington, Jeans,
Einstein, and Planck point to a dynamic interpretation of actual entities. -Vhite-
head translates the atomic doctrine as follows: ’’All flow of energy obeys quantum
conditions. In specific application to the organic philosophy it may be said
that 7/hitehead*s treatment points to the actual occasion as a quantum of fluent
energy. The position here taken by V/hitehead is designated ’organic realism.
The actual occasion in the organic realism of .Thitehead is suggestive of metaphysi-
cal realism. The aoti&l occasion is VVhitahead’s measure of minimum actuality.
It is the fundamental unit of fluent energy. The actual occasion is always some-
thing dynamic and particular.
Because of his doctrine of the actual occasion as the dynamic unit of
actuality Thitehead has a defense against the notion of substance. On the basis
of the doctrine of the actual occasion there can be no unchanging subject of
change. The essence of an actuality consists in its process of becoming. In
the general structure of the organic philoscphy the actual occasion is essential
therefore to the defense of the thesis of dynamism. Whitehead’s use of his dy-
namic theory is also to be noticed in his argument against the doctrine of simple
location irtilch will be treated in the next section on valuable reorganizations of
thought.
iil. The denial of simple location makes plausible the space transcendence
of actual occasions
The study of apace and time in the metaphysics of Whitehead reveals his
general acceptance of the relational theory. Whitehead accepts the work of
65. PR, 471.
66. Ibid.
67. See pp. 96 ff.
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Einstein and llnkowski in assimilating apace and time. In the denial of simple
location ^Wiitehead has made a frontal attack on materialism. This is suggested
in Whitehead's statement; "I agree with Beigaon that materialism as the simple
68
location of instantaneous material configurations is to "be protested against."
Whitehead's protest against materialism as here interpreted is centered in his
doctrine of prehension according to v^aich there are no truly isolated hits of ex-
istence at an instant. "But there is no sudi thing as a sense object at an
instant. Essentially there is duration. -jhe sense object of materialism is
analyzed by Whitehead into act\aal occasions having space-time functions. The
attack is strengthened by the equatii^ of being and becoming. It is a basic
thesis of v^titehead 's philosophy that process characterizes all actualities. Ho
actual entity is without process. By affirming process and denying simple loca-
tion 'mtehead is offering us a point of view which is a plausible v»y of inter-
pretli^ the entities of nature as transcending space and time.
In the discussion of the durational character of experience the time transcen-
dence of actual occasions was noticed. The denial of simple location is the
basis of ^Vhitehead's notion of the space transcendence of actual entities. Actual
entities are atomic. Yet each atomic structure prehends other structures, and
thereby can not be absolutely localized. Each actual occasion has extensive
connections with all other actual occasions. As a quantum of fluent energy no
actual occasion can be reduced to an Instantaneous configuration having an absolute
position. Thus, '.'Whitehead defends his organic philosophy against the notion of
simple location.
The denial of simple location is a valuable reorganization of thought. It
pushes further back the traditions of materialism. It is felt by some of White-
68. SWV, 72.
69. or, 14S.
dXk
head’s critics ihat his complete actionizing of actualities and the
denial of simple
location has nade his concept of nature untenable. Sidney holds it to
be a falla-
cious assumption that "becoming is more intelligible than being."
Sellars takes
up his cudgels against .Thitehead’s denial of simple location in
his defense of sub-
stance. The concept of substance held by Sellars is ^et forth as follows;
"The
category of substance is but an explication of the category of thinghood. . . It
stands for continuants iithich may change and enter into new relations
with other
continuants. Sellars thinks that the notion of substance provides a princij>le
of unity for the systems of space and time. A substance as a continuant
is sub-
ject to cahnge; yet it is thought by Sellars to retain its selfhood in the persis-
tence of a specific organization. The specific organization of a substance
is the
character of a definite content extended in a particular locality. The
extended-
ness of substance consists according to Sellars in "the coexistence of continuants.'
The coexistence of continuants is thought to involve shifts in the constitution
of the continuants themselves. In opposition to Sellars, '/Whitehead holds
that
there is no unchanging subject of change. The notion of substance as a continuant
with a simple location is protested against by ’.Thitehead vflio thinks that such a
notion gives no teneble basis for induction. The basis for induction is in each
instance of actuality, and in each actual occasion. Althcwgh .Thitehead’s
view
does not fully escape some -’Involvements in the doctrine of substance,
it neverthe-
less is suggestive of a promising reorganization of thought. In a final
section
on appraisal we shall state our agreements and disagreements with .'.liitehead
whicn
have a bearing upon the doctrine of the actual occasion. In the forthcoming
sec-
tion we shall also state our final estimate of the actual occasion.
70. Eidney, "The problem of substance in Spinoza and vVhitehead,"
71.
45 (t9S6), 584.
Sellars, PPR, 274.
72. Ibid.
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4. Remarks :agreemen ts , disagreements, and final estimate
i. Remarks on agreements
I agree with T/liitehead in giving a fundamental status to activity. By
doing so he guaiiantees a dynamic ground for all actualities. Granting the ul-
timacy of the creative advance, '.Thitehead is under no necessity to account for
activity in the world. On the basis of .'.’hitehead ’ s logic there is no originally
static being. Being for '^Thitehead equals becoming. Thus in the organic philoso-
phy there is no unchanging' subject of change. There are no instantaneous con-
fig'urations at absolute positions. I agree vd th .Vhitehead in his protest against
materialism expressed in his repudiation of substance, and also in his denial of
simple location.
TV agreement with ’/hitehead ’ s conception of the actual occasion as the
measure of minimum actuality embraces the atomism and the relatisrity of the or-
ganic philosophy. The attetnpt to correlate these two notions is fundamental to
.
an,v cogent theory of nature, Each actual occasion, althotgh having a degree of
separateness, is nevertheless conjoined with other occasions which require of it
a measure of conformity, Tibitehead with justification makes conformity the
source of a d6fense of interconnection in nature. Conformity involves the mutual
immanence of actual occasions, TThitehead follo\vs a sound procedure by requiring
mutual immanence as a first principle for the organic view of nature, Without
such a principle it is extremely difficult to provide a logical basis for sequence
in nature. 2ach actual occasion leaves an inheritance for some occasion which
follows it.
Each actte.1 occasion has Ingressed in it some eternal object. I agree
with '.Thitehead in the v'erv close affinity which he establishes between universals
and particulars. The eternal objects or universals are in actual occasions. Ac-
tual occasions are not separable from eternal objects. Eternal objects are thought
by '.Thitehead always to have a specific reference to the determination of fact.
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By this specific reference to the detomination of fact eternal objects have value
for the actual world,
I agree with .Vhitehead further in his protest against bifurcation. This
protest against bifurcation is an important step in the constrojction of a coherent
theory of the actual world. The relation beirsen the mental and the physical in-
volves cross reference according to '•Thitehead, In his defense of an unbifurcated
world 7i/hitehead argues for an evolutionary process from the simple to the corrplex.
There is no line of absolute separation between the physical and the mental.
In his various attenpts to reconcile apparently diverse aspects of actiiality
Whitehead takes experience as his point of primary consideration. I agree with
Whitehead In making experience the starting point of philosophical analysis. Th®
philosophy of organism is preeminently a philosophy of experience. In this ap-
proach Whitehead subscribes to an essentially empirical method. The appeal to
experience has one of its results in the doctrine of the actual occasion as a
center of experience. Our remarks on general appraisal will now be supplemented
by a discussion of our general disagreements with Whitehead,
ii. Renarks on disagreements
Although I agree with Whitehead in his essentially empircal approach, I
think his appeal to analogies between the mental and the physical gives his generali-
zation of sentience nothing more than the status of probability. The freedom with
^ich he uses psychological terms in describing the lowest as well as the highest
grades of actual occasions seems t o me to be a tendency needing greater discriraina
tlon.
Whitehead’s conception of creativity as a substratum of all psycho-physical
entities pierhaps supports the notion of a neutral stuff. The obscurity of the
final status assigned to creativity relative to psycho-physical entities leaves
the organic philosophy open to the notion that it supports a neutral stuff. In
as much as Whitehead holds to neutral sttiff or neutral entities I disagree with
him because in doii^' so he abandons his empirical method.
Ki'il a-' ?
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?.’5r disagree irents with ?/hitehead include his notion of the priority of
experience over the experient. The assertion of priority involves the ascrih-
ing of aims to vague feelings, or to feelings ^ich demonstrate the posession of
only a very slight degree of consciousness. By taking this step 'i-Vhitehead in
my judgment weakens the teleological character of his organic philosophy.
The teleological character of the organic philosophy is involved in
Whitehead’s theory of value. The objectivity of value is a problem which I
think Whitehead unsuccessfully proposes to solve by ecjuating existence with value.
I disagree with the equating of existence with value because the notion of value
is thereby reduced primarily to a spatio-temporal concept. On this basis there
is an increased difficulty in the problem of the discrimination of values. On
the highest levels of actual occasions the spatio-ten^oral concept of value is
quite an inadeqpiate account of the value process. .Vith this account of agree-
ments and disagreements we have broTjght our general critique to the point where
a final estimate of the actual occasion would give a total significance to the
investigation.
iii. Final estimate of the doctrine of the actual occasion
As an hypothesis the notion of the actual occasion appears to be verified
by the general results of current scientific investigation. As a concept of v^at
Is actual it is consistent with the dynamic interpretation of the world. The ac-
tual occasion is a reconciling ground for many diverse aspects of nature. It is
a high point in Whitehead’s repudiation of substance, and in his protest against
bifurcation in nature. The actual occasion is a fairly consistent outcome from
the presuppositions of the organic philosophy as set forth in the table of catego-
ries. In the construction of his theory of the actual occasion wa have noticed
that Whitehead at times provokes problems as serious as those he is trying to
solve. This situation is illustrated in the problems of the objectification of
perishing occasions, and in the priority of experience over an experient. These
and other problems have been dealt with at various points of our general treat-
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doctrine of the actual occasion.
In a few words of final critique it may he said that the doctrine of the
actual occasion, or some similarly comprehensive doctrine, will he included in
the consideration of all ^o seek to huild a comprehensive philosophy of nature
upon the fairly certain results of modern science. The task of our general
treatment of ths actual occasion will he hroTi^^t to a close in a chapter devoted
to summary and conclusions.
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Chapter VII
Sunnnary and Conclueions
1, SumnEiry
The ohject of Investigation throughout the course of this dissertation
has "been the doctrine of the actual occasion in the philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehead. The chief problems have been the definition and the evaluation of
this concept. We have tried to ccme to a clear understanding of Whitehead*
s
doctrine of the actual occasion within his system. In the work of evaluation
we have sought to appraise the doctrine In comparison with other doctrines of
Whitehead, and also with related doctrines of other writers. The methods employ-
ed to achieve the ends set forth have included analysis and synthesis. The ap-
proach was organized around the study of the actual occasion In Whitehead's psy-
chology, his philosophy of nature, and his theory of value. A chapter devoted to
general criticism has been included to give further penetration to the analysis
and greater concentration to the efforts at criticism and evaluation.
In the first chapter the problem for Investigation was stated. This was
followed by statements of methods of procedure and sources of data. Mention was
made of treatments of the actual occasion by Whitehead and other writers. The
Introductory work was ccaitlnued In the second chapter which had as Its aim the
presentation of a general view of the philosophy of organism.
The first business of chapter two was to give historical placement to
Whitehead's philosophy. In the work on Whitehead's presuppdstfeions' we havd tried to
get at the starting points of the organic philosophy. The curiosity of Whitehead
centers in such basic questions as the following: What is ultimatet What is actual?
What Is the nature of experience? Does experience give us any dependable analogies
for the Interpretation of the universe? In getting at these basic, and many sub-
sidiary, questions Whitehead constructs not a few hypotheses. In the course of his
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intellectual lators Whitehead makeB phlloBophical declBionB which call for repudi-
ations as well as positive constructions. As we followed the ramifications of
many of Whitehead’s concepts we sought to put these notions into the service of
clarifying the doctrine of the actual occasion. The relation of Whitehead’s con-
cepts to some of the persistent prohlems of philosophy was noted. The correla-
tion with persistent philosophical prohlems has heen used at various points for a
wider interpretation of Whitehead. In the closing section of this chapter there
was included in table form a series of definitions of the actual occasion. An
actual occasion is variously called hy Whiteheads an actual entity j an event
(limiting type), a process of limitation, a monadic creature, a spatio-temporal
extension, a process of feeling the world, the ego of a specious present ( a unit
of experience), an hierarchical prehension, a limitation of possihllity, a hecom-
Ingness, a mode of actualized possihllity, a synthesis of eternal objects, an
epochal process, an activity of concern, a value, and a completely real thing.
In the third chapter on Whitehead’s psychology we observed that Whitehead
alms at an analysis of experience in terms of what he conceives to be its most
fundamental character, namely, feeling. It is in feeling that Whitehead finds the
basic analogy between human experience and experience in nature. Feeling refers
to the conjunction of the potential and the actual. In this way it is equivalent
to Plato’s notion of the participation of Ideas in matter. It is equivalent to
the term ’enjoyment’ as used by Alexander and the term ’intuition’ as used by Berg-
son. Every occasion from Whitehead’s point of view is a sentient entity. The
notion of sentience applied to entities throughout nature is the essence of White-
head’s position which he calls provisional realism. According to this position
every actual occasion is a prehenslve (sentient) unification. An occasion of con-
sciousness consists in a contrast of theory as mere theory with fact as mere fact.
In his psychology Whitehead argues for a derivative status of the subject of ex-
perience, hence the superJect. Whitehead’s psychology calls for a lanlon of the

private (atomicity) and the public (relativity) on various levels of experience in
the life of actual occasions. The notion of social order is found in Whiteheads
theory of societies of actual occasions.
A number of the concepts of Whitehead's psychology are expanded in his
philosophy of nature. Prominent in his philosophy of nature is his categoreal
scheme. The term category is used by Whitehead to refer to generic notions pre-
supposed in our reflective experience. The ultimate category is creativity.
It is thought by Whitehead to be similar to Aristotle's primary substance and to
Spinoza's one great Substance. It is also similar to Alexander's Space-Time.
The categoreal scheme is built around the concepts of creativity, actual entity
or actual occasion, and eternal objects. For the purpose of concreteness of
euialysls we Included a table of definitions derived from Whitehead's discussion
of his categoreal scheme . Included also was a set of graphic illustrations of
relationships within the categories. In addition to a specific treatment of
the categories the following problems were discussed in chapter four: space and
time, causality, change and permanence, continuity and atomicity, and cosmic
order. The problem of order is logically involved in Whitehead's discussion of
value.
Our treatment of chapter five on Whitehead's theory of value contained
the sug^jested identification of vs.lue with actuality. The actuality is the value.
Value is the intrinsic reality of an event. An activity of concern is a value.
The whole creation according to Whitehead alms at value or the realization of
value. On the basis of these statements about value we said that for Whitehead
value is objective as well as subjective. The general emphasis seems to be on
the objectivity of value. In his theory of value Whitehead gives room for an
idealistic interpretation of the universe. Whitehead's faith in the permanence
of value is Indicated by his calling God an actual entity rather than an actual
occasion. The actual occasion has the characteristic of perpetual perishing.

Whitehead wishes to avoid this notion of perpetiial perishing in the supreme object
of value. In his treatnoit 6f the manifold character of God we noted that according
to 'Ahitehead God is a preserver of values.
The actual occasion in v^itehead’s theory; of value, psychology* and concept
of nature was seen at various points in our treatment not to be without difficulties,
and possibilities for significant reorganizations of thou^t. Thus in chapter six
we gave a general criti<lue. In this critique we sought to make more specific and
penetrating some of the criticisms in the earlier part of the work. The general
scope of problems vftiich formed the basis of our discussion of difficulties in the
doctrine of the actual occasion is indicated in the subsequent abbreviated account.
The problems of mechanism and vitalism we foujid ’.Vhltehead struggling with in
formulating his doctrine of creativity, Whitehead holds it seems to both mechanism
and vitalism. Creativity is the wealth of potentiality (vitalism). Yet this poten-
tiality is expressed according to laws in the actual world, Energy has dependable
routes in aottie.l occasions (mechanism). In the last analysis vitalism (teleology)
and mechanism are Interpreted by ’.vTiitehead in terms of a complementary relation.
There is conformity, and there is non-conformity or novelty, bipolarity is an hy-
pothesis suggested by Whitehead to solve the problem of the relationship of the
physical and the m.ental, or the mental and the physical. The difficulties of di-
polarity are as follows? vVhile generally avoiding dualism, it leaves us seemingly
with a neutral entity having aspects or differentiations of function. There is also
the difficulty of fusing what was originally declared to be two poles, //hitehead
begins by holding the mental and the physical to be ’inextricably intertwined,’ He
ends by coming close to making the mental and the physical ’inextricably confused,*
'.Vhltehead oscillates between the notions of the necessary and the incidental
reference of mind and matter to each other.
The distinction between the actual occasion and the actual entity was
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another source of difficulty to which some attention was given in the chapter on
general criticism. In his choice of terms Whitehead tries with little success
to adjust the Newtonian absolute space to the relativistic assemllation theory.
The result is unchanging occasions in a dynamic world. In the dynamic world of
the organic philosophy the actual occasion is a unit of space-time. It is the
measure of minimum actuality. The essence of the actual occasion is its beccaning-
ness. One of the difficulties of the distinction made between the actual occa-
sion and the actual entity is put in relief by Whitehead's refusal to call God
an actual occasion. The problem in point is that of the permanent and the passing,
the temporal and the non-temporal. If non-tempoi^l, it is difficult to see why
God should be called actual, that is, an actual entity.
ttider perishing and objectification we face the difficulties of passage
and sequence, remainders and the non-actual. Actualities perish. There is
nevertheless a carrying over from past to future. In the notion of objectifi-
cation there is the difficulty of reconciling repetition and novelty. The in-
creased content of the repetitive makes novelty increasingly a problem. White
-
head has a way out of the difficulty in the primordial nature of God. There is
a conceptual character in the cosmic process. The ultimate creativity has ulti-
mate resourcefulness
. Through the mutual immanence of actual occasions and the
inheritance each occasion leaves for its successor Whitehead works his way to
the notion of sequence and interconnection in nature.
Whitehead avoids the substantiallst view of the soul in his theory of the
superJect. However the issue of priority, whether of an experient or of exper-
ience, should be transformed into a union and co-extension of experient and
experience. Whitehead's Insistence upon priority weakens the teleological char-
acter of hie philosophy.
The doctrine of internal and external relatione was treated as a part of
Whitehead's doctrine of the actual occasion. The opposites with which Whitehead
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characterized the actual occaeion place a serious draft upon its unity. Hence,
a threat to Whitehead’s doctrine of internal relations. A threat to his doctrine
of external relations is found in the problem of the datum eliminated in negative
prehensions
.
In another section of the general critique we considered some valuable
reorganizations of thought suggested by Whitehead's doctrine of the actual oc-
casion. It was pointed out that the actual occasion makes possible a synthetic
Interpretation of experience. The emphasis is on the wholeness of experience.
This analysis is in line with the tested results of gestalt psychology. It was
noted that the actual occasion provides a dynamic basis for the interpretation of
the actual. Bach actual occasion is thought to be a quantum of fluent energy.
Whitehead designates his position at this point as organic realism. By the denial
of simple location Whitehead transcends the old materialistic view of instantan'-.
eous material configurations at absolute positions. The actual occasion perpetually
perishes. It is nevertheless in prehensive relations with the world which it enjoys*
In remarks on general agreements with Whitehead it was noted that our* agree-
ments included the following: the dynamic basis of actuality (activity), protest
against materialism, the union of atomism and relativity, the principle of con-
formity, ingression, protest against bifurcation, evolution or emergence, and
empirical method. Expressing disagreement with Whitehead it was observed that
his doctrine of creativity probably supports the idea of neutral stuff. The
ascribing of alms to vague feelings was the source of our disagreement with White-
head's notion of the priority of experience. In his theory of the objectivity of
value disagreement was expressed with Whitehead's emphasis upon the spatio-
temporal conception.
An attempt to give total significance to our evalmtion of the actual oc-
casion was sot forth in the expression of a final estimate of this doctrine. In
the final estimate attention was called to the fact that the doctrine of the actual
occasion Is oonslstsnt with the general results of modem science. It Is a fairly
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adequate means of reconciling diverse aspects of nature. The actual occasion has
a fundamental place in any philosophy of nature which rests upon modern scienti-
fic theory. We shall now state the conclusions of our general investigation of
the problem of the actual occasion.
2 . Conclusions
The first general conclusion of this dissertation is that the actual oc-
casion is a term of such fundamental significance that its definition and clar-
ification constitute a primary means of understanding euid evaluating the meta-
physics of the organic philosophy of Whitehead. Whltehead*B definitions of the
actual occasion vary ccaisiderably. In the interest of clarification certain inter-
pretative statements of the actual occasion resulting from our investigation are
here set forth. An actual occasion is an ultimate metaphysical unit. In the
organic philosophy the actual occasion is the measure of minimum actuality. It
is a monadic sentient entity possessing the characteristics of immovableness (it
is what it is, and where it is), perpetual perishing (becoming), potentiality for
division (ultimate limitation), spatio-temporal extensiveness (transcending simple
location and having duration), and dlpolarlty (mental and physical). It is a
process of aiming at and achieving value. The fact that Whitehead usually makes
the term actml occasion synonymous with the term actual entity makes it necessary
that we also offer an interpretative definition of the actual entity. When social
structure and endurance are the characteristics to be emphasized Whitehead uses the
term actual entity. Accordingly, an actual entity is an enduring object composed
of actual occasions. The distinction noted here between an actual occasion and an
actual entity is the basis of Whitehead’s assertion that God is an actual entity,
but not an actual occasion.
The second general conclusion of this dissertation has to do with the phil-
osophic position at which Whitehead arrives as a result of constructing his doctrine
of the actual occasion. This position is doubly designated by Whitehead as prov-

visional realism and organic realism. According to provisional realism each actual
occasion is a prehensive (sentient) unification. According to organic realism each
actual occasion is a quantum of fluent energy. Within the scope of provisional re-
alism Whitehead shows a tendency toward panpsychism. This tendency toward panpsy-
chism is expressed in the notion that each actuality (ranging from the simple to
the complex) is an occasion of sentient experience or feeling. The tendency toward
panpsychlsm is also expressed in the notion that dlpolarity (mental and physical)
Illustrates the structure of the monadic feelings. Whitehead's panpsychlsm is
ccmplicated by the fact that creativity, which is the ultimate ground of each psy-
cho-physical occasion, perhaps supports the notion of a neutral et-uff . ' s
appeal to analogies between the mental and the physical gives the thesis of pan-
psychism merely the status of probability
.
The third general conclusion of our Investigation is the observation that
the actual occasion is basic to Whitehead's system of philosophy. The essential
position of the actual occasion is indicated in several ways. Without the actual
occasion there would be no measure of minimum actuality in Whitehead's philosophy’.
Without the actual occasion Whitehead would be without defense against the doc-
trines of substance and simple location. The notion of the objectification of
actual occasions is basic to Whitehead's argument for Beq.uence and Interconnection
in nature. The actual occasion is fundamen'tal to Whitehead's working out a com-
plementary relation between mechanism and vitalism or teleology
.
The fourth general conclusion of this dissertation is that the acti^l occa-
sion is not adequate as a proposal for the solution of cer’tain problems. One of
these problems is the ultimate nature of the relation of the men’tal to the physical.
The notion of the dlpolarity of the actual occasion suggests mainly an indissoluble
relation. Another problem is the objectivity of "value. By equating "value and ac-
tuality Whitehead's theory is reduced mainly to a spatio-temporal concept of "value.
There is also the problem of avoiding the notion of vacuous actuality. Whitehead
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dooB not completely escape the notion of vacuous actuality in his notion of ohjec-'
tified preceding occasions. Still another problem is that of establishing a coherent
teleology . The teleological character of the organic philosophy is weakened by
ascribing the poesession of aims to vague feelings or to feelings characterized by
only a negligible degree of consciousness.
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Abstract
The problem of this dissertation is twofold. In the first place, the task
is to define and evaluate the actual occasion in the philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehead, In the second place, the task is to relate the doctrine of the actual
occasion to those concepts of other thinkers which contribute to its clarification
and to an understanding of its adequacy.
The first chapter is introductory and begins with a statement of the problem.
Following the statement of the problem mention is made of the methods of procedure
and the sources of data. The preliminary work of the first chapter is concluded
with an account of treatments of the actual occasion by Whitehead and his critics.
The second chapter presents a general view of Whitehead’s system of philosophy.
The first task necessary to the presentation of a general view of Whitehead’s philos-
ophy is to give historical placement to his scheme of thought. In the effort at
historical placement Whitehead’s own designation of his system are used as indicators.
These designations include the following: philosophy of organism, provisional realism
(nature as a complex of prehenslve unifications) ,and organic realism (e^oh actuality
as a quantum of fluent energy). Of ancient philosophers 'Whitehead acknowledges
Intellectual kinship mainly with Plato and Aristotle. The Platonic theory of Ideas
is reflected in Whitehead’s treatment of the eternal objects. In his notion of the
inseparable relation of the abstract eternal objects and concrete entities or actual
occasions Whitehead follows Aristotle. Whitehead’s references to philosophers since
Plato and Aristotle give evidence of considerable affinity with Leibniz vftiose
monad ology has counterparts in the organic philosophy. In the writings of Locke,
tVhitehead claims that he finds antecedents for certain aspects of his thought ^ich
reveal the psychological character of actual occasions. Kant is mentioned by
Whitehead primarily to be refuted, especially in regard to his analysis of the problan
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of the subject and its world,
A broader scope for a general view of //hitehaad’s jdiilosophy is provided
in a section of this ch^ter dealing with recent advances in the physical sciences
and mathematics. Particularly from the fields of physios, biology, and psychology
does Whitehead draw ideas congenial to his construction of the concept of organism.
In attempting to introduce greater discrimination into our general perspective of
the chief ideas of the organic philosophy a portion of our d iscussion is devoted
to the setting forth of presuppositions of the organic philosophy. The introductory
analysis of this chapter is deepened by calling attention to those concepts ^ich
Whitehead thinks it necessary to repudiate. The discussion of Whitehead’s repudia-
tions, especially the repudiation of the notion of an tmchanging subject of change,
constitutes a good preface to his ozganic philosophy. The exploratory work of
this chapter is expanded in abbreviated treatments containing comparisons of problems
of the organic philosophy with some of the persistent problems of philosophy.
In order to show the relevance of the notion of the actual occasion to a
general view of the organic philosophy we include in this oahpter a series of
definitions of the actual occasion. An actual occasion is variously called by
-Vhitehead* an actual entity, an event {limiting tsrpe), a process of limitation, a
spatio-temporal extension, a process of feeling the world, a monadic creature, an
hierarchical prehension, the ego of a specious present (a unit of experience), a
liraitatlhn on possibility, a becomingness, a mode of actualized possibility, a 0301-
thesls of eternal objects, an epochal process, an activity of concern, a value,
and a completely real thing. Summarizing this material we may say that an actual
occasion is a monadic and sentient entity possessing the characteristics of spatio-
tenporal extensiveness (transcending simple location and having duration) and
dl polarity (mental and physical). As a concrete whole of becoming it is a process
of aiming at and achieving value.
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Our effort to mark out the general scope of Whitehead’s philosophy reveals
the fundamental status ^ich he accords to feeling in his analysis of the actual
occasion. The application of the notion of feeling to the concept of the actual
occasion takes us into Whitehead’s psychology. It is in chapter three that the
actual occasion is studied from the point of view of Whitehead’s psychology. White-
head finds in feeling the source of what he believe s to he fruitful analogies be-
tween the mental and the physical. The term feeling as used by Whitehead is
equivalent to the term ’enjoyment* as used by Alexander, and the term ’intuition’
as used by Bergson. Every actual occasion Is according to «Vhitehead a sentient
entity. The notion of sentience applied to entitles throughout nature is the es-
sence of Whitehead’s provisional realism. On its highest level the actual occasion
Is an occasion of consciousness. Whitehead’s theory of consciousness is summed tqp
in the suggestion that it is a contrast of theory as mere theory with fact as mere
fact. In the psychology of the actual occasion 7i/hitehead sets forth the idea
that the actual occasion has a life which is both private and public. The public
phase of the life of an actual occasion is expanded in the notion of societies of
occasions. The various notions developed in this chapter in their relation to
the actual occasion have ramifications that reach into a larger orbit of Whitehead’s
thought. This larger orbit we call sVhitehead ’s iSiilosophy of nature.
The fourth chapter deals with the actual occasion in the setting of White-
head’s philosophy of nature. The key notions of Whitehead’s philosophy of nature
are to bo found in his oategoreal scheme. The tenri category is used by Whitehead
to refer to the generic notions presupposed in our reflective experience. The
actual occasion (sometimes called actual entity) is one of the leading concepts
of 'Whitehead 's categoreal scheme, the others being creativity and eternal objects.
The treatment of the categotles in the dissertation is made fairly broad and detailed
in order to provide a technical background for the understanding of the actual
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occasion. The ultimate category is creativity. It is thought hy ‘Thitehead to
he similar to Aristotle’s primary substance and to Spinoza’s one great Substance.
It is also similar to Alexander’s Space-Time. For the puirpose of concreteness
in the discussion of the categories and concepts closely related thereto, the
chapter Includes a table of definitions derived from the categoreal scheme, and
also a set of graphic illustrations of the categoreal concepts. The effort is
made to clarify the concept of the actual occasion by observing how Whitehead
implements his categoreal scheme into the analysis of particular problems, e.g.,
space and time, causality, change and pemanence, continuity and atomicity, and
cosmic order. The result is a more conrqprehensive view of the actual occasion.
The problem of cosmic order is especially Involved in .Vhitehead’s discussion of
value. The theory of value appears to be a backdrop for most of the ideas pre-
sented in Whitehead’s philosophy of nature. A treatment of Whitehead’s theory
of value thus logically follows the discussion of his theory of nature.
The aolraal occasion in ’Whitehead’s theory of value is the problem of
chapter five. A conspicuous result of the investigation of this chapter is the
observation that Whitehead identifies actuality with value. Thus an actual oc-
casion (actual entity) is a value. Value is called by Whitehead the intrinsic
reality of an event. An activity of concern is a value. On the basis of these
statements it is said that for Whitehead value is objective as well as subjective.
•Whitehead expresses faith in the permanence of value by calling God an actual
entity rather than an actual occasion. The actual occasion is perpetually perish-
ing. By his refusal to call God an actual occasion Whitehead avoids the problem
contingent upon the application of the notion of perpetual perishing to the idea
of God. In Whitehead’s treatment of the manifold character of God we note that
God is a preserver of values.
In the sixth chapter there is an attempt to make more specific and penetrat-
ing some of the criticisms mentioned in the earlier portions of the treatise.
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These criticisms are brought together under the discussion of difficulties in
^fhitehead’s doctrine of the actual occasion. There is in iVhitehead*s doctrine
of creativity the difficulty of the relation of the abstract to the concrete actual
occasion. Another difficulty is the notion of the dlpolarity of the actual occasion.
By this theory Whitehead attempts to avoid bifurcation. The difficulty Involved
in Whitehead's distinction between the actual occasion and the actual entity comes
to a fucus in his refusal to call God an actual occasion. The notions of the per-
ishing and objectification of actual occasions reveal difficulties that inhere in
the notions of time, causality, novelty, and continuity. The notion of the super-
Ject has the virtue of exposing the weakness of the substantial! st view of the soul.
However, there lingers in vllhltehead's theory of the occasion as superject the notion
of the actuality of an entity having merely passive endurance. Another section of
this chapter is devoted to a treatment of reorganisations of thought suggested by
Whitehead’s doctrine of the actual occasion. It is pointed out that -Vhitehead's
en5)hasis on the wholeness of experience is in line with the tested results of gestalt
psychology. By the denial of sin5)le location ^Vhitehead transcends the old materialism.
Included in the critique are remarks on general agreements and disagreements
with Whitehead. The investigator agrees with Whitehead in making activity fundamen-
tal. By this technique Whitehead is able generally to avoid the weaknesses of a
aubstantialist philosophy. The writer's agreement with Whitehead extends to the
union of atomicity and continuity, the notion of the Ingression of eternal objects
in actual occasions, the protest against bifurcation, and the commitment to an es-
sentially em.plrloal approach. Disagreement is expressed relative to Whitehead 's
appeal to analogies between the mental and the physical. It is held that \7hito-
head’s generalizations at this point have only the status of probability. Further
disagreement with 'Whitehead is directed toward his tendency to conceive creativity
as a substratum. In this particular Whitehead’s theory is open to the interpreta-
tion of a neutral stuff. Such an Interpretation involves the abandonment of empirical
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method* Disagreement with .%itehead is oontlnned hy objecting to his notion of
the priority of experience over the experient. The suggested priority Involves
the ascribing of alms to vague feelings, or to feelings that give evidence of only
a slight degree of consciousness* Thus the teleological value of the organic
philosophy is reduced* Disagreement with Whitehead’s equating value and existence
is set forth on the ground that such an equating reduces Whitehead’s theory of
value primarily to a spatio-temporal concept*
The general critique contains a section in which is offered a final estimate
of the doctrine of the actual occasion. notwithstanding the difficulties dealt
with in the general scope of the analysis, it is held that the actual occasion is a
fairly consistent outcome from the basic structure of Whitehead’s thought* It is
also held that the doctrine of the adtual occasion, or some similarly comprehensive
doctrine, will be included in the philosophizing of all who seek to construct a
philosophy of nature upon the fhirly certain results of modem science*
The discussion of the problem of the dissertation is brought to a close in
chapter seven v&ich contains a suranairy and a statement of the conclusions arrived
at as a result of the investigation*
The main conclusions of this dissertation are presented in the following
arrangement of material:
1* Interpretative definitions of fundamental terms;
i* The actual occasion
An actual occasion is an ultimate metaphysical unit* It is 'White-
head’s measure of minimum actuality* The actual occasion is a monadic sentient
entity possessing the characteristics of immovableness (it is what it is, and where
it is), perpetual perishing (becoming), potentiality for divi8ion(ultimate limita-
tion), sx>atio- temporal extensiveness ( transcending simple location and having du-
ration), and dipolarity ( mental and physical)* As the measure of minimum actuality
the actual occasion is also the measure of minimum duration* In the being of the
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actml occasion becoming and perilling are conjoined. The actual occasion expresses
in the concrete whole of ite becoming a process of aiming at and achieving value.
ii. The aot\ial entity
Usually Whitehead treats actual occasions and actual entities as
synonymous. But there are exceptions, especially when grouping or social structure
is considered. In which the actual entity is an enduring object composed of actual
occasions. Hence, God in this sense is an actual entity, but not an actual occasion.
2, In his construction of the doctrine of the actual occasion Whitehead
arrives at a qualified realistic position. This realistic position is indicated
as follows:
i. Nature is a complex of prehensive (sentient) unifications. Each actual
occasion is a prehensive unification. iVhitehead calls this position provisional
realism. It suggests epistemological realism,
il. The notion of fluent energy replaces the notion of static stuff. The
actual occasion is a quantum of fluent energy. Because of the fluency of the energy
Whitehead calls this position organic realism. It suggests metaphysical realism.
3, Whitehead shows a definite tendency toward panpsychism in his doctrine
of the actual occasion,
i. Each actuality is composed of an occasion ( or occasions) of sentient
experience or feeling. There isgriidation in occasions of sentient experience
ranging from those having least discrimination in mode of feeling to those having
the greatest discrimination in conscious knowledge.
ii. The dipolarlty of each actual occasion illustrates the structure of
monadic feelings.
4, Whitehead’s tendency toward panpsychlsm is not clear cut, for
1. His idea of creativity perhaps supports the notion of a neutral stuff
as the ultimate ground of each psycho-physical occasion. The metaphysical nature
of creativity is obscurely treated. This obscurity rests mainly on its idealized
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detaohment from the concrete world of fact. Creativity ie of itself without
definite form or locus. It is a general metaphysical character (the universal
of universals) underlying all occasions. Thus Whitehead’s desire to maintain a
working union between creativity and the world of occasions loses some of its force
by the apparently ’non-actual ' status of creativity. However, Whitehead’s notion
of creativity as inseparable from its creatures saves the theory of creativity from
reduction to mere passive endurance, or to vacuous ’actuality.
ii. Whitehead’s appeal to analogies between the mental and the physical
gives jjanpsychlsm merely the status of probability. On the lower levels of actual
occasions (e.g. .those in so-called empty space) the probability of panpsychism is
least defensible.
5. The doctrine of the actual occasion is essential because without it
1. There would bo no measure of minimum actuality in Whitehead’s
philosophy. The ultimate creativity is no measure of minimum actuality because
it (the ultimate creativity) is merely the *non-actual’ condition of ^*fti%tever is
actual.
li. Whitehead would be without adequate defense against the doctrine
of substance and simple location.
(a) The essence of the actual occasion is its becoming. There
is thus no unchanging subject of change in the notion of the actual occasion.
Hence, the defense against substance.
(b) As a quantum of fluent energy the actual occasion is incapable
of reduction to an instantaneous configuration having absolute position. Hence,
the defense against simple location.
6. The notion of objectification contains vVhitehead’s argument for sequence
and interconnection in nature. The argument includes the following points?
i. There is mutual immanence of actual occasions. (ISitual Immanence
#
refers to the positive prehensive character of actualities.)
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ii, 3ach acttial occasion leaves an inheritance for its successor.
7. By the doctrine of the actual occasion Whitehead converts the opposition
"between mechanism and vitalism or teleology into a complementary relation.
8. Problems which Whitehead unsuccessfully proposes to solve by his doctrine
of the actual occasion:
i. The ultimate nature of the relation of the mental and the physical
(The notion of the dipolar! ty of the actual occasion suggests an indissoluble
relation.
)
li. The objectivity of value: by equating value with actuality, as in
the actual occasion, 7/hitehead*s theory is reduced primarily to a spatio-temporal
concept of value. The value significance of an eternal object refers to some
specific determination of fact.
9. Whitehead’s theory of the actual occasion as a superject (an experient as
the emergent of a sentient process) is xtnacceptable because
i. It falls to escape completely the notion of vacuous actuality (the
actuality of an entity having merely passive endurance). Every act\ial occasion
as a superject carries within itself some objectified preceding actual occasion.
As objectified this preceding actual occasion can have only a passive or fomal
endurance in its successor. There is consequently in every actual occasion a
content having passive endurance. Thus, with reference to a preceding occasion,
it may be said that no acttial occasion fully escapes the idea of vacuous actuality.
il. It weakens the teleological character of the organic philosophy by
ascribing the possession of alms to vague feelings or to feelings characterized by
only a negligible degree of consciousness.
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